


OLIN
BT
24
.B35
1901a
+



CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY



3 1924 096 083 443



The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

<http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924096083443>

St. Paul and the Roman Law

ST. PAUL
AND THE ROMAN LAW

AND

*OTHER STUDIES ON THE ORIGIN OF
THE FORM OF DOCTRINE*

BY

W. E. BALL, LL.D.

EDINBURGH
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET
1901



P R E F A C E

PRINTED BY
MORRISON AND OIRS LIMITED,
FOR
T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.
LONDON: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT, AND CO. LIMITED.
NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS.

It seems to be believed by some that the entire edifice of Christian theology came down from heaven ready-built, like the New Jerusalem in the vision of St. John: that the Catholie faith was born, not like its Founder, as a babe in a manger, but rather like fabled heathen deities, adult and panoplied: that the confessions of the Church are in substance coeval with Christianity itself.

According to another view, Christian doctrine, like man, was fashioned of earthly elements: not the outward frame but the informing spirit was divine. Our systems of divinity are but a compilation of the theories of hallowed thinkers in successive ages,—men who, however supernaturally directed, could only use the materials they had at hand, who were limited by the range of contemporary language and ideas, and who

gave utterance to their conceptions of religious truth in terms of the philosophy of their own time.

And if this second opinion be true, a study of the intellectual environment of the writers of the New Testament, and of the early Fathers, is necessary to a comprehension of the development of Christian theology. The following pages are designed to contribute in some small measure to this study, which has been too much neglected in the past, and is only beginning to receive the attention it deserves.

Of influences external to the Old Testament which have affected the form of Christian doctrine, the principal would seem to be Roman Law, Greek Philosophy, and the Uncanonical Scriptures of the Jewish Church.

The study of Roman Law has been generally regarded as so alien to the domain of divinity, that it has been wholly, or almost wholly, neglected by modern Biblical and theological students. And yet, perhaps, it may be said that there are inter-relations between all intellectual pursuits; and as Christianity unquestionably affected the substance and modified the theories of Roman jurisprudence, at any rate from the time of Constantine, so it may well be believed that Roman jurisprudence provided early Christian

teachers with language and modes of thought by means of which they might give expression to the truths they desired to propagate. Nor is the matter one of speculative interest only. Unless I am in error, a knowledge of Roman Law is of practical use for purposes of New Testament exegesis. If King James's bishops or the later Revisers had possessed it, fewer texts in the English Bible would have been confused and meaningless, and many pages of unilluminating commentary might have been dispensed with.

Again, the study of Greek Philosophy in its Alexandrian dress, from the days of Potamon downwards, has more than a mere abstract value. It throws valuable side-lights upon the writings of St. John and St. Paul; it serves to dispel some of the obscurity surrounding the earliest Christian heresies; and it supplies, perhaps, the best corrective to the modern theories of German theologians concerning the authority of the Fourth Gospel, which are based too exclusively upon literary criticism, and depend more on *à priori* reasoning than on historical research.

The interest attaching to the uncanonical books of the Jewish Church is of a somewhat different character. Some of them must have

formed part of the libraries of the Apostles and of the scribes and Pharisees ; some of them were written contemporaneously with the Gospels and the Epistles. Perhaps no author is fully understood until acquaintance has been made with the works he read and with the works which his contemporaries wrote. Those lovers of Shakespeare know him best who have traced the outlines of his dramas to the bald chronicles and idle Italian tales whose dross he transmuted into gold. Those are best able to measure his unapproachable excellence who are most familiar with the poets and dramatists of the age in which he lived. This bright particular star in the firmament of genius is seen to most advantage amid the lesser lights of the constellation in which he shone. Even the best in literature and art of a particular period may receive interpretation from that which is inferior. And the Hebrew uncanonical Scriptures, even if they were intrinsically worthless, would possess a critical value, as completing our knowledge of the religious lore which the first teachers of Christianity assimilated, and as portraying the mental attitude and exhibiting the literary methods of un-Christianised Jewish thinkers in the age of Christ and the Apostles.

So far as these uncanonical writings can be shown to have been quoted by New Testament writers, or to have coloured their language, or to have affected the form of the doctrines of the Church, it must be admitted that questions arise which hardly suggest themselves in connection with the influence of such entirely secular and extraneous systems as Roman Law and Alexandrian philosophy. It may be accepted that St. John in using the language of the Alexandrian schools, and St. Paul in using that of the Roman Law, were merely employing a convenient vehicle of thought. No one could suppose that St. John was giving an apostolic imprimatur to the philosophy either of Plato or Philo Judæus, or that St. Paul was lending a religious sanction to Prætorian Equity. But the use of uncanonical Scripture by canonical writers is a different matter. Does the inspiration of the inspired writer extend to his quotations ? Is any inference to be drawn as to the inspiration, or the authority, or the authenticity of the work cited ? Perhaps the answer of Origen to those who raised like questions in his day may be found sufficient. " Possibly," says he, " the Apostles and Evangelists, full of the Holy Ghost, knew what

should be taken out of those (apocryphal) Scriptures, and what not." In other words, inspiration may consist in the divinely directed appropriation of the language and even of the religious theories of uninspired writers. But if it be thought that Origen's answer is insufficient, if it be shown that there are cases in which uncanonical Scripture is quoted in the New Testament as authoritative and inspired, still the problem which is raised is of precisely the same character as that which is raised by New Testament quotations of the Old Testament itself; for the writers of the New Testament make use of the Septuagint translation, notwithstanding its undoubted errors, in such a way as to suggest that they regarded it as of equal authority with the Massoretic text.

The greater part of Chapters I., II., and III., on "St. Paul and the Roman Law," appeared in the *Contemporary Review* in August 1891. Chapters VII. and VIII., on "St. John and Philo Judæus," appeared substantially in their present shape in the same review in March 1898.

TEMPLER, October 15, 1901.

CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
I. ST. PAUL AND THE ROMAN LAW	1
II. ST. PAUL AND THE ROMAN LAW (<i>continued</i>)	13
III. ST. PAUL AND THE ROMAN LAW (<i>continued</i>)	29
IV. ROMAN LAW IN THE FORMULARIES OF THE CHURCH	38
V. ROMAN LAW IN ANTE-NICENE THEOLOGY	52
VI. ROMAN LAW IN ANTE-NICENE THEOLOGY (<i>continued</i>)	71
VII. ST. JOHN AND PHILO JUDÆUS	95
VIII. ST. JOHN AND PHILO JUDÆUS (<i>continued</i>)	117
IX. NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION OF CANONICAL SCRIPTURE	134
X. NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION OF DEUTERO-CANONICAL SCRIPTURE	148
XI. NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION OF UNCANONICAL SCRIPTURE	159
XII. NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION OF UNCANONICAL SCRIPTURE (<i>continued</i>)	185

that he was a Roman citizen. In his time the citizenship of Rome was much more than a mere social distinction. It was accompanied by incidents which affected every relation of life. In the routine of business, in the making of contracts, in the payment of taxes, in the commonest details of domestic management, in the whole field of litigation, in testamentary dispositions and the succession to inheritances, the Roman citizen was confronted with technical distinctions between his position and that of the Roman subject who had not received the franchise. It was impossible for a man's citizenship to remain an unnoticed element in his daily life. At that period there existed no professional class corresponding to the modern solicitor, for the jurisconsults were rather professors than practitioners of law. To the private citizen some considerable knowledge of law was more than an advantage: it was almost a necessity.

The Roman people had an innate genius for law. The science of jurisprudence was the only intellectual pursuit in which they discovered the highest order of excellence. With her fine faculty for assimilating her conquests to herself, Rome spread her passion for the study of law wherever she imposed her yoke. The inhabi-

ants of distant provinces came to rival the Italians themselves as masters of their national science. At a period not long after the death of Paul, Gaius, who like him was a native of Asia Minor, became the greatest jurist of the age.

Already, before the close of the Republic, the Roman law, once an intricate maze of technicality, had been profoundly modified by that Praetorian equity which was destined to transform it into a symmetrical and philosophical system. And in the reign of Augustus a school of lawyers had arisen whose genius and enlightenment gave no uncertain promise of that meridian brilliance of jurisprudence which illuminated the epoch of the Antonines. The Augustan age of literature prepared the way for the Augustan age of law.

Judea, although conquered by Rome, was never Romanised. It was occupied by Roman soldiery and governed by Roman officials; but it was never colonised by Roman citizens or subjected to Roman law. It was otherwise generally throughout the Roman world; and it is not until we call to mind how closely the Roman law affected the daily life of the great mass of the subjects of the empire, and how

deeply the study of jurisprudence imbued their minds and coloured their ideas, that we obtain an adequate sense of the forcefulness of many of St. Paul's allusions, or duly appreciate the appropriateness of some of his lines of argument to the spirit of the age in which he lived, or discern that some of the doctrines of the faith have assumed the form in which they have come down to us, from the accident—if in such a connection we may speak of accidents—of this Apostle's status and education.

Of all distinctively Pauline phraseology, perhaps the metaphor which enshrines the most important truths, and which has become most thoroughly incorporated in the language at once of theology and devotion, is that of adoption. The word is so far naturalised in the vocabulary of religion that we hardly recognise it as a metaphor at all. Adoption, as we know it in English life, is a comparatively rare social incident. It has no place in our laws, and can scarcely be said to have any definite place in our customs. Among the Jews adoption was hardly even a social incident, and in a juridic sense it was absolutely unknown. The family records of the chosen people were kept with scrupulous care, in order that the lineage of

the Deliverer might be identified. Fictitious kinship could manifestly find no recognition in Hebrew genealogies. Amongst the Romans, however, adoption was a familiar social phenomenon, and much more. Its initial ceremonies and its incidents occupied a large and important place in their law.

By adoption under the Roman law an entire stranger in blood was admitted into a family exactly as though he had been born into it. He became identified with the family in a higher sense than some who had the family blood in their veins, than emancipated sons or descendants through females. He assumed the family name, partook in its mystic sacrificial rites, and became, not on sufferance or at will, but to all intents and purposes, a member of the house of his adoption: nor could the tie thus formed be broken save through the ceremony of emancipation. Adoption was what was called in law a *capitis deminutio*, which so far annihilated the pre-existing personality of the individual who underwent it that during many centuries it operated as an extinction of his debts.¹ But

¹ This would only apply when the person adopted (or *arrogated*, as the phrase would be in this case) was *sui juris*. If not *sui juris*, he could in strict law have no debts.

the most striking illustration of the manner in which the law regarded relationship by adoption is to be seen in the fact that it constituted as complete a bar to intermarriage as relationship by blood.

St. Paul is the only one of the sacred writers who makes use of the metaphor of adoption. Nor is it the word only which is peculiar to him, but also the idea. This metaphor was his translation into the language of Gentile thought of Christ's great doctrine of the New Birth. "Except a man be born again he cannot see the Kingdom of God": this was the most vital, and at the same time the most difficult, teaching of the Messiah; this was the doctrine of spiritual initiation into that spiritual kingdom which Christ came into the world to found. St. Paul exchanges the physical metaphor of regeneration for the legal metaphor of adoption. The adopted person became in the eye of the law a new creature. He was born again into a new family. By the aid of this figure the Gentile convert was enabled to realise in a vivid manner the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of the faithful, the obliteration of past penalties, the right to the mystic inheritance. He was enabled to realise that upon this spiritual act

"old things passed away, and all things became new."

St. Paul's use of the metaphor of adoption has no doubt exercised a wide influence upon the form of dogma. It is intimately connected with the doctrine of Assurance. This doctrine is principally founded upon Romans viii. 14-16. In this passage, as elsewhere, the Third Person in the Trinity is represented in the character of a witness. The reference is to the legal ceremony of adoption. The common form of adoption was singularly dramatic. It consisted of the ancient and venerated conveyance "with the scales and brass," followed by a fictitious law-suit. The proceedings took place in the presence of seven witnesses. The ceremonial sale and re-sale, and the final "vindication" or claim, were accompanied by the utterance of legal formulae. Upon the words used depended whether the ceremony amounted to the sale of a son into slavery or his adoption into a new family. The touch of the *festuca* or ritual wand might be accompanied by the words, "I claim this man as my son"; or it might be accompanied by the words, "I claim this man as my slave." The form of sale into bondage was almost undistinguishable from the form of

adoption. It was the spirit which was different. It was the function of the witnesses to testify that the transaction was in truth the adoption of a child. The adopter, it may be supposed, has died: the adopted son claims the inheritance; but his claim is disputed and his status as a son is denied. Litigation ensues. "After the ceremony with the scales and brass," declares the plaintiff, "the deceased claimed me by the name of son. From that time forward he treated me as a member of his family. I called him father, and he allowed it. It is true, I served him; but it was not the service of a slave but of a child. I sat at his table, where the slaves never sat. He told me the inheritance was mine." But the law requires corroborative evidence. One of the seven witnesses is called. "I was present," he says, "at the ceremony. It was I who held the scales and struck them with the ingot of brass. It was an adoption. I heard the words of the vindication, and I say this person was claimed by the deceased, not as a slave but as a son."

"Ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God; and if children, then heirs."

This text is sometimes quoted as though the witness of the Divine Spirit were addressed to the human spirit. A glance at the original Greek is sufficient to show that what is referred to is a coincidence of testimony,—the joint witness of the Holy Ghost and the soul of the believer to the same spiritual fact. A little further on in Romans viii. there is another reference to adoption—

"Even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body" (Rom. viii. 23).

Some commentators have found it difficult to harmonise this passage with that above quoted, in which the spirit of adoption is spoken of as already received and the witness of the Holy Ghost as a present fact. The conjecture is put forward that the resurrection is referred to as constituting a new and different kind of adoption. But I do not understand St. Paul in this sense. After describing the adoption of the believer into the family of God, with reference (as I have suggested) to the formalities prescribed by law in cases of secular adoption, the Apostle intimates (ver. 19) that the sons of God although adopted into His family are not yet manifested. In ver. 23 it is plainly this manifestation which is

referred to. The word *νιοθεσία* used by St. Paul is the Greek equivalent of the Latin *adoptio*; but *νιοθεσία* means literally "the placing in the position of a son." This literal signification of the word allows of its use in a somewhat more elastic sense than *adoptio*. It may refer to the ceremony by which a person is placed in the position of a son; or it may refer to some later act by which the adopted person is manifested as such, and "placed in the position of a son" in the eyes of all. The words "redemption of the body" (*τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν*) should, I think, be translated "release from the body." Ver. 23, therefore, may be rendered, "Even we groan within ourselves, waiting for that placing in the position of sons which will be accomplished by our release from the flesh." What is meant is not a new adoption, but a manifestation of the adoption already referred to. Released from the flesh, the adopted believer is taken home to his father's house, and his adoption is consummated by public acknowledgment and recognition.

Very similar to the language of Romans viii. 15, 16 is that of Galatians iv. 4-7—

"God sent forth His Son . . . to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons.

And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. Wherefore thou art no more a servant, but a son; and if a son, an heir of God through Christ."

Here, again, adoption is contrasted with bondage. Before the sending forth of the Son, Israel was under the dominion of the Mosaic Law. Christ is represented as an *Adsortor libertatis*, setting the chosen people free in order that they might receive the adoption of sons. And, according to the A.V., the bold word of Romans viii. 17 is repeated, and the believer pronounced to be "an heir of God." The R.V., however, has adopted a supposed emendation of the Greek text, and in it the passage reads, "and if a son, an heir *through* God." The analogy of Romans viii. 17 should have pleaded strongly in favour of retaining the Greek text on which the A.V. was founded. The phrase "an heir through God" seems meaningless in any juridical sense, and cannot, I think, have been used by Paul.

In one celebrated passage St. Paul seems to substitute the idea of the new birth for that of adoption in stating the basis of the believer's heirship. In Titus iii. 5 "washing of regeneration" is said to be "poured out upon us," that we "might be made heirs." This text seems to

show clearly the identity of the spiritual facts described under the names of adoption and regeneration. It is also interesting as affording the chief foundation for the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. It is certain that this doctrine has very early patristic authority in its favour. In the office of baptism there is one portion of great antiquity, which may perhaps owe its form to the belief of early Christianity upon this point. No one can say with any degree of certainty whether the signature with the cross is a genuinely primitive practice; but there is no doubt that it is a very ancient practice. This symbolic act, accompanied by the words, "We receive this child (or person) into the congregation of Christ's flock," bears a striking resemblance to the vindication, or claim, with the *festuca* in the ceremony of adoption. If it be true that adoption was the rendering into the vernacular of Gentile thought of the doctrine of Regeneration, and if regeneration was understood to result from, or at least to be coincident with, baptism, it would not be unnatural that something of the symbolism of secular adoption should be imported into the first liturgical services into which the simple rite of immersion or aspersion was expanded.

CHAPTER II

ST. PAUL AND THE ROMAN LAW (*contd.*)

THE metaphor of the spiritual inheritance is peculiarly, though not exclusively, Pauline. St. Peter employs it twice and St. James once, but St. Paul in a multitude of instances: it is closely interwoven with the substance of the longest and most intricate arguments in his Epistles; it appears in the reports of his sermons in the Acts of the Apostles; he alone of all the sacred writers employs it in what may be described as the most daring of all theological conceptions, —that which is embodied in the definition of believers as "heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ."

It may be urged that in his use of the metaphor of inheritance St. Paul is merely drawing upon the common stock of illustrations derived from the facts of ordinary life, without reference to any specific legal theories. But such a

metaphor cannot be used, nor can its full significance be appreciated, without reference to specific legal theories. Take, for instance, the phrase just quoted. If we were not so thoroughly familiar with the description of the faithful as "heirs of God," would not this expression strike us as peculiarly forced and unhappy? If these words had not been used by St. Paul, would any modern divine have ventured to use them as explanatory of the relation between God and the human soul? To our minds heirship involves no more than the idea of the acquisition of property by succession, and the idea of succession is manifestly inapplicable with reference to the eternal God. That the heirship to which St. Paul alludes is Roman and not Hebrew heirship is evident, not merely from the accompanying reference to adoption, but also from the fact that it is a joint and equal heirship. In the Hebrew law the right of primogeniture existed in a modified form, closely resembling the ancient custom of Normandy, which still obtains in our own Channel Islands. In Roman law all "unemancipated" children succeeded equally to the property of a deceased father upon his intestacy.

The whole complex and voluminous system of

Roman inheritance depends upon a remarkable theory of indissoluble unity between the heir and his ancestor. "The notion was that though the physical person of the deceased had perished his legal personality survived and descended unimpaired to his heir or co-heirs, in whom his identity (so far as the law was concerned) was continued."¹ "The testator lived on in his heir, or in the group of his co-heirs. He was in law the same person with them."² "In pure Roman jurisprudence the principle that a man lives on in his heir—the *elimination, so to speak, of the fact of death*—is too obviously, for mistake, the centre round which the whole law of testamentary and intestate succession is circling."³ Sir Henry Maine explains this idea by reference to the period when the family, and not the individual, was the "unit of society." "The prolongation of a man's legal existence in his heir, or in a group of co-heirs, is neither more nor less than a characteristic of the family transferred by a fiction to the individual."⁴

In English law there is a well-known maxim, *Nemo est heres viventis*, but this was no principle of Roman law. The moment a child was

¹ Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 181.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

born he was his father's heir. The word *heres* originally means "lord" or proprietor. The namesake of the Apostle, Paul the Jurist, who lived in the third century after Christ, observes that there is a species of co-partnership in the family property between a father and his children. "When, therefore," says he, "the father dies, it is not so correct to say that they succeed to his property as that they acquire the free control of their own." This inchoate partnership of an unemancipated son in his father's possessions, and his close identification with his person, may be regarded as some set-off against the quasi-servitude of his position under the formidable *patria potestas*.

In the light of the theories of Roman jurisprudence this great Pauline metaphor loses its apparent incongruity and acquires a sublimer meaning. Instead of the death of the ancestor being essentially connected with the idea of inheritance, we find this circumstance "eliminated." The heir has not to wait for the moment of his father's decease. In and through his father he is already a participator in the family possessions. The father does not die, but lives on for ever in his family. Physically absent, he is spiritually present, not *with* so much as

in his children. In this phrase, "the heirs of God," there is presented a most vivid conception of the intimate and eternal union between the believer and God, and of the faithful soul's possession in present reality, and not merely in anticipation, of the Kingdom of God on earth and in heaven.

St. Paul's references to the spiritual "inheritance" in the Roman sense are frequently rendered more obscure by the introduction of allusions to the Roman *Will*. The word *διαθήκη*, which in the A.V. is sometimes translated "covenant" and sometimes "testament" or will, occurs thirty-three times in the New Testament. Three of the Evangelists employ the word in their report of our Lord's sacramental declaration, "This is the blood of the new testament." Here, of course, it is no more than the translation into Greek of the original Aramaic spoken by Christ. The word also occurs once in the Apocalypse, and, with three exceptions, it is exclusively used by St. Paul; that is, assuming that he was the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The double meaning of the word *διαθήκη* has occasioned both translators and commentators extreme difficulty. This may be seen particu-

larly in the mass of exegetical literature which deals with the argument concerning the two covenants or two testaments in chapters vii., viii., and ix. of the Epistle to the Hebrews. According to our notions, there is such a complete difference between a covenant (or contract) and a testament (or will) that the interchangeability of the words produces confusion of thought. In the R.V., in order to avoid this confusion, *διαθήκη* is always translated covenant in the three chapters referred to, except in Hebrews ix. 16, 17, where from an obvious necessity the word "testament" is retained. Another perplexity arises from the intermingling in these chapters of a discussion concerning the priesthood of Christ with the discussion concerning the covenants or testaments. I think that some explanation of these difficulties may be found in the Roman Law of Will-making. It need hardly be said that St. Paul, in any metaphor based upon will-making, could only refer to the Roman will. "To the Romans belongs pre-eminently the credit of inventing the will."¹ "It is doubtful whether a true power of testation was known to any original society except the Roman."² The laws of Solon permitted the

¹ Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 194.

² *Ibid.*, p. 196.

disposal of property by will only upon a failure of descendants. The Rabbinical will, introduced at a late period of Jewish history and directly based upon the Roman model, was only admissible upon failure of all the kindred entitled under the Mosaic Law. The double meaning of the word *διαθήκη* is explained by the circumstance that the Roman will was in its origin actually a contract *inter vivos*; and that in the time of St. Paul it retained, in general usage, the form of a contract.

Originally the testator *in articulo mortis* sold his estate or "family" to the person whom he wished to be his heir. A nominal price was paid. There were present the scale-holder, who weighed out, or purported to weigh out, the purchase-money, five witnesses to testify to the transaction, and the intended heir himself, who was called *emptor familiæ*, or purchaser of the estate. The ceremony, in its essential features, remained the same in the time of St. Paul, and for many centuries later. The *Prætorian* or written will, already employed in the first century, was only an alternative form, and is thought to have been comparatively little used. But long before the time of St. Paul some important modifications had taken place.

The ceremony was not deferred until the last moments of life. It had become rather a contract to deliver than an out-and-out sale. The *emptor familiæ* was no longer the heir himself, but (to use the language of modern English law) a "bare trustee," through whom the estate passed to the persons intended to be benefited; and the testator at the time of the fictitious sale gave verbal directions (*nuncupatio*) as to the destination of his property.

I must confess that I have read many commentaries on Hebrews vii., viii., and ix. without being yet able entirely to understand the argument. But I think the ground will be found to have been cleared of the most serious difficulties if two points are borne in mind.

First, the writer, so far as he refers to a will or testament, refers to it *in its contractual aspect merely*. The idea of succession is ignored.

Secondly, both the Old Covenant with Abraham and his seed, and the New Covenant with Christian believers, *consisted of the promise of an inheritance*.

I need not, perhaps, elaborate the first point, but the second requires a few observations.

The covenant with Abraham consisted prin-

cipally of the promise that he should be the father of many nations, and that in him should all the families of the earth be blessed. And I think that wherever the Old Covenant is referred to by St. Paul or the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, this promise is connoted, if it is not explicitly referred to. Now this promise, no less than the possession of Canaan, was the "inheritance" of Israel. It was so expressly regarded by St. Paul, who speaks of "the promise made to Abraham that he should be heir of the world" (Rom. iv. 13). But, as we have seen, a promise to a man that he should be heir exactly expresses what was meant in the time of St. Paul by a will or testament. St. Paul was not the first to use the word *διαθήκη* with reference to the Old Covenant. The Seventy had done so in their translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek. There are other words in the Greek language to express a contract. The word *διαθήκη* means a contract of a solemn or formal character; and no doubt it came to be applied to the "mancipatory" will, because that was the most solemn and formal as well as the most comprehensive of contracts. It is likely that the Seventy were led to use this particular word with reference to the Abra-

hamic covenant because they realised that what was covenanted was an inheritance.

I need hardly insist that the New Covenant also had reference to an inheritance. If St. Paul spoke of the Old Covenant as "the promise made to Abraham that he should be heir of the world," so also the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews spoke of the New Covenant as "the promise of an eternal inheritance" (Heb. ix. 15).

From these observations it will appear that the word *διαθήκη* may be uniformly translated covenant, if it be borne in mind that the covenant relates to an inheritance; and that it may be uniformly translated testament, if it be borne in mind that what is referred to is the contract by which the testament is made.

The most difficult of all the passages in which the word *διαθήκη* occurs is that contained in Hebrews ix. 15-17—

"15. And for this cause He is the Mediator of the new testament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance.

"16. For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be the death of the testator.

"17. For a testament is of force after men are dead: otherwisc it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth."

In the R.V. the word covenant is substituted for testament in verse 15; but the word testament is retained in verses 16 and 17.

In this passage, at first sight, the idea of succession does seem to be introduced into the metaphor of the divine testament. It is through a death that the promise of the spiritual inheritance is to be received; and the analogy is pointed to the death of a testator. But, even here, I think it will appear on closer examination that it is solely in a contractual aspect that the divine testament is regarded.

The death spoken of in verse 15 is obviously the death of Christ. But Christ is not the testator who makes the new testament; He is the Mediator, that is, the intermediary between the testator and those who are to receive the inheritance.

The passage is highly rhetorical, and the sequence of thought is not altogether plain; but if the context be studied, it will be seen that the point which the writer desires to make is that death is necessarily associated with the covenantal promises of God. The old testament was ratified by the slaughter of victims; the new testament was ratified by the death of Christ. Although God does not die, and

there can be no succession to Him, nevertheless no testament can avail without a death. In the case of mortal man it is the death of the testator which gives the testament its operative force. But the testaments of God require another sanction. They become operative by the death of Him whose merits procured them, presfigured on sacrificial altars or endured in actual fact.

The word *μεστης*, or mediator, is probably borrowed from Philo-Judeus. It was one of the epithets applied by him to the Word, to indicate His function as the intermediary between God and man. The phrase "Mediator of the new testament" may have been suggested by the position of the *empor familiæ* at the period when he was no longer a beneficial heir, but a person who formally intervened between the testator and the person who was designated to receive the inheritance. The *empor familiæ* was at this period still in theory the "purchaser of the family"; and it was probably upon him that the duty of performing the family *saera* still in the first instance devolved. And this last-mentioned circumstance may serve in some measure to explain the association of the functions ascribed to

Christ as priest with those ascribed to Him as Mediator of the new testament. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews insists that as the old testament involved the services of a priesthood to offer sacrifices, so the new testament involved the intercessory office of Christ as both priest and victim. Now, in Roman law, inheritance was indelibly associated with sacerdotal functions. The heir, whether by will or by descent, was a hierophant. The institution of will-making itself is supposed to have been due to the extraordinary horror with which the heathen Roman contemplated the neglect at his decease of those obsequies which were the first and most important function of the heir, and which no other person might perform. But the duty of the heir was not limited to the observance of funeral rites. The death of the head of a family was, as has been pointed out, in a measure ignored. He was supposed to preside in spirit over the destiny of his representatives. His image was retained in the household. It was for the heir to keep up the communication, so to speak, between the departed and the survivors. It was for him to propitiate the *manes* of the deceased and to secure his tutelary aid.

Ancestor-worship is supposed by some to have been the origin of all religion. The Christian may rather find in this practice some pathetic reminiscence of a purer primeval faith, and trace in the idea of the Godhood of the Father some dim survival of the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. The sacerdotal aspect of inheritance only disappeared with the prevalence of Christianity.

The Praetorian will has been mentioned as affording already in the time of St. Paul an alternative to the more ordinary or "mancipatory" will. In the Praetorian will the ceremony with the scales and bronze was dispensed with: the testator's directions, instead of being verbally delivered, were reduced to writing, and fastened up by the seals of seven witnesses. The seven witnesses represented the five witnesses of the older form, together with the scale-holder and the *empor familiæ*. The seals served the double purpose of securing secrecy and providing a means of authentication. This species of will was the first and only instrument known to the Roman law which required sealing. There is probably a reference to the Praetorian will in Ephesians i. 13, 14—

"In whom, having also believed, ye were sealed with the Holy Ghost of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession, to the praise of His glory" (R.V.).

As translated, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign any precise meaning to this passage. It should rather be rendered—

"In whom, having also believed, ye were sealed *with the Holy Spirit of testimony*, which is an earnest of our inheritance, until the *ransoming accomplished by the act of taking possession* (of the inheritance), to the praise of His glory."

Here, as elsewhere, the Holy Spirit is referred to as a witness. It is His seal which authenticates the will by which we obtain the inheritance. This spiritual inheritance, as in other passages, is referred to by St. Paul as succeeding upon a state of bondage. When a slave was appointed heir, although expressly emancipated by the will which gave him the inheritance, his freedom commenced not upon the making of the will, nor even immediately upon the death of the testator, but from the moment when he took certain legal steps, which were described as "entering upon the inheritance." This is "*the ransoming accomplished by the act of taking possession*." In the last

words of the passage—"to the praise of His glory"—there is an allusion to a well-known Roman custom. The emancipated slaves who attended the funeral of their emancipator were the praise of his glory. Testamentary emancipation was so fashionable a form of posthumous ostentation, the desire to be followed to the grave by a crowd of freedmen wearing the "cap of liberty" was so strong, that, very shortly before the time when St. Paul wrote, the legislature had expressly limited the number of slaves that an owner might manumit by will.

CHAPTER III

ST. PAUL AND THE ROMAN LAW (*contd.*)

THERE is one passage in the writings of St. Paul which relates to the law of guardianship in connection with the law of inheritance, and which possesses some points of peculiar interest—

"The heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a servant, though he is lord of all; but is under tutors and governors (R.V. guardians and stewards) until the time appointed by the father" (Gal. iv. 1, 2).

This passage refers to the guardianship of orphans under an age which, for practical purposes, may be stated as fourteen. The expression "until the time appointed by the father" would be better rendered "until the time of the father's appointing," *i.e.* the period over which the father's power of appointing a guardian extended. This period

was arbitrarily fixed, and could not be extended by the father's testamentary directions. The "guardian" was the "tutor" of Roman law—that is, the protector of his person and estate. The "steward" was generally the slave of the guardian, appointed by him when necessary, as a bailiff to manage some distant portion of the infant's property. Tutelage was a device for artificially prolonging the *patria potestas*, notwithstanding the decease of the father. The text has sometimes been regarded as applying to a child whose father was living. But this is obviously an error. The *filius familias*, so long as he remained a *filius familias*—that is, so long as his father lived—was not less in the condition of a bond-servant at forty than at fourteen.

The chapter commencing with the passage which has been quoted, and the chapter preceding it, abound in legal allusion and legal argument, into the detail of which it is not necessary to enter here. The problem to which St. Paul is addressing himself in this and other parts of his writings is one which evidently caused no little perplexity amongst Christian converts. Christianity was in effect the substitution of what St. Paul calls the "Law of

Faith," or, more shortly, "Faith," for the Ceremonial Law. Current speculations enable us to grasp, more readily than those to whom St. Paul addressed himself, the idea of an evolution, so to speak, from the Law of Moses to the Law of Christ. We may recognise a development of spirituality in the supersession of Ceremony by Faith. But the early convert remembered that the reign of Ceremony had itself superseded a previous reign of Faith. There was Faith, as St. Paul so earnestly insists, before the Law. The progress of religion between the age of Abraham and the age of Christ was a progress "from faith to faith." Now, if the Law of Faith were a sufficient religious rule, how came it to have been superseded at all? Did not the very fact of the imposition of the Ceremonial Law imply its necessity, or at least its superiority, to the simpler form of religion which preceded it?

St. Paul is fond of personification, but his personifications are not poetical but legal. In his argument he figures the Jewish nation as a child, who was heir to the inheritance of Abraham. The Mosaic Law is a guardian appointed to protect the infancy of the nation,

and to train it for the period when, in the fulness of time, it should enter upon the inheritance. This inheritance is the advent of the Messiah. But although upon the advent of the Messiah the period of tutelage is past and the inheritance entered upon, the child—still a child—is not left without protecting care, for he gives himself in adoption to God, and is received into the family of the great Father; and whereas he was formerly but the heir of Abraham, he now becomes, by a new and better title, an “heir of God through Christ.” The result of the whole argument is that the Law of Faith is the law of the family. It was the law of patriarchal households, and it is to be the law of the new and mystic household—“the household of faith.”

The life of the patriarch was solitary. He dwelt apart from men, surrounded only by his family and servants: to these he was the only lawgiver and the only priest. Duty towards God was unencumbered with ceremonial observances. Duty towards man needed no elaboration in specific rules. A ritual law would have been as much out of place in the primitive family as a civil law. The simple principles of affection and faith were a sufficient substitute for both.

The imposition of the Law of Moses was coincident with the transition of the children of Israel into nationhood. When the family develops into a tribe, and the tribe expands into a nation, affection is no longer a sufficient rule of conduct between individuals. The paternal authority is superseded by custom, and custom is consolidated into codes of law. Worship becomes national and public, and the head of the family relinquishes the functions of the priesthood to a consecrated order. The home is replaced by the society; and all this is in itself an explanation of the Dispensation of Discipline. But Christ’s mission was to restore the family, not by disintegrating society, but by comprehending it. All men were to become brethren, and all the sons of God. The purpose of the law was accomplished. The training of the long-orphaned nation was complete, and the reign of Faith was restored.

The supersession of the Law of Moses by the Law of Faith is the subject of a very long and very elaborate argument in the Epistle to the Romans. Among Hebrew and Gentile converts alike the question had arisen, what law of religious observance and conduct was henceforward to be observed. Our Lord was not

ostensibly a legislator. He did not explicitly enact a code, or formulate a system of church government. Even after the faith had been accepted, the believer might not at once, or readily, perceive that the faith involved and comprehended a code; that Christ's life was in itself a law; that His precepts were the summary of a spiritualised jurisprudence; that, in truth, the epoch in divine government had arrived for discarding detailed rules of conduct and ritual, and their replacement by great principles, the particular application of which was reserved for the forum of the individual conscience. It was not easily apprehended that it was in this sense that Christ had come, not to destroy, but to fulfil the law. Moreover, much of that part of the Mosaic Law which related to civil matters was, prior to the destruction of Jerusalem, still the common law of Judea.

It is worthy of notice that at the period when St. Paul wrote, and for some time previously, Roman jurisprudence had been deeply engaged with a problem analogous to that which perplexed the early Church.

The Roman Republic was as exclusive in its spirit as the Jewish theocracy. The ancient

Quiritarian law, elaborately ceremonial in its character, was regarded as the peculiar heritage of the Roman citizen. Foreigners were jealously excluded from participating in its benefits. A separate system and separate tribunals were established for those who were outside the pale of citizenship, very much as in the temple at Jerusalem an outer court was provided for Gentile worshippers. Every student of Roman law knows how this subsidiary system, distinguished for its extreme simplicity, and based on reason instead of immemorial usage, was gradually brought into competition with the old Quiritarian jurisprudence, and finally in all material points superseded it. Originally disliked and despised, the Prætorian law, by means in part of the influence of the Stoical philosophy, came to be the object of peculiar admiration. It was regarded as the Law of Nature, restored from the Golden Age; it was lauded by the name of Equity.

What the Prætorian law was to the Quiritarian law, the law of Christ was to the law of Moses. Like the Prætorian law, the law of Christ was characterised by its simplicity. It consisted of the great principles which underlay the rigid rules and forms of the Mosaic

code. What the Prætorian law was conceived to be by current speculation, that the law of Christ actually was—a law of millennial perfection. During the first century, the law schools of the Roman Empire resounded with discussions concerning the origin and nature of Prætorian Equity, and the degree and manner in which it ought to replace the Quiritarian law. In the light of these judicial controversies we may see some explanation both of the nature of the difficulty which beset the early Church, and of the method of reasoning which the Apostle adopts in dealing with it.

Further illustrations might be adduced of metaphors and lines of argument in the writings of St. Paul which appear to be derived from the Roman law. St. Paul is perhaps of all writers, either ancient or modern, the most difficult to understand. It cannot be that his obscurity is deliberate. It is due chiefly, no doubt, to our ignorance of the intellectual atmosphere of the age in which he lived. It is not suggested that a study of the Roman law as it existed in the first century will afford an explanation of all the perplexing passages in which the Pauline Epistles abound;

but it is certain that no satisfactory commentary upon these Epistles will ever be produced except by an author who, in addition to other qualifications, is a thorough master of the history of civil jurisprudence.

CHAPTER IV

ROMAN LAW IN THE FORMULARIES OF
THE CHURCH

I HAVE said that there is one portion of the office of Baptism which bears some analogy to the final act of the ceremony of Adoption, and which may have been suggested by it. However that may be, there is another portion of the office in question which bears unmistakable traces of the influence of Roman jurisprudence. That part of the Baptismal Service which assumes the form of a covenant has been unquestionably framed upon the pattern of the Roman *stipulatio*. In the English Service the part referred to consists of four covenantal questions and responses, beginning with: "Dost thou renounce the devil and all his works?" The second question consists of the Creed put in an interrogative form. In the most ancient liturgies each article of the Creed is placed in a

38

separate interrogatory, with a separate response. The third question and answer constitute the acceptance of baptism in "this faith." The fourth question and answer, taken together, constitute the vow of obedience to the commandments of God. Here it is to be observed that the person exacting the several undertakings is the person who puts them into shape: he summarises them in the form of interrogations. The person undertaking the several obligations expresses his assent in a short answer. In the first, second, and fourth answers he does so in the very word in which the question is put to him. The engagement, so to speak, is looked upon from the point of view of the promisee, and not from that of the promisor. These were the characteristics, as every student of Roman law is aware, of the *stipulatio*, a venerable form of contract to which, although made by word of mouth, there attached much of the peculiar efficacy which in our law attaches to contracts made by deed.¹ But there is other evidence in favour of the derivation of this part of the Bap-

¹ It need hardly be said that the terms of an agreement were arranged by the process of chaffering or bargaining before they were reduced to the form of a *stipulatio*. If the contract were bilateral, it would be constituted by two *stipulationes*, the *sponsor* in the first becoming the *stipulator* in the second. From

tismal Service from the *stipulatio* besides analogy of form. The formal question of the *stipulatio* originally might only be put and answered by the use of the words *Spondes?* *Spondeo*. Hence the person making the promise was called the *sponsor*, just as the person exacting it was called the *stipulator*. And although in course of time other words indicating a promise were admitted as of equal validity with *spondeo*, nevertheless the person entering into an engagement by the contract of *stipulation* was always technically known as *sponsor*. The word *sponsor* figures prominently in the office of Baptism of Infants. The name has been commonly taken to imply suretyship, and is referred to as bearing that meaning in the Post-Baptismal Service (which, however, dates only from the year 1552). And it is true that the word *sponsor* was frequently used to signify a surety, from the circumstance that the contract of suretyship was often made by means of the *stipulatio*. But in the office of Baptism the god-parents do not purport to undertake any contract of suretyship. The name *sponsor* was no doubt originally em-
the time that writing became a common accomplishment, it was usual for the parties to draw up and sign a memorandum of a contract by *stipulatio*; but this was for evidential purposes only and was never necessary.

ployed from the circumstance that the person so designated was the person who in fact made the formal *sponsiones* in answer to the successive *stipulationes* of the baptist. The sponsor, in short, was the person who "answered for" the infant, in the sense of answering *instead of* him, and not in the sense of answering *in his default*. The adult was of course his own *sponsor*, inasmuch as he made his own responses.

The derivation of the covenantal questions and answers in the office of Baptism from the Roman *stipulatio* throws an interesting light upon a passage in the First Epistle of St. Peter. In the Greek language, which was spoken by a large part of the subjects of the Roman Empire, the contract of *stipulatio* was known by the name of *ἐπερώτησις* or *ἐπερώτημα*. The latter form, however, came to be technically applied to the promise or undertaking made by means of the *stipulatio*. In very early patristic writings the plural *ἐπερωτήματα* is habitually used to describe the promises or vows made in response to the questions of the Baptismal Service. These *ἐπερωτήματα* comprised, as has been seen, the declarations of assent to the several articles of the Creed. Indeed it is from the fragments which exist of

the early offices of Baptism that what is traditionally known as the Apostles' Creed has been compiled. We find it in no earlier documents and in no earlier form.

The passage in the First Epistle of St. Peter to which I wish to refer reads as follows:—

"The long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls, were saved by water. The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, *but the answer of a good conscience*) by the resurrection of Jesus Christ" (1 Pet. iii. 21, 22).

The word here translated "answer" is *éπερώτημα*, a word nowhere else found in the New Testament, and the technical equivalent, as I have pointed out, of *sponsio*, or an undertaking entered into by means of the contract of *stipulatio*. It can hardly be doubted that the Apostle refers to the covenantal questions and answers of the baptismal ceremony. It is not, says he in effect, the water used in the rite of baptism which saves or cleanses, but the sincere declaration of faith and promise of obedience made in response to the *stipulationes* of the baptist. And if this is the meaning of St. Peter's language, it follows that in his time the Christian faith had been already

embodied in articles which might be severally placed before the convert for his acceptance as a preliminary to the ceremonial sprinkling or immersion; and it may be inferred that the Apostles' Creed is entitled to the name which it traditionally bears. To be more accurate, the inference which may be drawn is that the groundwork of the Apostles' Creed was in fact apostolic; for the Creed, which is found in the most ancient Baptismal Services, and which is therefore presumably referred to by St. Peter, was a shorter and simpler formula than that with which we are now familiar. It ran as follows:—

"I believe in God Almighty,
And in Jesus Christ His Son our Lord,
Who was born of a virgin,
Was crucified under Pontius Pilate.
The third day He rose again from the dead,
He sitteth at the right hand of God,
From thence He shall come to judge the quick and
the dead,
And in the Holy Ghost."

The office of Matrimony is connected in a very interesting manner with the history of Roman law. In early times the marriage of patricians was celebrated by a religious ceremony called *confarreatio*; the marriage of plebeians by

coemptio, a fictitious sale. Long before the close of the Republic both *confarreatio* and *coemptio* had fallen into disuse. Thenceforward, when once the parties had agreed to marry, and the paterfamilias of each had given his consent, all that was required to constitute a legal marriage was *traditio*, that is, the delivery or handing over of the bride to the bridegroom. This delivery, according to common usage, was accomplished by leading the bride, arrayed in white garments and garlanded with orange blossom, in festal procession to the house of the bridegroom. Hence *ducere uxorem* means to marry. There was no religious ceremony, and nothing corresponding to registration. In order to prove a marriage, all that was necessary was to show that the due consents had been obtained, and that a formal delivery of the bride to her husband had taken place. It was usual, indeed, to draw up *instrumenta ad probationem matrimonii*,¹ which recorded the fact of the marriage and were signed by the parties and by witnesses; but these documents, as their name implies, were merely for the

¹ Also called *nuptiales tabula*. In the case of well-to-do families there were also *instrumenta dotalia*, relating to the dowry of the bride.

convenience of proof and were not required by law.

But, in accordance with a custom so ancient that Roman antiquaries believed it to have existed in Latium before the foundation of Rome, marriage was commonly preceded by a contract of betrothal called the *sponsalia*. This contract, as the name indicates, was entered into by means of reciprocal *stipulationes* and *sponsiones*. The bride, or some relative on her behalf, in the presence of witnesses, put the formal question to the bridegroom whether he was willing to marry her, and he made a formal answer in the affirmative. A similar question was put to the bride on behalf of the bridegroom, and in like manner she expressed her assent. From that time the parties were with respect to one another "sponsus" and "sponsa"; that is, a "promised" or engaged couple. Either party might break off the engagement, subject to liability to an action for breach of promise (*actio ex sponsu*); but, in order to avoid exposure to such an unpleasant form of litigation, it was usual for the gentleman and the lady at the time of the contract of betrothal to give each other *arrhae* or earnest-money, which was to be forfeited by the party who withdrew from the

engagement, and which, in fact, constituted, in English legal phraseology, "liquidated damages." In process of time jewellery was substituted for money for the purpose of *arrhes*: the gift by the lady to the gentleman fell into disuse, and the gentleman's gift to the lady came by invariable custom to consist of, or at least to include, a ring. Already in the second century, as may be inferred from the writings of Tertullian, it was the rule for Christian converts to seek a religious sanction for their betrothals and marriages. The *sponsalia* took place before the bishop or presbyter, who himself put the respective *stipulationes* to the parties, received their answers in the presence of witnesses, and added some religious exercises, after which followed the delivery of the *arrhæa*.

The actual nuptials in like manner received the blessing of the Church. The bride and bridegroom appeared before the bishop or presbyter, accompanied by the bride's father or some other representative of her family. The ceremony commenced by the formal "giving away" of the bride by this person. The bride and bridegroom then clasped hands and mutually plighted their troth. Prayers and exhortations followed, and finally the *nuptiales*

tabulae and *instrumenta dotis* were duly signed and witnessed. The essential part of the ceremony was doubtless the giving away of the bride. This was the formal *traditio* which the law required. The procession to the house of the bridegroom, although, as I have said, usual, was never necessary to constitute *traditio*. Any other formal method of "delivery" in the presence of witnesses was equally effectual.

But, although the formalities of the law were thus Christianised in practice, the law itself remained unchanged for centuries after Christianity had become the religion of the empire. All that was required to constitute a valid betrothal was that the appropriate *stipulationes* should be put and answered: all that was required to constitute a valid marriage was that, the due consents having been obtained, there should be a "delivery" of the bride to the bridegroom. It was a matter of indifference to the legislature whether the *sponsalia* or the *traditio* took place in a church or elsewhere, in the presence of priests or before lay witnesses.

The *sponsalia* continued to be an entirely separate ceremony from the nuptials as late as the ninth century. Down to that period the "Office of Espousals" was distinct from the

"Office of Matrimony." The former consisted of prayers and exhortations, followed by the formal *stipulationes*, which are represented in the English Prayer-Book by the questions: "Wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wife?" "Wilt thou have this man to thy wedded husband?" and after this came the gift of the ring, a part of the ceremony which in ecclesiastical phraseology long retained the name of "the subarrhation." The office of Matrimony commenced with the words, "Who giveth this woman to be married to this man?" and continued very much as it does now from that point in the English Prayer-Book, with the exception that the giving of the ring and the words accompanying that act were omitted.

It is not known at what date the formal betrothal ceased to be customary, but it was probably soon after the close of the ninth century. Soon after that date we find the two services amalgamated into one, as they appear in the office of Matrimony as it now exists. But the giving of the ring, instead of immediately following the formal questions and answers, was placed after the "troth-plighting," and thus became the symbol of performance instead of promise.

The merger of the betrothal with the nuptial ceremony has occasioned a change in the meaning of words as well as of symbols. The words *sponsus* and *sponsa*, which, as we have seen, originally signified an engaged couple, are in their modern form (*sposo*, *sposa*, *époux*, *épouse*, spouse) exclusively applied to married persons; and "espousal," the equivalent of *sponsalia*, means not betrothal but marriage.

There are other parts of the Book of Offices besides the Baptismal Service and the Marriage Service in which we encounter the *stipulatio* of the Roman law. Indeed it may be said that wherever in the Prayer-Book a quasi-contractual obligation is undertaken, it is undertaken in this form.

In the office for the Consecration of Bishops there is a long series of *stipulationes*, followed by appropriate *sponsiones*. In the offices for the Ordination of Priests and Deacons, what are commonly called the ordination vows are couched in the same form. The date at which these services were originally framed cannot be determined. They can, however, be traced back in their essential features for nearly a thousand years, and are probably much older. This at least is certain, that those portions of them

which consist of promises or undertakings, although they may have undergone some modification in form, were originally framed at a period when the *stipulatio* was still the recognised mode of entering into a solemn contract.¹

Again, in the Coronation Service in the *Liber Regalis* there is a series of *stipulationes* addressed by the officiating archbishop to the monarch, and responded to by the latter. These together constitute the substance of the coronation oath; and it is only after the monarch has replied in the affirmative to each separate interrogatory that he advances to the altar and says, "The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep."

It need hardly be said that the method of

¹ It is to be remarked that the questions and answers in the Anglican form for the ordination of priests are more numerous and comprehensive than in any other known ordinal. Some of the *stipulationes* are not to be found in any of the most ancient books of offices. This is not, however, conclusive as to their comparative novelty, for in the early centuries of the history of the Christian Church every bishop was at liberty to frame liturgies and offices for his own diocese, and only very few of the ancient provincial "uses" have survived. But if additional interrogatories for which there was no exact precedent in older ordinals were introduced into the English Prayer-Book, they would naturally be framed in conformity with those already in use. So, in the office of Confirmation, the question and answer which appear in the English rite do not occur in any other book of offices, and are supposed to have been framed upon the analogy of the *stipulationes* in the office of Baptism.

contracting by interrogatory and answer is quite alien to English usage and inharmonious with English legal theory. A contract with us is looked at, not from the point of view of the promisco but from that of the promisor. It is the promisor who is supposed to put the contract into shape; or, in other words, what the English lawyer looks for in the case of an alleged agreement is an unconditional offer on the part of the promisor, followed by an unconditional acceptance on the part of the promisee. I do not think that any trace of the Roman *stipulatio* can be found in English law, unless it may be in the form in which certain oaths are administered; and this is probably derived from Roman sources through the medium of the canon law.

CHAPTER V

ROMAN LAW IN ANTE-NICENE THEOLOGY

THE age which witnessed the Incarnation was one of high intellectual culture throughout the greater part of the Roman Empire. In almost every considerable town there existed grammar schools, from which our own grammar schools derive not only their name but also in a large measure the nature and extent of their curriculum. In the Greek-speaking and in the Latin-speaking provinces alike, even in Rome itself, these schools were mainly taught by Greek masters, and the basis of their instruction was the classical literature of Greece. But besides the Schools of Grammar, there were also in the great cities places of higher education, which were known under the generic and somewhat misleading name of Schools of Rhetoric. At first but loosely organised, or not organised at all,—the private ventures, so

to speak, of learned men,—they gradually during the early centuries of Christianity acquired more and more of a corporate existence. They became possessed of public endowments, different departments of learning were specialised, separate professorial "chairs" were established for separate "faculties," academic titles were conferred, and some approach was even made to the system of competitive examinations. In short, the Schools of Rhetoric in their developed form became the prototypes, and in some cases possibly the direct progenitors, of the Universities of Medieval and Modern Europe.

It is an entire misconception to infer from the name of these institutions that they existed mainly, or even principally, for the purpose of teaching the arts of declamation and dialectic. They were called Schools of Rhetoric, to indicate not so much the scope as the method of the studies pursued in them. These studies comprehended literature and philosophy. Nor was this all. It is important to bear in mind that under the common name of Rhetoric was included the old or forensic rhetoric as well as the new or Greek rhetoric. In schools designated by this undescriptive title instruc-

tion was imparted in Roman law as well as in the learning of Greece. Indeed it is a curious circumstance, and worthy of some consideration, that the new rhetoric derived that disputative method which was its characteristic, and which produced such an extraordinary effect upon the human mind during many centuries, from the old rhetoric, and that its system of training was borrowed less from the Athenian Academy than from the Roman Forum, or, to be more accurate, from the atrium of the Roman Jurisconsult. It may be useful to trace the history of this development.

I have incidentally remarked that a Roman jurisconsult was rather a professor of law than a lawyer. He was indeed a kind of legal oracle who gave his opinion and advice gratuitously, not only to private persons but also to the magistrates,¹ who were often, and to the "judges," who were generally, men of no legal training. But whilst the jurisconsult advised a litigant as to what proceedings he should adopt, he did not conduct them on his behalf, like an English solicitor, or advocate

¹ The Roman magistrate was a judge, in our sense of the word; the *judex*, on the other hand, was an arbitrator to whom issues were remitted for trial. Such issues were usually of fact, but their determination might involve questions of law.

his cause in the courts like an English barrister. He might indeed accompany his client to the tribunal in order to assist and prompt him, or in order to state his opinion on the law for the benefit of the magistrate or *judex*; but it was not his function to examine witnesses or to argue or declaim. It was open, however, to the Roman citizen to employ for forensic purposes a professional "orator." The orator was not necessarily a lawyer in any sense. It was a part of the object of Cicero's *De Oratore* to demonstrate the advantages of a knowledge of the law in the practice of advocacy; but he does not attempt to prove that it is necessary. On the contrary, Antonius, one of the supposed interlocutors in that brilliant dialogue, and in fact the most famous advocate of his day, is represented as saying that for his own part he had never had any legal training whatever, and had never felt the want of it in his profession. It is to be supposed that in cases involving technical knowledge of the law the orator would consult a jurisconsult, and if necessary obtain his opinion for the guidance of the Court, just as in other technical matters an expert might be called in. Cicero was himself a trained lawyer as well as an orator;

but it was only at a comparatively late period of his career that he ranked as a jurisconsult.

The Roman jurisconsult, in pronouncing his opinions, was exercising a double function. His ante-chamber was crowded not only by clients but also by students, who stood ready with note-book in hand to record the great man's replies to the legal questions which were propounded to him. It was in this manner that the *Responsa Prudentum*, which in some measure corresponded to our "case law," and which formed a most important part of the fabric of the early Roman jurisprudence, were compiled. But the *Responsa Prudentum* did not consist solely of opinions given in actual cases. It was a part of the education of the law student to invent hypothetical cases for solution by his master, so that the scope of the application of any given legal principle might not be left in doubt. Whether the set of circumstances in respect to which the jurist pronounced his opinion was real or imaginary, made no difference whatever to the value or the authority of the dictum.

About the time of Cicero the jurist began to give instruction in a somewhat more formal manner. Besides pronouncing opinions, he com-

posed dissertations, upon which he invited comment and discussion from his pupils. Early in the empire the *atrium* or ante-chamber gave place to the *statio* or class-room. The jurist became less a practitioner and still more a teacher. He might still be consulted by clients; but whereas the *atrium* was a place of consultation to which students might resort, the *statio* was a law school to which clients might come for advice.¹ In these law schools the students not only propounded imaginary cases, but also debated them under the presidency of their master, after the manner of the ancient "mootings" of our own Inns of Court. They were now instructed not merely in the rules of law but also in the art of expression, in grace of language and propriety of argument. This extended curriculum was no doubt designed to meet the requirements of those who intended to practise as orators, for the orator, formerly a lawyer only by accident, gradually became a lawyer by profession. This change, which was completed long before the time of Constantine, was marked by the merger of the name of *orator* in that of *advocatus*. This name had originally no

¹ "Stationes jus publice docentium aut respondentium."

association with forensic practice, but was exclusively applied to the jurisconsult, who according to ancient Roman theory was a friend *called to one's side* in order to give advice and assistance.¹

It would seem that, from the time when elocution and logic as well as law began to be taught in the *stationes*, the latter became known as Schools of Eloquence or Rhetoric; and the jurists who taught in them came to be described as "doctors of law," "professors of law," "professors of eloquence" or "professors of rhetoric."

When Greek philosophy first became a fashionable study at Rome, it was taught by private tutors. But in process of time public classes were formed, in imitation of the juridic *stationes*, for the purpose of affording instruction in advanced Greek literature, composition dialectic, and philosophy, and received the name of Schools of the "New Rhetoric" or of the "Greek Rhetoric." In these schools the methods of the law schools were adopted. Instead of arguing legal points, the students discussed some literary thesis or some problem

¹ *Advocatus dicitur amicus, quem vocamus ad nos, ut cum consulamus de controversiis nostris, qui que honoris causa in judicio in subsellis nostris sedet, aut nobiscum in rem praesentem venit.* See Cic., *De Off.* i. 10.

of philosophy under the presidency of their professor. Instead of simulating the trial of causes in the courts, they assumed the part of historical or mythical characters, invented situations or incidents, and were taught to speak and act in presumed accordance with the occasion and the character. The professor directed, suggested, corrected, and criticised. He was always more or less a lecturer; but his lectures were to a large extent subordinate and incidental to this curiously histrionic manner of instruction. Schools of Roman Rhetoric and Greek Rhetoric grew up in all parts of the empire: in many cases they existed side by side, practically forming one institution, and assuming, as I have said, something of the organisation of a university as we understand the term. The name of rhetoric came to be applied indifferently to every species of higher education, and the forensic method seems to have been adopted not only in the newer but also in the most ancient seats of learning.

The Schools of Rhetoric were popular. They were crowded, like Oxford and Cambridge in our time, by the sons of the rich, and, like the Scotch universities of our time, by the sons of the poor. They produced successive genera-

tions of ready speakers and subtle disputants, of scholars versed in the literature and philosophy of Greece or in the jurisprudence of Rome, and not uncommonly in both. It was to men so trained that Christianity was preached. It was already, before the end of the second century, by such men that the Gospel was preached. It was natural, and indeed inevitable, that the theological speculations of the early Christian teachers should be influenced by the secular studies with which they and their hearers were familiar, and it is abundantly acknowledged that both Roman law and Greek philosophy had their share in determining the matter as well as the manner of ecclesiastical controversy. But it has been very positively asserted that, during the period which preceded the crystallisation of religious belief into definite dogmatic form, the influence of Roman law was unfelt, and that the problems to which the Church addressed itself were problems for which Greek philosophy in its later forms had prepared the way, and for which the Greek language alone provided a vocabulary.

"Greek metaphysical literature," says Maine,¹ "contained the sole stock of words and ideas out of which the

human mind could provide itself with the means of engaging in the profound controversies as to the Divine Persons, the Divine Substance, and the Divine Natures. The Latin language and the meagre Latin philosophy were quite unequal to the undertaking, and accordingly the Western or Latin-speaking provinces of the empire adopted the conclusions of the East without disputing or reviewing them."

"Latin Christianity," says Milman,² "accepted the Creed, which its narrow and barren vocabulary could hardly express in adequate terms . . . the adhesion of Rome and the West was a passive acquiescence in the dogmatic system which had been wrought out by the profounder theology of the Eastern divines."

I venture to think that this is a mistaken, or at least an incomplete, view of the subject. I believe that even in the ante-Nicene period the Roman law exerted a more powerful influence than has been suspected upon Christian controversy. On the other hand, I cannot agree with Renan² when he says—

"There is a sense in which, in point of time, the action of Rome comes first. It is only in the earlier part of the third century that the Greek mind, in the persons of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, really laid hold of Christianity."

¹ *Ancient Law*, p. 355.

² Hibbert Lectures, 1880. These lectures "On the Influence of the Institutions, Thought, and Culture of Rome on Christianity" are superficial and disappointing. On the other hand, the complementary Hibbert Lectures, 1888, "On the Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church," by the late Dr. Hatch, constitute one of the most valuable contributions ever made to the study of historical theology.

Certainly no "action" of Rome could have affected Christian thought at an earlier date than that Neo-Platonism which was adapted beforehand to the service of Christianity by the writings of Philo, and which was instinctively utilised by the apostolic Fathers in explanation and defence of the doctrine of the Incarnation. And from first to last it was mainly through Neo-Platonism that Greek philosophy "laid hold of Christianity."

But I think it may be shown that as early as the second century the influence of Roman law impressed itself, concurrently with that of Greek philosophy, upon Christian thought, and that both had their share in shaping those intellectual conflicts which ended with the promulgation of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.

I suspect that the deficiencies of the Latin language as a medium for the early controversies of the Church have been exaggerated. But whether this be so or not, I cannot but think that Sir Henry Maine has laid too much stress upon the ineptitude of the Western mind for metaphysical inquiry, and upon the ineptitude of the Eastern mind for the study of law. No doubt the Latin race had a genius for law, and the Greek race had a genius for meta-

physics; but, after all, only a small part of the population of the West was of Italian blood, and only a small part of the population of the East was really Greek. The study of Greek philosophy can hardly have been, as Maine describes it, "a transient fashionable taste" in the Western world, since it persisted without intermission during centuries as a principal branch of higher education, and either by direct or indirect tradition retains its place as such to-day. It is equally difficult to understand how the study of Roman law can have been, as Maine says it was, "always an exotic in the East," considering that it remained during nine centuries the only law known to the inhabitants of the Eastern Empire. There are no indications of any disinclination on the part of the Greek-speaking populations for legal study. As Maine admits—

"The premium on the study of jurisprudence was so enormous that there were schools of law in every part of the empire, even in the very domain of metaphysics."

The schools of Byzantium and Berytus in the Far East hardly yielded supremacy to Rome itself as centres of legal education. Amongst the great juridical writers whose works were excerpted in

order to compose the great mosaic of the Pandects of Justinian, a considerable proportion bear Greek names; and of the five jurists whose supreme pre-eminence was established by common consent, and confirmed by the imperial sanction accorded to their works, Gaius was a Greek of Asia Minor, Ulpian was a Tyrian by birth and by descent, and Modestinus, who appears to have been a Dalmatian, wrote some of his legal treatises in the Greek language. Greek became indeed, hardly less than Latin, the language of the law; and the *Corpus Juris* itself was compiled at Constantinople mainly by Greek lawyers and professors.

Again, it seems to me that, in estimating the comparative influence of Greek philosophy and Roman law during the early centuries of the Christian era, there is a consideration of the utmost importance which has been altogether lost sight of. The Greek philosophy which was taught in the Schools of Rhetoric was a dead philosophy; the Roman law that was taught was a living science. All the speculative systems of past ages were impartially brought under the attention of the student by the Greek professor; but they were brought before him, not as philosophy but as literature,—not

as something to be believed in and lived up to, but as the mere record of men's thoughts in ancient times. The science of Roman law, on the other hand, was from the commencement of the empire in a state of active development, and during the period between about 120 A.D. and 220 A.D. it reached its highest point of intellectual dominion. It is difficult to convey to the minds of any but lawyers a just estimate of the jurists who flourished during this period, or of the importance of the work which they accomplished. Papinian, Gaius, Ulpian, Paul, Modestinus, were not for one age alone. They were "the great lights of jurisprudence for all time." Their supremacy is as unapproachable as that of the Greek dramatists, or the architects of our medieval cathedrals, and it is as impossible to analyse or explain.

The jurisconsults of an earlier age were attended, as I have mentioned, by students who took notes of their opinions, which notes were published under the name of the *Responsa Prudentum*. But when the jurisconsult was transformed into a professor, the *Responsa* ceased, and their place was taken by regular treatises on particular departments of the law. It was through the medium of these treatises

that the most striking developments of the Roman law were effected, and that the master-minds of jurisprudence left their mark upon all European systems of law for all succeeding ages.

None of the works of the great jurists remain entire. We know them mainly from the excerpts from which the voluminous Pandects of Justinian were compiled; but even in this mutilated state their unrivalled excellence is beyond dispute. It is, of course, primarily upon their merit as expositors of their own system of jurisprudence that the fame of the Roman jurists rests. They apprehended its general principles with extraordinary clearness and penetration, applied those principles to details with unfaltering accuracy, and thus reduced the law of which they were professors to a compact and coherent whole. The immediate effect of their work was great. In older times the edict of the *prætor* had provided the machinery by which the improvements in the law suggested by the *Responsa Prudentum* had been actually introduced into the legal system. But the edict of the *prætor* became stereotyped or, as one may say, codified in the reign of Hadrian. No new edicts were added after that period. All legislative functions were thenceforward in

the hands of the imperial despots. A succession of wise emperors, however, frequently based their reforming and innovating decrees upon the writings of the jurists. Any opinion which was unanimously expressed in these writings was declared to be binding upon the tribunals. When the great age of the Antonines was past, peculiar authority was conferred upon the works of the five pre-eminent jurists of that period whose names have been already mentioned. When they agreed, their opinion was given the force of law. In case of difference, the view of the majority was to be followed. If they were equally divided, the opinion supported by Papinian was to prevail. Finally, under the auspices of Justinian the works of all the eminent jurists were collected, compared, dissected, and rearranged under the different departments of the law; all matter which had become obsolete, or which was considered faulty in expression, or which was at variance with the general trend of authority, was rejected; and of that which remained, such extracts were chosen as seemed most clearly to deal with the subject in hand. It was thus that the Pandects were compiled; and this work, together with a revised collection of the imperial constitutions or

decrees, and the Institutes, or first book for students, made up the famous *Corpus Juris Civilis*, which formed a new starting-point in the history of Roman law.

The jurists of the great age were singularly homogeneous in their character and aptitudes. They were impregnated with the same principles, and animated by the same spirit; and they exhibit the same style, which is always simple, clear, terse, and nervous. It is not so much their matter as their scientific method, their symmetry and compactness, and their pellucid logic, well compared by Leibnitz to the irresistible sequence of mathematical deduction, which have made them the models of later ages, and caused them to exercise so powerful an influence on European jurisprudence.

The Roman jurists were intolerant of obscurity, and abhorred incompleteness. They saw things clearly, and also saw them whole. They were not content, like English lawyers, to decide a single point irrespective of other points which might arise: they insisted on a complete theory completely worked out, and capable of immediate application to any set of circumstances which might occur. Their

treatises are models of classification and orderly arrangement. The jurists had a passion for definition, and observed a rigorous exactness in the use of legal phrasology. They possessed the rare faculty of condensing general principles into aphoristic forms in such a way as to impress the memory and insensibly convince the mind. Their legal maxims have indeed obtained acceptance far beyond the bounds of those legal systems which are based upon their own; and, regarded as the expression of universal and indubitable truths, have exerted an enormous influence upon some departments of our own law, upon international law, and even upon branches of learning which have no direct connection with jurisprudence. In the authority which these maxims have obtained, it is not altogether fanciful to compare them with that "philosophy of proverbs" which, as Dr. Hatch has said,¹ was the philosophy of Palestine.

The influence exerted by the great jurists upon succeeding ages in many departments of thought besides pure law is unquestioned. Is it possible that they exerted none upon the Christian controversies of their own? Is it

¹ Hibbert Lectures, 1888, p. 124.

possible that none of their genius for classification and definition was at the service of the Church at the very period when theological dogma was in process of formulation? Had the passion of the jurists for precision and completeness, and for the carrying out of every theory to its ultimate results, no share in the composition of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds? It would have been strange, indeed, if it had been so. But it was not. Before the close of the second century, and whilst Roman jurisprudence was still at the height of its intellectual activity, law and theology met in the person of Tertullian.

CHAPTER VI

ROMAN LAW IN ANTE-NICENE THEOLOGY (*contd.*)

TERTULLIAN became a convert to Christianity about the year 185 A.D., or a year before the birth of Origen. He had already reached middle life, and had practised, probably at Rome, as a lawyer. Eusebius describes him as a man who was thoroughly versed in Roman law, a man of high reputation, and greatly distinguished at Rome.¹ After his conversion he received orders as a presbyter, and acquired much fame as a Christian teacher and writer; but embracing the opinions of Montanus, which were regarded as heretical, he resigned his clerical office and spent the last years of his life as a "Professor of Rhetoric" at Carthage, dying there about 220 A.D. The title of Professor of Rhetoric is, as I have ob-

¹ Τοὺς Ἱωαννούς ἡγεμόνας ἡγεμόνας ἀνὴρ τά τε ἀλλα ἐνδοξος καὶ τῶν μάλιστα ἐπὶ Ρώμης λαμπρῶν.

served, ambiguous. It may apply to the "old" or "forensic" rhetoric, or to the new or Greek rhetoric. In the case of a man of Tertullian's antecedents, however, there can be no doubt as to the meaning of the expression. He evidently resumed his old pursuits, and occupied a chair of law in the schools of Carthage.

It is an interesting question whether this Father of the Church was identical with Tertullian the jurist, some fragments of whose works ultimately had the honour of a place in the Pandects of Justinian. These fragments are too brief to afford room for a comparison of style with the writings of the Christian presbyter; but from internal evidence they can be proved to have been written between 161 A.D. and 212 A.D., and therefore may well have proceeded from the pen of the jurist and professor of eloquence.

Apart from the testimony of Eusebius, the reader of Tertullian can entertain no doubt as to his professional education. As Neander says of him—

"There is sufficient in the method of argument and controversial traits of the ecclesiastic to enable us to recognise a trained advocate, and in the juridical cast of his language and his comparisons borrowed from the law to find palpable evidence of his early legal studies."

A striking example of Tertullian's lawyer-like attitude of mind may be found in the title of one of his best-known books, *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*.

The word *præscriptio* was a technical term of law which had its origin in a purely arbitrary rule of pleading. In the ordinary course of procedure in a Roman action at law, the *prætor*, upon the application of the parties, drew up a *formula* for the guidance of the *judex* to whom the case was remitted for trial. The *formula* set forth the issues of fact, or of mixed law and fact, which were to be decided. If the defendant wished to rely upon any defence other than a bare denial of the plaintiff's case, a clause was introduced by which such defences were raised. This clause was usually placed at the end of the *formula*, and was called an *exceptio*; but in the case of the defence of "long possession," for reasons which are immaterial, it was placed at the beginning of the *formula*, and was hence called *præscriptio*. The effect of the *præscriptio longi temporis possessio*¹ was to protect a person who had

¹ The old law of *usucapio*, which may be roughly described as corresponding to our Statutes of Limitations, did not apply to real estate beyond the confines of Italy. The defence of

been during a certain period *bond fide* in possession of real estate against eviction by any one whatever. Given possession during the qualifying period, and the possessor was relieved from the necessity of proving his original title. This defence came to be shortly described as "the *præscriptio*"; and Tertullian, in using the word, is as obviously employing a legal technicality as an English writer would be who introduced into the title of an essay the word "demurrer" or the word "replevin."

In this treatise Tertullian applies the beneficent principle of the law to Catholic doctrine. He claims that beliefs which had held the field from the time of the apostolic Fathers were on that account alone entitled to protection against the new-fangled theories of heretics. The doctrines and practices of the Church which were, so to speak, in possession, were not even to be put on their defence as against theological novelty and ritual innovation.

It was thus that the far-reaching dogma of ecclesiastical tradition was enunciated. It has sometimes been asserted that Tertullian set up "long possession" was introduced by the *prætor*, and subsequently sanctioned by imperial constitutions, in order to remedy his defect, and to institute a period for the limitation of actions in the case of real estate in the provinces.

tradition in contradiction to the Scriptures. But this is an error. He appealed, indeed, to tradition independently of the Scriptures; but this, as he was careful to explain, was because both the orthodox and the heretical declared that Scripture was on their side. It was only when the Scriptures were silent, or ambiguous, or disputed that he invoked the authority of tradition.

It would be easy to give many other illustrations of the legal tone and complexion of Tertullian's writings; but it is more important to observe that this Roman lawyer was the first to reduce the transcendental doctrines of the Church to anything like definite dogmatic form. The polemical writings of the earlier Fathers, chiefly directed against the fantastic errors of Gnosticism, contained, indeed, many detached doctrinal statements with regard to more or less abstruse theological points, and particularly with regard to the nature and functions of the Word and Spirit. But these statements were unsystematic and defective. It was the work of Tertullian to embody doctrinal teaching in more scientific form. Very much as it was the task of the jurists of his age to reduce the theories and opinions of expert lawyers and great

thinkers to a coherent system of jurisprudence, so it was his task to convert floating theological doctrine into precise dogma, and to prepare the way for its consolidation into the longer creeds.

The twenty-first chapter of Tertullian's *Apology* is a brief compendium of the teaching of the Church concerning the central truths of Christianity, and became the basis of Catholic Christology. The later and far more remarkable treatise entitled *Adversus Praxeas* amplified the doctrine of the Incarnation, formed the groundwork and, indeed, most of the superstructure of Trinitarian dogma, and placed theology under an obligation which has perhaps never been sufficiently acknowledged.

From the polemical character of Tertullian's writings, it is naturally the forensic side of his legal training which is most conspicuous in them; but in the twenty-first chapter of the *Apology* and in the whole of the masterly treatise *Against Praxeas*, and in some other parts of his works, we find suggestions of the jurist as well as the advocate. His energetic mind laid hold of the principles of received truth concerning the dual nature of our Lord and the mystery of the Trinity, and laboured to express them with lucidity, and yet with caution, with

wealth of inference and deduction, and yet with compactness. He abounds in subtle definition, so guarded by reservations and refinements that the faith seems to be fenced in by barriers built up of ingeniously constructed phrases.

It is a convention of theologians to ignore the fact that there ever was a time when even the most abstruse of Christian doctrines was in process of manufacture. And, accordingly, it is customary to apply to the opinions of the ante-Nicene Fathers a test of orthodoxy which did not exist in their day. They are judged by the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, which they insensibly helped to frame, but which were promulgated in a later generation. Even Origen, in some respects the greatest of theologians, has been censured with asperity by later writers on divinity for having fallen short of these standards. Tertullian has not escaped similar criticism; but he has found valiant defenders; and notwithstanding his undisputed lapse into Montanism in his later days, and his consequent resignation of holy orders, the orthodoxy of his works has been pronounced by eminent authorities—Bishop Bull and Bishop Kaye amongst the number—to be almost beyond reproach.

Be that as it may, it is certain that some of the most elementary terms of theology are directly due to this Father of the Church. It was he who first employed, one might almost say coined, the word TRINITY, to express the God-head. It was he who first employed the word PERSON to differentiate the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

It is not commonly recognised that the latter word represents a purely juridical conception, introduced into the sphere of theology.

Persona originally meant a mask¹ used by a player. Hence it was used to signify a part or character represented by an actor. It was this sense of the word which led to its employment in the technical language of the law. In Roman law *persona* meant an individual conceived of in some particular capacity, status, or condition, abstracted from every other capacity, status, or condition. "Unus homo," it was said, "sustinet plures personas": a single individual comprises many persons. He may be regarded in his *persona*, *ex. gr.*, as a citizen, as a paterfamilias, as a magistrate, and so forth.

One of the main divisions of the law adopted by the Roman institutional writers was "The

¹ Derived from *per sona*—I speak through.

Law of Persons." This title has sometimes been ignorantly ridiculed. It has been supposed to mean the law relating to individual human beings, as though all law did not in effect relate to persons in this sense. By the Law of Persons was of course meant the law relating to the various capacities or characters in which human beings came under the cognisance of the law; or, in other words, the law of status. The word *persona* was never employed with the meaning of an individual being before the date of the empire, and but rarely by any Latin author afterwards. It probably only came to bear this meaning at all through a colloquial misuse of the technical legal term. It may be confidently asserted that never at any time was the word used by a Latin author as meaning "that which *per se* constitutes an individual, the individual that he is,"—a signification which has been imported into it in comparatively modern times by a false and ridiculous derivation. It is important to remark that *persona* had its exact analogue in the Greek word *πρόσωπον*, which meant the part played by an actor in a play, and which in the form *προσωπεῖον* meant the mask of a player. In Greek translations of treatises on Roman law *persona* was uniformly translated *πρόσωπον*.

In his treatise *Against praxeas* and in other writings Tertullian introduces the word *persona* for the purpose of differentiating the Trinity in Unity. Take, for example, the following passages, amongst many others:—

“ Notwithstanding the intimate union which subsists between the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we must be careful to distinguish between their persons ” (ch. 9).

“ Tho orthodox never speak of two Gods or two Lords, though they affirm that each person in the Trinity is God and Lord ” (ch. 15, and see ch. 19).

“ Whatever, therefore, was the substance of the Word, that I designate a person. I claim for it the name of Son ” (ch. 7).

The word *persona* was not, however, immediately adopted into the vocabulary of theology. That did not happen until, in the fourth century, the famous dispute arose concerning the meaning of the word *ὑπόστασις*. This controversy may be sufficiently adverted to in a few words.

When the Trinity in Unity was preached to the world, the questions inevitably arose: In what respect are the Three one? and In what respect is the One three? In answer to the former question it was said the Three are one in *οὐσίᾳ*; that is, in essential existence. The Latin equivalent for *οὐσίᾳ* was *substantia*. The word *essentia* was rejected, not on the

ground of novelty, as ecclesiastical writers have alleged, for it had been coined in classical times, but on the ground of *inelegance*,—a consideration of no small importance to a generation trained in the traditions of the Schools of Rhetoric. In answer to the second question, it was found sufficient in the earliest times to say that the Three in One were distinguished, the Father by His Fatherhood, the Son by His Sonship, and the Holy Ghost by His Procession. But the need arose for a single word by which to express the differentiation of the Trinity: As *οὐσίᾳ* was used to express the essence of the genus, so a word was wanted to express the essence of the species. This word was found in the Greek *ὑπόστασις*. It was affirmed that in the Godhead there was one *οὐσίᾳ* but three *ὑπόστασεις*. There were two obvious drawbacks to the employment of this word. It had been regarded as exactly synonymous with *οὐσίᾳ*, and it was therefore only by attaching to it an arbitrary value that it could be adapted to the service of technical theology. And, again, *ὑπόστασις* was the etymological equivalent of *substantia*, which was already established in use as the translation of *οὐσίᾳ*. The latter difficulty, however, was

not seriously felt, for the Latin word *subsistentia* supplied as nearly as might be the exact shade of meaning which it was desired to affix to *ὑπόστασις*; and as the Easterns declared that there was one *οὐσία* but three *ὑπόστασεις*, so the Westerns declared that there was one *substantia* but three *subsistentiae*.

Until some time after the Nicene Council these distinctions had been well preserved, and little or no confusion arose. But in the fourth century the technical meaning which had been placed upon *ὑπόστασις* in the second century was forgotten, and theologians again began to use it in its original sense as synonymous with *οὐσία*. This naturally occasioned much misunderstanding and dispute in the Eastern Church. In this difficulty recourse was had to the West. The Latin bishops recalled that Tertullian had employed the legal term *persona* to express the very idea which had been embodied in *ὑπόστασις* and *subsistentia*. The controversy was determined at the Council of Alexandria, A.D. 362, by the adoption of Tertullian's word. From thenceforward, although the word *ὑπόστασις* was retained in Greek theology, it was authoritatively defined as the equivalent of *persona* or *πρόσωπον*; and in the

West the word *persona* was permanently employed instead of *subsistentia*. Thus it was that the Church learnt from Tertullian to speak of Three Persons and One God.

There were other occasions upon which the theologians of a later age had recourse to the writings of Tertullian in order to find a form of sound words. Forty years before the Council of Alexandria, the framers of the Nicene Creed adopted the phrase "God of God, Light of Light," and perhaps some other expressions, from the twenty-first chapter of the *Apology*; and at a much later period¹ his works were freely drawn upon in the composition of the Athanasian Creed, the style of which, in its terse and rhythmical antithesis, might seem to have been founded on some of his best passages.

The following parallel columns will enable the reader to judge how far the compilers of the Athanasian Creed were indebted to Tertullian:—

ATHANASIAN CREED.

And the Catholic Faith is All (three) are One, by this: That we worship one unity that is of substance;

TERTULLIAN.

¹ The earliest date which can be assigned to the Athanasian Creed is 430 A.D. Some place it as late as the ninth century. The Treves MS., which contains a great part of this Creed in its present form, is supposed to have been written about 700 A.D.

ATHANASIAN CREED.

God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity.

Neither confounding the Persons: nor dividing the substance.

For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost.

But the Godhead of the

TERTULLIAN.

while the mystery of the "economy" is still guarded which distributes the Unity into a Trinity.—*Adv. Prax.* ch. 2.

[The Son is] another in Person not in substance, in the way of distinction not of division.—*Adv. Prax.* ch. 12.

Notwithstanding the intimate union which subsists between the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we must be careful to distinguish between their Persons.—*Adv. Prax.* ch. 9.

For¹ though the Father,

¹ The quaint balance of affirmative and negative in this passage may have consciously or unconsciously influenced the style of the framers of the Athanasian Creed; and there is a certain correspondence in thought, and even in language, between its statements and those of the catena of articles in the opposite column. The word *status*, which I have translated dignity, has a double signification. It means both station and state, rank in an absolute sense and the externals of rank; in other words, it corresponds to the "glory" and the "majesty" of the Creed. The assertion of the unity of essence of the Godhead is elaborated in the Creed into an assertion that the Godhead is one eternal, one incomprehensible, one uncreated. And, finally, the statement, "They are three... not in might... one might because one God," corresponds to the article, "And yet there are not three Almighties, but one Almighty."

ATHANASIAN CREED.

Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one: the glory equal, the majesty coeternal.

Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost.

The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, and the Holy Ghost uncreate.

The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible.

TERTULLIAN.

the Son, and the Holy Ghost are three, they are three not in dignity but in office, not in essence but in attribute, not in might but in manifestation: of one essence and one dignity and one might, because one God from whom these offices and attributes and manifestations in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are derived.—*Adv. Prax.* ch. 2.

This interesting passage has been much quoted, but I think inadequately translated. The original reads: *Tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potentiae sed species.* And this is baldly rendered: "Not in condition but in degree, not in substance but in form, not in power but in aspect (or property)." So translated, it is no wonder that the passage has been censured as "crude" and "vague."

As *status* refers to absolute rank, so *gradus* refers to official rank, and may properly be translated office. The words "form" and "aspect" are unsuited in this connection. *Forma* is used in classical writings to express the distinguishing characteristics of the individual as contrasted with the essential nature of the *genus*, and may perhaps be expressed by the word "attributes"; and *species* should assuredly be rendered rather by the word "manifestation" than by the word "aspect" or "appearance."

ATHANASIAN CREED.

The Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal.

And yet there are not three eternals, but one eternal.

As also there are not three incomprehensibles, nor three uncreated; but one uncreated, and one incomprehensible.

So likewise the Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy Ghost Almighty.

And yet there are not three AlUIThies, but one Almighty.

So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God.

And yet there are not three Gods, but one God.

So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord, and the Holy Ghost Lord.

And yet not three Lords, but one Lord.

For like as we are com-

TERTULLIAN.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

The Christian verity has

ATHANASIAN CREED.

peled by the Christian verity: to acknowledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord,

So we are forbidden by the Catholic religion: to say There be three Gods or three Lords.

The Father is made of none: neither created nor begotten.

The Son is of the Father alone: not made, nor created, but begotten.

The Holy Ghost is of the Father and the Son: neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.

So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.

And in this Trinity none is afore or after other; none is greater or less than another;

Neither is less or greater than the other; neither is lower or higher than the other.¹—*Adv. Herm. c. vii.*

¹ This is written, however, not of the Trinity, but of certain doctrines of Hermogones concerning the eternitY of matter. But, as Bishop Kaye observes, it seems evident that the phrase has been copied.

ATHANASIAN CREED.

But the whole three Persons are coeternal together, and coequal.

So that in all things, as is aforesaid: the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped.

He, therefore, that will be saved: must thus think of the Trinity.

Furthermore, it is necessary to everlasting salvation: that he also believe rightly the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

For the right Faith is, that we believe and confess: that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man:

God of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds: and man of the substance of his mother, born in the world:

Perfect God, and perfect man: of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting;

TERTULLIAN.

ATHANASIAN CREED.

Equal to the Father, as touching His Godhead; and inferior to the Father, as touching His manhood.

Who although He be God and man, yet He is not two, but one Christ;

One; not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh; but by taking of the manhood into God:

One altogether; not by confusion of Substance; but by unity of Person.

For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man: so God and man is one Christ.¹

TERTULLIAN.

The Son is subordinate to the Father, as He comes from Him as the principle, but is never separated.—*Apol.* ch. 21.

Was the Word made flesh by transfiguration into flesh or by taking upon Himself the flesh? Verily, by taking upon Himself the flesh.—*Adv. Prax.* ch. 27.

God and the man Jesus not confused, but united in one Person.—*Adv. Prax.* ch. 27.

The divine and human nature making up this Person, as soul and body does one man.—*Apol.* ch. 21.

¹ This sentence in the Athanasian Creed has been criticised as introducing, for the first time, an argument, or at least an illustration, into a confession of faith. The passage seems "out of harmony with the stately simplicity of a creed" (Pope's *Person of Christ*, p. 98). But Dr. Pope is quite wrong in ascribing this "novelty" to the "Africen rhetoric" of Vigilius Ticensis. The thought expressed in the article is identical with that of the passage from Tertullian's *Apology* which I have set against it, and the language is so nearly the same that it is impossible to doubt from whence the article was derived. I cannot, however, find that this striking correspondence has been noted.

Origen entered into the labours of Tertullian. The works of the latter were translated into Greek within a few years of their appearance; and that Origen studied them does not rest entirely on conjecture. This great man was as thoroughly representative of the Greek culture as Tertullian was of the Latin. Like Clement of Alexandria, he was a trained "rhetorician," deeply versed in the learning of Greece. He succeeded Clement as teacher of the so-called Catechetical School at Alexandria. The name of this school is misleading; it suggests a place of merely elementary instruction. But a considerable portion of the works of Origen which have come down to us consist of lectures which he delivered at this school. It was assuredly not to a class of neophytes that Origen addressed himself in those profound deliverances. Bearing in mind the inveterate eclecticism of Alexandria, the broad toleration of its schools, and the absence of anything like corporate organisation amongst them, Clement and Origen may be described not inexactely as successive occupants of the Chair of Christian Philosophy at the University of Alexandria.

It was in Biblical criticism that Origen was really greatest. No one can read his *Com-*

mentaries without admiration of his acuteness, learning, and large-minded liberality, or without surprise at finding his tone of thought so modern. But it is as a metaphysical athlete wrestling with the unfathomable mysteries of the faith that his name is chiefly known. And indeed his theological speculations had a range and subtlety far beyond the mental capacity of Tertullian. Yet it is said of him by theological critics that he raised more questions than he solved, and that two of the most grievous heresies which devastated the Church at a later period are to be traced to their source in his writings.

If the test of greatness in a theologian is not so much his metaphysical subtlety as his aptitude for finding forms of words which satisfy the intellectual conceptions of devout thinkers, and close the controversies of the Church, then Tertullian might be regarded as a greater theologian than Origen. But this is not the test which has been commonly applied, and the fame of Tertullian has been overshadowed by that of the more brilliant Alexandrian doctor.

Tertullian is not the only Roman lawyer whom we find in the ranks of the early Fathers

of the Church. Lactantius, who has been called the Christian Cicero, was also both a legal practitioner and a Professor of Forensic Rhetoric. He died in 325 A.D., the year of the Council of Nicæa, and he may therefore be reckoned the last of the ante-Nicene Fathers. Lactantius was not a great theologian, like Tertullian or Origen. He left little mark upon the intellectual life of the Church; and his writings, though praised for their style, are tedious to the modern reader. In the title of his principal work, the *Divine Institutes*, he bewrays his profession; for the name of Institutes had been immemorially, and before his time, I think exclusively, applied to the text-books of law students. Throughout the *Divine Institutes* there are evidences of the legal training of the author. A striking example may be cited. I have referred¹ to the theory of the Roman law regarding the indissoluble unity existing between the paterfamilias and his heir. In the following passage from Book iv. of the *Divine Institutes*, Lactantius appeals to this well-known legal theory in order to explain and illustrate Christian doctrine concerning the mystic relations between the Divine Father and the Divine Son:—

¹ *Supra*, Chap. II.

"We may use an illustration which is nearer at hand. When any one has a son to whom he is much attached, who is still a member of his household, and under the *potestas* of his father, although the father concedes to him the name and power of a master, yet, by the civil law, the household is one, and only one is master. So this world is the one house of God, and the Son and the Father who dwell therein are one God, for the one is as two and the two are as one."

Although, as I have endeavoured to show, Roman law was not without its influence upon theology during the ante-Nicene period, it must be admitted that, even in the West, Greek metaphysics had an equal, perhaps a preponderating, share in determining the subject-matter and the methods of ecclesiastical controversy. But at a later date, when the East and the West became politically separated, the Latin-speaking peoples gradually ceased the study of Greek and lost their taste for Greek philosophy. Thenceforward Roman law impressed itself without any rival upon the intellectual activities of Western Christendom.

"Theology became permeated with forensic ideas and couched in forensic language. . . . The Western Church threw itself into a new order of disputes, the same which from those days to this have never lost their interest for any family of mankind at any time included in the Latin communion. The nature of sin and its transmission by inherit-

ance—the debt owed by man, and its vicarious satisfaction—the necessity and sufficiency of the atonement—above all, the apparent antagonism between Free Will and the Divine Providence,—these were the points which the West began to debate. . . . Almost everybody who has knowledge enough of Roman law to appreciate the Roman penal system; the Roman theory of obligations established by contract and debit; the Roman view of debts, and of the modes of incurring, extinguishing, and transmitting them; the Roman notion of the continuance of individual existence by universal succession—may be trusted to say whence arose the frame of mind to which the problems of Western theology proved so congenial, whence came the phraseology in which these problems were stated, and whence the description of reasoning employed in their solution.”¹

¹ Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 356.

CHAPTER VII

ST. JOHN AND PHILO JUDÆUS

DEAN MILMAN and Sir Henry Maine have shown that the early controversies of the Church took their colour on the one hand from Greek metaphysics, and on the other hand from Roman law. But this twofold source of theological expression is apparent before the controversies of the Church commenced,—in the pages of the New Testament itself, Roman thought had, as I have maintained, a part in the formation of doctrine, as well as in its ultimate development. And the same is true of Greek thought, or at least of Greek thought filtered through the schools of Alexandria, and popularised amongst Jew and Gentile in the time of our Lord, or immediately thereafter, by the genius of one original and eccentric thinker. To some extent this truth has been recognised. It is admitted by orthodox writers, though with some

vagueness and with perplexing limitations, that both St. John and St. Paul display traces in their writings of the influence of "Alexandrianism." But the nature and extent of this influence are often imperfectly appreciated, and sometimes altogether misunderstood. Modern Divinity, here as in other departments of research, has shown unnecessary hesitation in accepting the reasonable inferences from established facts; and the subject has been avoided as abstruse and uninteresting by the general reader.

But the genesis of an idea is to some minds a fascinating study, and this is especially the case when the idea in question is one which relates to the Supreme Deity, and therefore embodies the highest efforts of human thought. It is rational and not irreverent to believe that, as in secular philosophy so also in theology, "the human mind has never grappled with any subject of thought unless it has been provided beforehand with a proper store of language, and with an apparatus of appropriate logical methods"; that, in short, revelation has availed itself of existing language, and of the ideas wrapped up in that language, and of the modes of thought by which these ideas were evolved. "Christianity," says

a learned apologist, recently deceased, "did not invent new words; and it could not, therefore, avoid fixing a different sense to many of the words and phrases which it adopted."

But words and phrases enshrine ideas. When Christianity fixed a different sense to words and phrases which it adopted, it did so by developing the ideas which underlay them. The symbols received a new value, not arbitrarily, but by a definite process of evolution which may properly be called natural, however supernaturally designed.

Such a symbol is the Logos of St. John. This expression is introduced into the pages of Holy Scripture with startling suddenness by the Evangelist in the exordium of his Gospel. There is nothing in the Old Testament or in the Synoptic Gospels to prepare the way for it or to explain it. The Word is named to become instantly the subject of exposition, to be consecrated to the service of theology, and to give the key-note to that noblest of the biographies of Christ which dwells least upon the mere incidents of His career, and most upon His relations to His Father and His relations to His flock.

But St. John did not coin the expression: he

only appropriated and developed the ideas which already attached to it. No one can read the opening chapter of St. John without perceiving that both he and those to whom he addressed himself must have been already familiar with the meaning of the word as applied to a manifestation of the Supreme Being. What the Evangelist did was to lay hold upon a current theosophical theory, and to use it to express his conceptions of the nature of Christ. And he succeeded so well that the Logos idea became the basis of Christian metaphysics. The Greek Fathers rejoiced to refine upon John's great word, whether as expressing the *ratio* or the *oratio* of God, and it became the centre around which religious controversy raged for centuries.

The theory of the Logos was unquestionably derived from an Alexandrian source, but not in the manner which is often loosely implied in theological works. No lecturer ever propounded this theory in the Alexandrian schools. It was not contained in or directly derived from any of the philosophical systems which mingled in the eclecticism which prevailed at Alexandria during the early part of the first century. The Alexandrian schools provided, so to speak, the intellectual furnace in which the Logos idea was

forged, rather than the material of which it was wrought. The theory took its shape in the mind of a Hebrew thinker who passed his life in Alexandria and saturated himself with its learning.

That thinker was Philo Judæus, the reverent and scholarly recluse who was elaborating his curious Scripture allegories and interweaving them with the loftiest and most daring speculations in theology at the very time when Jesus Christ, whom he never knew and apparently never heard of, was preaching and teaching in Galilee.

In the voluminous works of Philo there are abundant traces of indebtedness to the Greek philosophers, and particularly, as the well-known aphorism indicates, to Plato. But if Philo "platonises," if his doctrine of the Logos is associated with, is even blended and confused with, purely Platonic theories, it is not a necessary development of those theories. Treating philosophically of the divine mysteries, Philo inevitably uses the philosophical language and ideas with which he is familiar. But in his sublime conception of the Word he rises very far beyond the misty theism of the Academy, and reaches theologi-

cal altitudes of which assuredly Plato never dreamed.

For in the treatises of Philo the Word is no mere abstraction of the schools. He is "the image and first-born of God," "the shadow of the Supreme Being," "the second Deity," "the agent of God in the creation of the world," "the celestial Adam," "the archangel and high priest of the world," "the mediator—standing between the Creator and the created—interceding with the immortal God on behalf of the mortal race—the ambassador sent by the ruler of all to subject man," "the interpreter of God's will." And with reference to this Word we are told that in approaching the Father of the world it was "necessary to use as advocate (paraclete) the Son most perfect in virtue both for the forgiveness of sins and for the supply of richest blessings."¹

It may well be asked, "Whence had this man this wisdom? It was not from the Old Testament Scriptures. Where in the Messianic prophecies or in the higher inspiration of the Songs of Israel is the coming Deliverer por-

¹ See, amongst many other passages: *De Confus. Ling.* 28; *De Mund. Opif.* 8; *De Agric.* 12; *Leg. Alleg.* iii. 31, 73; *Frag. De Mund. Opif.* 4, 6, 7; *De Somn.* i. 37; *Quis rer. div. ii.* 625; *De Mund. Opif.* 4, 6, 7; *De Somn.* i. 37; *Quis rer. div. ii.* 625; *De Vit. Mos.* iii. 14.

trayed with such lineaments as these? Where in the works of Plato is to be found the groundwork for this structure of metaphysical divinity?" Plato indeed had taught that conceptions of the mind had a substantive existence, and that the world itself was framed upon the model of pre-existing types which had a being in the mind of God. And from some passages in Philo's writings it has been thought that he identifies the creating Word with Plato's Divine Idea, which took form in the making of the material world. But this, though true, is not all the truth. Philo does indeed, in a manner, adopt the language of Plato's theory of the Creation; for he describes the Word as "the primordial archetype." But the Word was this because He was much more. In Plato's scheme inferior beings were employed in the work of creation, and they required models of the divine idea to work by. But according to Philo the work of creation was accomplished by a second Deity, who was the Word of the Supreme, His Image and First-born, and who required no models of the divine idea, inasmuch as He was Himself the fullest expression of the divine idea. He was the Primordial Archetype, because by virtue of

His own omniscience He was the "source of all special types and particular ideas."

Many writers have sought to derive the Word of Philo from the Wisdom of the Sapiential Books. But it is very difficult to maintain this view. Wisdom is personified even in the canonical writings. In Proverbs she is described as "uncreated and eternal." In the apocryphal Ecclesiasticus she is described as "coming from the Lord," and as being "with Him for ever." In the Book of Wisdom this personification is carried much further; but it is still personification—that is to say, it is still the poetical representation of an abstract idea as a person. It may be, as some theologians contend, that the author of the Book of Wisdom prepares the way for the doctrine of the personality of the Holy Ghost; for Wisdom is said to be "the holy spirit of discipline" and the "spirit of the Lord which filleth the earth"; but these passages fall far short of the distinct personality which is attributed by Philo to the Word. Take the passage which has been most strongly relied upon in support of the opinion that the Divine Word is only another name for the Divine Wisdom. In the Book of Wisdom (ch. iii. 26), Wisdom is described as "the

brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted image of His goodness." Even here the comparison is between two abstractions. Wisdom is the "image," not of God, as in the phrase of Philo, but of His goodness. It is very likely that this passage was in the mind of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews when he wrote of Jesus¹ that He was "the brightness of God's glory and the express image of His person." The use of the unusual and expressive word, *ἀπαύγασμα*, in both cases to signify "brightness," favours the idea that this was the case. But, whilst the phraseology is very similar, the underlying idea is altogether changed. The apocryphal author pronounces God's wisdom to be the reflection of His goodness, whilst the Apostle declares that Christ was fashioned in the similitude of the person (or rather *substance*) of His Father. It was not in the Book of Wisdom, but in the works of Philo, that a precedent existed for the assertion that the Son was the image, not merely of God's goodness but of God. But whether the author of the Book of Wisdom is to be regarded as attributing a real personality to wisdom or not, it is clear that he did not identify wisdom and

¹ Heb. i. 3.

the Word. He refers occasionally to the Word of God in terms which admit, at any rate, of being interpreted in a Philonic sense. For example, referring to the Israelites who were bitten by the fiery serpents, he says: "It was neither herb nor mollifying plaisters that restored them, but Thy Word, O Lord, which healeth all things. It is Thy Word which preserveth them that put their trust in Thee."¹ But, so far from blending the two conceptions, the writer seems rather to distinguish them, as in the passage: "O God of my fathers, who hast made all things with Thy Word, and ordained man through Thy wisdom."² In these and some other passages in the Book of Wisdom it may be thought that the Word is intended to signify not merely a divine message but also a divine person. But if this be the case, it is more probable that the author was indebted to Philo for this conception than Philo to the author. It is agreed by critics that the Book of Wisdom was written very shortly prior to the New Testament Scriptures. Its author was no doubt a contemporary of Philo's, but he was most probably a younger man. Professor Plumptre has maintained, with great

¹ *Wisd.* xvi. 12-26.

² *Ibid.*, ix. 1, 2.

ingenuity, the thesis that he was none other than Apollos, and that he wrote the Book of Wisdom before, and the Epistle to the Hebrews after, his conversion.¹ Be that as it may, it is considered most likely that he was an Alexandrian Jew, and there is no difficulty in supposing him to have been familiar with the works of his distinguished fellow-citizen and co-religionist. But, on the other hand, if it could be demonstrated that the Book of Wisdom was written before the time of Philo, and that Philo had studied it, it is clear that his indebtedness could extend but little beyond the bare personification of the Word.

Much the same may be said in answer to those who have conjectured that Philo derived the Logos idea from the Targumists. The Targums, as is well known, are commentaries, or rather paraphrases, of the Scriptures in the Chaldee or Aramaic language. They were written for the instruction of the Jews of Palestine, very many of whom were unable to read or to understand Hebrew. The earliest and most celebrated of the Targumists, Onkelos and Jonathan, may have been contemporaries of Philo, though a somewhat later date is generally as-

¹ See *Expositor*, vol i. pp. 329-409.

signed to them. Onkelos may be taken, by his name, to have been a Hellenist, and was, perhaps, by birth an Alexandrian Jew. The Targums of both Onkelos and Jonathan show signs of Alexandrian influence in more ways than one. In both, the "Memra" is referred to as a divine person. Memra is a Chaldee word which is apparently intended as the exact equivalent of the Logos of Philo. It signifies the medium by which the mind and intentions of one person are communicated to another. It includes, therefore, spoken and written language. Both Onkelos and Jonathan ascribe actions and qualities to the Memra of Jah, and Onkelos speaks of the Memra as the Son and image of God, and the mediator between God and humanity.

The most probable inference from these passages would seem to be that the Rabbinical commentators had studied Philo and had adopted his opinions. That they knew Greek is plain from the use which they make of the Septuagint; whilst, on the other hand, it is nearly certain that Philo was ignorant of Aramaic. It is natural that the Targumists should have accepted Philonism with other notions which had their origin in Alexandria, whilst, on the

other hand, it is hardly likely that the Alexandrian philosopher should have borrowed his ideas from the Judean Targumists.

But the internal evidence is practically conclusive in this matter. In the works of Philo the theory of the Word is discussed and elaborated. The writer has the air of one who is propounding, not accepted doctrine but new views of truth. Indeed he claims to have been vouchsafed a measure of divine revelation. "But I have heard," says he, "even a more solemn voice from my soul, *accustomed often to be possessed of God and to discourse of things which it knew not*, which, if I can, I will recall." The voice in this instance told him that the primary attributes of God were goodness and power, and that these two were united in the Word. Some may believe that Philo did come at least within the penumbra of inspiration; others may regard the assumption as solemn trifling. But whether his claim was justified or not, the fact that he made it supports the view that his theories were original, and is incompatible with the opinion that they were derived from sources so notorious as the Book of Wisdom or the Targums.

Neither the author of the Book of Wisdom

nor the Targumists reason concerning the Word, or purport to bring forward a theological novelty. Their allusions require the key of Philo or of the New Testament writers to be clearly comprehended. They write of the Word or the Memra as of a conception which is familiar to their readers and requires no comment or exposition. And if this was the case, it is clear that Philo's ideas must have become very rapidly popular, not merely amongst the Greek-speaking Jews, but also amongst the Aramaic-speaking masses of Palestine. From any point of view it is interesting to find Rabbinical doctrine advancing, either in the lifetime of our Lord or at a very early period after His death, so far beyond the Messianic teaching of the Old Testament. A still further advance was to be made apart from, or, as it may be said, in spite of, the influence of Christianity. In the Talmudic Zohar, which was written towards the close of the second century, the mediatorialship of the Messiah is more prominently enunciated than in the Targums.

Again, it has been conjectured by learned writers that Philo and the Targumists alike derived the theory of the Divine Word from the ancient Persian creed, in which the creation of

the material universe is ascribed to "Honover," the utterance or word of Ormuzd, the Supreme Being. It is quite possible that the mythology of Persia was familiar to the omnivorous learning of Alexandria. It is known by indelible traces that the secret subterranean cult of Mithras travelled from Persia to Alexandria, and found its way even to Rome, at a period which was probably anterior to the age of Philo, and which cannot certainly have been much later. The channels by which this mysterious ritual was communicated may well have served for the initiation of Alexandrian scholars in that purer faith of ancient Persia which underlay the gross and fantastic forms of her later worship. Nor, if ancient creeds are scrutinised, is Honover the only deity which may seem to have a direct analogy with the Logos idea. In the Hindu mythology the goddess Vâk plays a principal part in the poetic legend of Soma, which embodies the spiritualised nature-worship of one phase of Brahminism. But Vâk means "speech" (cf. Latin *voco*); and in the Vedas this goddess appears as an emanation from Brahma, the supreme deity, and the agent through whom he exercises his power over the external world.

But it is perhaps unnecessary to go so far afield as Persia or India to find the clue to the Logos idea as Philo shaped it. It may be surmised that he derived the germ of his conception from his meditations on the Mosaic account of the Creation. This explanation is so simple as to have been overlooked; but if it be the true explanation, it may afford also some hint of the origin of Honover and Vâk, and testify to the inevitableness of certain metaphysical conclusions when a certain stage of theological inquiry has been reached.

In the language of modern evolutionists, religions are represented as uniformly generated in fetishism, and gradually developed into a more spiritual form with the advance of human intelligence. This view is singularly at variance with the history of those Oriental religions whose records can be traced into remote antiquity. Investigation invariably proves that their multiplied divinities, elaborate ceremonial, and degrading superstitions are morbid growths and excrescences upon an elder faith in a single supreme being. So far from constantly advancing towards a higher spirituality, the tendency of religions would appear to be to retrograde towards anthropomorphism. This

tendency may no doubt be kept in check. The purer faith may be preserved in a secret esoteric doctrine, or it may be from time to time revived by the enthusiasm of some great reformer. But the history of religions is the history of the action and reaction of anthropomorphism and spirituality; and this conflict is not infrequently stimulated by external scepticism.

An eclectic philosophy is a sceptical philosophy; and the Alexandrians of Philo's day were sceptics. The only religious element common to the varied systems which they studied was a barren theism. To them the Supreme Being was little more than a passionless abstraction. In their revolt against the anthropomorphism of a decadent heathendom, the idea of attributing form or substance, or even feeling or action, to the Deity repelled and disgusted them. Even the Hebrew Scriptures appeared to their critical fastidiousness to invest Jehovah with too much of the semblance of humanity. Now, Philo was emphatically an apologist. Like Josephus, he wrote, no doubt, primarily for "the Greeks." He desired so to re-state the truths of the Hebrew religion as to conciliate the Gentile world. But he also desired to reconcile to the records of their own

faith that portion of the Jewish world which, like himself, had become impregnated with the Hellenistic spirit. The need for this conciliation and this reconciliation had been perceived long before his time. Indignantly as modern Jewish authors deny it, it is certain that the editors of the Septuagint deliberately set themselves to soften down those passages in the earlier books of the Bible which were conceived to be most open to the charge of anthropomorphism. A single example will suffice. In Exodus xxiv. 9-11 it is related that Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy elders ascended Mount Sinai "and saw the God of Israel." The Hebrew text is clear beyond dispute; but in the Septuagint the passage reads, "and saw the place where the God of Israel stood."

The allegorising tendencies of Philo are to be referred to his desire to overcome anthropomorphic difficulties of this kind, and to spiritualise a narrative which might seem, even to those who were not altogether worldly-minded, to be sometimes trivial and sometimes even repulsive in its character.¹ It was not

¹ Long before the time of Philo the Sophists had professed to find moral allegories in Homer. Long after his time Christian apologists—Origen amongst the number—explained the difficulties of the Old Testament upon the same principle. Some even

that he either discredited or disparaged the Scriptures. His views undoubtedly accorded with those which, as we learn from him, were held by the Therapeutæ, an ascetic community resembling the Essenes. The Therapeutæ maintained that, whilst all the narratives of Scripture were to be received as absolutely true, there was, nevertheless, a deeper truth, of which the mere letter of Scripture was the allegory. In other words, the sacred writings were a parable, the spiritual meaning of which could be perceived only by those whose eyes were opened by secret communion with the Author of all truth.

Philo set himself to discover this hidden interpretation. Beginning naturally with the Mosaic cosmogony, he found at once matter for profound meditation. The Book of Genesis leaves the *modus operandi* of Creation in obscurity. The account given of the matter is, "God said, Let there be light," "God said, Let there be a firmament," and the fiat is repeated until "the heavens and the earth were finished." Thus the *spoken word* of God

allegorised the narrative of the Gospels. Nearer to our own times Swedenborg applied an elaborate system of allegory to the interpretation of the whole of the sacred Scriptures.

is represented as the efficient cause of Creation. But to attribute speech to the Most High was manifestly a concession to the frailty of the human intellect. Now, the spoken word of man is the expression of his thought, the manifestation of his purpose, the revelation of himself, his means of communication with others. By the spoken word of God, in like manner, must be meant that which was the expression of the divine thought, the manifestation of the divine purpose, the revelation of the divine nature, the means of communication between the Divine Being, enthroned in absolute repose in the unfathomable depths of the infinite, and the material universe. Here it may be supposed that we have the origin of Philo's conception of the Logos;¹ and, granting (what, in the face of modern discoveries, can scarcely be denied) that a tradition of the Creation corresponding to the Mosaic narrative was widespread in remote antiquity amongst the nations of the East, we may here also find a clue to the

¹ Compare Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.* ch. vii. "Then, therefore, does the Word also Himself assume His own form and glorious garment and vocal utterance when God says 'Let there be light.' This is the perfect nativity of the Word, when He proceeds forth from God formed by Him first to devise and think out all things." See also *ibid.*, ch. xii.

process by which Honover and Vâk became divinities.

And, moreover, although Philo knew nothing of the modern theory of an Elohistic narrative interwoven with a Jehovahistic narrative, it cannot have escaped his attention that in the account of the Creation the Deity is referred to sometimes by the word Elohim, which is obviously a plural form, and sometimes by the word Jah, or Jehovah, which is a singular form; nor did he fail to note the suggestion conveyed in the phrase, "Let *us* make man."¹ And hence it was not difficult for him to conceive that the Word emanating from the Supreme Being, the agent and efficient cause of the Creation, must be not merely a person, but also a divine person comprehended in the incommunicable name, a sharer, in a measure if not in all its fulness, of the splendour of Jehovah.

Seeing in the Divine Word the means of communication or the "link" between the Supreme Being and the material universe, little further effort was required to see in the same Divine Word the "link" between the Supreme Being and humanity. The "one

¹ See *De Mund. Opif.* 24.

living and true God" Philo conceived to be, as our own Articles declare, "without body, parts, or passions." But the Scriptures asserted that men had seen Him and conversed with Him. The explanation was that, just as the work of Creation had been accomplished not immediately by God, but by a divine person emanating from God, so also the invisible had appeared to mortal eyes, not directly but as manifested by the same divine person. Thus, according to Philo, it was the Word who appeared to Moses in the burning bush, who promised posterity to Abraham, and who spoke in a vision of the night to Jacob.

It might not, perhaps, be impossible to trace the trains of thought by which Philo came to recognise the sonship as well as the divinity of the Word, and to see in Him the Mediator, the High Priest, and the Paraclete. But it must be confessed that the dreamy and half-poetic style of his meditations is not calculated to assist the reader in discovering the processes by which he arrived at his results.

CHAPTER VIII

ST. JOHN AND PHILO JUDÆUS (*contd.*)

THE treatment accorded to Philo by Christian writers is a curious subject of study. The early Fathers are frequent in their quotations from his pages, and fervent in their admiration of his genius; but they betray no consciousness of the problems which are suggested by the substance of his writings taken in connection with their date. A later age, perceiving the anachronism, so to speak, of his teachings, the discrepancy between the Christian lustre of his learning and the entire absence of Christian illumination from his life, gave credence to the idle legend reported by Eusebius, that, when advanced in years, Philo met with St. Peter and became a convert to the Christian faith. At a still later but equally uncritical period, the difficulty was solved by the assumption that the entire works of Philo

were forgeries concocted by the pious fraud of some early Christian convert. Early in the last century a treatise, which had some reputation in its day, was written by a learned clergyman to prove that Philo was himself a member of the sect of Therapeutæ, and that the Therapeutæ, although resembling the Essenes in some particulars, were in fact a community, not of Hebrew but of Christian ascetics.

Modern orthodox critics seem concerned rather to minimise than either to deny or explain the anticipatory character of Philo's "Doctrine of the Word." They lay stress upon the fact that his language, although generally, is not uniformly applicable to a divine personality. They insist that his conception, even in its sublimest forms, never rose to the height of identifying the Word with the Messiah; that he gave no hint of an Incarnation or of the dual nature of the Incarnate One; that he never ventured to ascribe to the Son existence from eternity or equality with the Father.

It is true, indeed, that Philo's language, clear and unmistakable in some passages, is in others vague and vacillating. But if it be granted, as it cannot fail to be, that in *some* passages

he does plainly describe the Word as a divine person, as the Son of God, the Mediator, the Paraclete, then, whatever may have been his verbal inconsistencies or mental fluctuations, it nevertheless remains the fact that he provided a theological vocabulary for the expression of Johannine and Pauline doctrine.

It is also true that Philo never identifies the Word with the Messiah. Strangely enough, the Messianic prophecies seem to have interested him but little. He does indeed assert that a time will come when the Jewish race, purified and regenerated, shall be gathered together from all quarters of the earth and restored to their own country under the guidance and leadership of a more than human being who will be invisible to all eyes except their own. But he does not say, or in any way indicate, that this "more than human being" is the Word; and this is the only reference to a personal Messiah in the whole of his writings. And although Philo asserts the divine character of the Word, he knows nothing of His human character: he never dreamed that the mediatorialship of which he speaks lay in the assumption by the Word of our nature and our frame. So far from recognising the existence of the

Word from eternity, he expressly says, "He is not like God, without beginning." And the whole scope of his theory seems to involve not merely the subordination but the inferiority of the Son to the Father.

But these defects of Philonic teaching, so far from disproving the connection between the Word of Philo and the Word of John, tend rather to confirm it. For an examination of the Apostle's language seems to indicate that it was his express purpose to correct, or rather to complete, the doctrine of the philosopher.

In appropriating the conception of the Word to the service of Christian theology, the points which it was necessary to emphasise were precisely those which Philo had missed—the Incarnation and the Messiahship.

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him. . . . In Him was life. . . . And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. . . . The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."

The creating Word, the source of life, is thus ushered into New Testament terminology with

the great addendum that He was made man, and that He was the Anointed One.

Nor was Philo's saying, that the Word "was not without beginning," left uncorrected by St. John. In his Gospel he says no more than "In the beginning was the Word. . . . The same was in the beginning with God,"—expressions which have indeed been held by some to imply the eternal pre-existence of the Son. But in his First Epistle the Apostle is more definite, and, as though to remove any misconception or ambiguity, asserts that the Word was "that eternal life which was with the Father"; and in that sentence we have the high-water mark of doctrine concerning this matter until Origen presented theology with the paraphrase "the Eternal Son."

Philo, as we have seen, had described the Word as the "first-begotten of God." St. Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews adopt this phrase. In Colossians i. 15 Christ is called "the first-born of every creature," and in Hebrews i. 6 "the first-begotten." Nowhere else in Scripture is He so referred to. But again the doctrine is developed by St. John. To him it was reserved to use the bolder word, which is his alone, and which occurs four times

in his Gospel and once in his First Epistle,—the name which has become so familiar in our creeds and formularies, “the *only-begotten* of the Father. . . . The *only-begotten* Son which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared (manifested) Him.”

The last passage shows that St. John had grasped Philo's conception of the Word as not only the revelation of the silent God, but also as the reflection of the invisible God. It was this aspect of the Word which St. Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews rapturously appropriated to their Lord. They never use the name of Logos; but as Philo had written of the Logos that He was the “image of God,” so Paul¹ speaks of “Christ who is the image of God,” and again² says of Him that He is “the image of the invisible God,” adding the words above quoted, “the first-born of every creature,” and proceeding, as though to emphasise the reference to the Word, “for by Him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth.” And the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in a passage which has been already referred to, says of the Son that He is “the express

¹ 2 Cor. iv. 4.

² Col. i. 15.

image” of the person of God. And here again the allusion to the Word is rendered unmistakable by the phrase, “by whom He made the world,” which immediately precedes, and the phrase, “the first-begotten,” which immediately follows. Except in these three passages, Christ is never in the Scriptures described as the image of God.

It is also St. Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews who take hold of the idea of the mediatorship of the Word and apply it to Jesus Christ. They alone amongst New Testament writers use the name of the Mediator (*Μεστής*—the word used by Philo); so strangely alike in this, as in many other things, are these two writers, if indeed they are not one and the same. In Galatians iii. 19, 20 the law is said to have been “ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator”; and it is added, “Now a mediator is not a mediator of one; but God is one.” In the Epistle to the Hebrews Christ is thrice entitled the Mediator of a “new,” or “better,” covenant. And in a still more celebrated saying St. Paul pronounces,¹ “There is one God, and one Mediator between God and man, the man

¹ 1 Tim. ii. 5.

Christ Jesus," insisting apparently upon the truth, of which Philo was wholly unaware, that it was the human nature of our Lord which constituted Him the "link," the medium of communication between God and man, and the Intercessor for man with God.

As Intercessor the Word is represented by Philo in the character of "High Priest of the World," and in the character of Paraclete, or Advocate, with the Father. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, alone of New Testament writers, describes our Lord as "Priest" or "High Priest." "It behoved Him to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining unto God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people"; and he harps in several successive chapters upon the saying of the Psalmist, "Thou art a high priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec." On the other hand, St. John is the only writer who applies to Christ the name of Paraclete, a title which is elsewhere applied solely to the Holy Ghost: "If any man sin, we have an advocate (paraclete) with the Father, Jesus Christ the Righteous."

It may be readily perceived what it was

which led these New Testament writers so unhesitatingly to apply what Philo had said concerning the Word to Jesus Christ. The connecting link is to be found in the expression "the Son of God." Whether Christ ever so described Himself is not perhaps beyond dispute; but others so described Him in His presence, and He tacitly acquiesced in the title and all that it involved. But the Word is again and again asserted by Philo to be the "Son of God." And when this assertion came under the notice of the Apostles and Disciples, it was an irresistible inference that the Word was no other than the Lord they knew.

We have seen how, in appropriating the doctrine of Philo, they expanded and developed it. But in one point his doctrine remained without explicit correction until a later age than that of the Apostles. It is true that the New Testament writers nowhere endorsed the phrase, "the second Deity," as applied to the Word, or gave any warrant for the Arian heresy that the Son, although divine, was not of the divine essence. But, on the other hand, they refrained from any direct assertion of the equality of the persons of the Godhead. It

was not until after long and wearisome metaphysical wranglings that the Church agreed to say, in the words of the Creed called Athanasian: "And in this Trinity none is afore or after other; none is greater or less than another. . . . Jesus Christ the Son of God is . . . equal to the Father as touching His Godhead, and inferior to the Father as touching His manhood."

Modern advanced criticism on the Fourth Gospel seems to take too little account of the influence of Alexandria, not merely as the intellectual centre of the world, but also as a great—perhaps the greatest—centre of the Jewish race during the first century. Rome was indeed the political capital of the Roman Empire; it was also the home of literature and jurisprudence; but Alexandria was at once the greatest commercial city of the age and the greatest seat of learning. It was not like a modern university, a mere training-school for youth. In Alexandria the distinction between "town" and "gown" was non-existent. Its lecture-halls were open to the public, and were thronged every day by such miscellaneous crowds as one might expect to see in the theatre or the exchange. Not less thronged

was the vast library which the Alexandrians prized as their most precious possession, and which, when it was destroyed by fire, Anthony, anxious to conciliate their favour, replaced by one which he pillaged from Pergamos. It may be questioned whether the world has ever known a more intellectual population than that which existed during several centuries in this illustrious city.

Alexandrian philosophy may be said to have commenced and ended its career with mathematics. The first "school" was made illustrious by the names of Euclid and Archimedes; the second by those of Ptolemy the astronomer and Diophantus the arithmetician. But in the long interval between these two great periods of mathematical activity Alexandrian learning was so varied and so impartial that it can only be described by the word eclectic. It was as though for a time the human mind had exhausted its capacity for original speculation and experiment, and was compelled to devote its energies to collecting and comparing past philosophies. Such periods are not unknown in the history of human thought. To take an example from the arts, a similar stage may be said to have been reached at the present day in the history

of architecture. Modern architecture has no originating genius, but it is learned beyond all preceding eras. Its practitioners can compare and combine, but they cannot invent. An eclectic philosophy is necessarily critical, and it is usually coincident with widespread education. These were the characteristics of Alexandrian philosophy in the time of Philo.

But Alexandria was largely a Jewish city. Of its total population of seven hundred thousand in the reign of Augustus no fewer than two hundred thousand were Jews, and the total Jewish population of Egypt was computed at one million. The Alexandrian Jews were, to a great extent, self-governed, under the charter of successive emperors, by a Council of Elders, presided over by an "Ethnarch" of their own choosing. It is worthy of remark that the most famous public teacher of the time, Potamon, the founder of the eclectic philosophy and the master of Philo in secular learning, was a Jew.

It seems probable that intercourse between Judea and Alexandria was intimate and continuous. The land-route by which the parents of the child Jesus fled with Him into Egypt, doubtless to take refuge amongst Egyptian,

perhaps Alexandrian, Jews, may have been too tedious and too much exposed to danger for frequent traffic. But ships must have been constantly passing and re-passing between the great port of the Levant and the various harbours of Palestine; and the Jews were already the busiest and most successful traders in the Roman world. It seems certain, moreover, that notwithstanding the erection by the Egyptian Jews of a temple of their own at Onion, near Memphis, no inconsiderable number of them must have swelled the enormous multitude of pilgrims, amounting, it is said, to nearly two million souls, who went up annually to Jerusalem to the feast of the Passover. It was, perhaps, because of the concourse of Greek-speaking pilgrims at Jerusalem at the time of the Crucifixion that the inscription on the cross was written in Greek, as well as in the official Latin and the scarcely less official Hebrew. But there must have been many residents in the Jewish capital who were familiar with Greek, through their intercourse with the Jews of Egypt and Asia Minor. There are many indications in the New Testament that the Jews of our Lord's time were not an illiterate people; and this impression is corroborated

from other sources. When Augustus Cæsar issued the edict which guaranteed the privileges of Judea, he expressly granted protection to the *public schools* as well as to the synagogues. Josephus tells us that the younger sons of Herod, anticipating that they would succeed to the kingdom in preference to their elder brothers, insolently announced that they "would make Herod's sons, by his former wives, *country schoolmasters*; for that the present education which was given them and their diligence in learning fitted them for such employment." When it is remembered the princes referred to had been educated chiefly at Rome, the inference would seem to be that, even in the country schools of Herod's kingdom, instruction was not confined to Hebrew studies. That Greek was very commonly understood in Palestine at a period shortly after the Crucifixion appears probable. The institution of the diaconate was due to the complaints of the "Grecian Jews" in the early Church of Jerusalem, that "their widows were neglected." The accusers of Stephen were "certain of the Synagogue, which is called the Synagogue of the Libertines and Cyrenians, and Alexandrians, and of them of Cilicia and of Asia"; and in his

long defence before the Jewish Council, the protomartyr employed the phraseology of the Septuagint, if not its actual words. Josephus himself learnt Greek in order to translate his *Wars of the Jews* into that tongue; but he informs us that he sold copies of the translation "to many of our men who understood the Greek philosophy."

It seems not unnatural or improbable that the works of Philo should become known to the Christian Church through the Hellenists of Jerusalem, if through no other channel of communication; and thus St. John may well have become aware of the doctrine of the Logos as early as the date of Stephen's martyrdom. At any rate, the references to the doctrine of the Logos in the Fourth Gospel afford no ground for assigning to that Gospel so late a date as 170 A.D. with Baur, or even so late a date as the beginning of the second century with Matthew Arnold. Baur, indeed, seems to have entertained the notion that the conception of the Word could only have been imparted to the Christian Church through the medium of the Gnostics; and according to his theory the author of the Fourth Gospel was a "Gnostically-disposed Christian, a consummate literary artist, seeking

to develop his Logos idea, to cry up Greek Christianity and decry Jewish." Apart from other objections to this theory, it involves a strange misconception of the tenets of the Gnostics. Much as the Gnostic sects differed amongst themselves, they were united in their denial that our Lord's body was truly human; it was, according to them, a semblance only, a "docetic" or "fantastic" body. No Gnostic or Gnostically-disposed Christian can be conceived to have written, "The Word became flesh." Matthew Arnold allows that St. John himself provided the materials for the Gospel which bears his name, but considers that these materials were edited by "a Greek Christian, a man of literary talent, a theologian." It is difficult to see the necessity for even this modification of the received tradition of the Church. There is nothing in the Alexandrianism of the Fourth Gospel which St. John might not readily have learned whilst still in early manhood. It is true that in youth he was a fisherman, and even after three years' companionship with his Great Master he may have been, as he seemed to be on the morrow of Pentecost to the rulers and elders and scribes, an "ignorant and unlearned" man. But it was impossible for him to engage

during many years in zealous propagandism of the new faith, involving perpetual controversy with learned Rabbis and subtle-witted Greeks, without a quickening of the intellect and a stimulus to study. It would have been surprising if such a man had failed to become acquainted with the religious works of Philo, which were well known to a soldier and politician like Josephus, and which were evidently familiar to Onkelos and Jonathan the Targumists. And if the Apostle ultimately became "a man of literary talent and a theologian," it is not more surprising in his case than in the case of many an ecclesiastic of later times whose birth was no less humble and whose early education was no less deficient than his own.

CHAPTER IX

NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION OF CANONICAL
SCRIPTURE

THE Christian religion professes to be the religion of the Hebrew people explained and amplified and developed. It is not a question of mere derivation; but of identity. The relation is not so much that of parent and child as that of the adult man to the earlier self of his own childhood. Christian doctrine is said to be latent in the Law of Moses, and the New Testament to be inherent in the Old. This was the thesis of Christ and His apostles; and therefore of necessity they constantly appeal to the Sacred Scriptures of what we have learned to call the older dispensation. It is insisted that events related in the Gospels explicitly accomplished the predictions of the Hebrew seers, and that the precepts of Christ did not destroy but fulfilled the Law of Moses. The Old Testament is

134

not indeed referred to in the New solely as an authority or as a test. It is used as literature as well as dogma. The books of the Old Testament contained the documents of the Jew's religion, but they also constituted the classics of his language, and they are therefore very naturally used by the Apostles and Evangelists for illustration as well as for evidence, or, as one may say, for literary as well as for theological purposes.

New Testament quotations from and references to the older Scriptures may be conveniently divided into four classes—

- (i.) Passages which are quoted as prophetic.
- (ii.) Passages which are quoted as authoritative.
- (iii.) Historical references.
- (iv.) Passages which are quoted by way of literary allusion.

(i.) Opinion may easily differ as to the passages which should be included in the first class. There can be no dispute with regard to those which purport to contain predictions of events which, it is claimed, have come to pass. Thus there can be no doubt as to Matthew i. 22, 23—

"That it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Behold, a virgin shall be with

child, and shall bring forth a Son, and they shall call His name Emmanuel."

This is a clear quotation of Isaiah vii. 14—

"Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a Son, and shall call His name Immanuel";

and the Evangelist, without any question, indicates not merely that the words are applicable to Christ, but also that Isaiah wrote them as a prophecy concerning Him.

But besides direct predictions of this character there are passages which are commonly described as "typical" prophecies. Thus in Matthew ii. 15 it is said that the child Jesus was taken into Egypt, and remained there until the death of Herod—

"That it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Out of Egypt have I called My Son."

The reference can only be to Hosea xi. 1—

"When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called My Son out of Egypt."

In this case it is difficult to regard the words of Hosea as conveying a prediction of an incident in the career of the Messiah. Still there are theologians who contend that the prophet was consciously using the childhood of the Jewish

people as an allegory or type of the childhood of our Lord. According to another view, the type or allegory existed, not in the mind of the prophet but in that of the Evangelist; and in support of this view it is pointed out that the Hebrew Targumists were fond of drawing similar analogies, and introducing them in similar language, as constituting the "fulfilment" of prophecy. These so-called "typical" prophecies may perhaps be more properly regarded as "literary allusions," and so falling under the fourth of the classes I have indicated.

(ii.) Passages which are quoted as authoritative—that is, such as are adduced as the basis of doctrine or as the rule of conduct—are numerous, and their character is easy to determine. Thus in Galatians iii. 11 St. Paul writes—

"But that no man is justified in the sight of God, is evident: for *The just shall live by faith.*"

Here the words I have italicised are taken word for word from Habakkuk ii. 4.

Christ Himself repeatedly quotes the Old Testament as affording the rule of conduct: as, for example, in Matthew iv. 7, where He says—

"It is written again, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."

This is taken from Deuteronomy vi. 16—

“Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God.”

Or, as the Septuagint has it—

“Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.”

(iii.) Historical references, by which I mean references to incidents recorded in Old Testament Scripture, are very numerous in the New. Thus our Lord refers to the occasions on which David did eat the shewbread, to the Queen of Sheba's visit to Solomon, to the fate of Lot's wife, and to the experiences of Jonah. Nearly the whole of Acts vii. and of Hebrews xi. are taken up with narratives of Scripture history.

(iv.) Quotations may be said to be made by way of literary allusion where their object is to adorn or illustrate a theme rather than to support an argument. Such are those numerous cases in which texts cited from the Old Testament are obviously “accommodated” to the purpose of the writer citing them. A similar use of quotation is familiar in secular literature. There is something pleasing to the mind in the employment of well-known phraseology in some new connection.

The following may be cited as examples of

quotation of the Old Testament by way of literary allusion. In Romans x. 15 St. Paul writes—

“As it is written, How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and that bring glad tidings of good things!”

This is from Isaiah lii. 7—

“How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace!”

Here there can be no question of “typical” prophecy. The words of the prophet are simply adopted by the Apostle as expressing his own meaning.

Again, in Acts i. 20 we read—

“For it is written in the Book of Psalms, Let his habitation be desolate, and let no man dwell therein.”

The reference is to Psalm lxix. 25—

“Let their habitation be desolate, and let none dwell in their tents.”

It can hardly be contended that the enemies of David were “types” of Judas, or that David's condemnation of them can have had any prophetic reference to the fate of Judas. The allusion seems to be of a purely literary character.

A very striking illustration of this kind of quotation is afforded in Ephesians iv. 8—

“Wherefore He saith, When He ascended up on high, He led captivity captive, *and gave gifts unto men.*”

This is taken from Psalm lxviii. 18, which, however, reads—

“Thou hast ascended on high, Thou hast led captivity captive: *Thou hast received gifts for men.*”

Here again there can be no question of prophecy, typical or otherwise. St. Paul uses the words in a different sense from that in which they were used by the Psalmist. The last clause was probably not varied without a purpose. Familiar as the Jews were with every page of their Scriptures, the discrepancy would arrest attention and emphasise the royal bounty of the ascended Lord.

The above classification of quotations from canonical Scripture becomes useful when we have to consider what is to be inferred from the quotation by New Testament writers of Scripture which is not canonical. For it is evident that whilst quotations which belong to the first two classes—namely those which are used as directly prophetic and those which are used as authoritative—necessarily imply a belief

in the sacred character of the Scriptures from which they are taken, this is not the case with quotations of the third and fourth classes.

No doubt the writers of the New Testament entirely believed in the truth of the incidents to which they refer; but nevertheless the fact that they referred to them does not *of necessity* involve a belief that they were literally true. St. James's reference to the “patience of Job” would be just as appropriate whether Job were an actual historical character or whether he were, as some contend, merely the hero of a kind of religious novel. And so, also, the New Testament reference to the sojourn of Jonah in the whale's belly affords no absolute ground for deciding whether this incident is to be regarded as literal fact or as allegory. Still less does quotation “by way of literary allusion” *of necessity* imply a belief either in the sacred character or in the truth of the writings which are quoted. The unfettered way in which St. Paul, in particular, avails himself of Old Testament phraseology makes it clear that he would have availed himself of purely secular literature in the same way if it had been equally familiar to the Jews to whom he wrote, and if it had been capable of supplying him with language

which he could have turned to the purpose of his arguments. And, in fact, on several occasions he did quote from heathen literature. He quoted Aratus the Alexandrian to his audience on Mars Hill (Acts xvii. 28)—

“As certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also His offspring.”

And in writing to Titus he presses Epimenides into his service (Tit. i. 12)—

“One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, The Cretians are alway liars, evil beasts, slow bellies.”

In writing to the Church of Corinth, without professedly quoting, he uses the exact language of Menander (1 Cor. xv. 33)—

“Be not deceived: evil communications corrupt good manners.”

And again, in Galatians v. 23 he uses an expression which is to be found word for word in Aristotle’s *Politics*—

“Against such there is no law.”¹

When it is said that the Old Testament comprised the classics of the Hebrew people, it must be added that the Greek version of the Seventy appears to have also become classical amongst

¹ The Greek in both cases is, *κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος*.

the Jews at the period when the New Testament was written. It is that version which is usually quoted by the Evangelists and Apostles, and their use of it has been the occasion of much perplexity. The Septuagint abounds in mistranslations of the Massoretic text. In some cases it is evident that the translators deliberately set themselves to tone down what might have appeared to Alexandrian readers too anthropomorphic in the original. In other cases they have committed blunders the genesis of which is obvious to the expert Hebrew scholar; whilst in other cases, again, there are in their version interpolations and omissions and variations which are altogether inexplicable. The surmise which has been advanced, that the Seventy may have used some Hebrew version which varied from the received text, is inadmissible. The care of the Jews in preserving the verbal accuracy of their Scriptures was scrupulous even to fanaticism. The writers of the New Testament cannot have been ignorant of the discrepancies between the Septuagint and its Hebrew original. In some cases, indeed, they betray their consciousness of these discrepancies by departing from the Septuagint and making a more accurate rendering of the Hebrew into

Greek. But in far the greater number of cases they adhere to the Septuagint, blunders and all. Nor can it be said that they correct the more glaring or the more important mistakes and pass by the rest as insignificant. On the contrary, they frequently amend where amendment appears immaterial, and leave mistakes unaltered which seriously obscure the sense.

One or two instances out of many may be given of the manner in which New Testament writers ignored the variations between the Septuagint and the Hebrew text.

In the Septuagint the Song of Moses (Deut. xxxii.) concludes with the words—

“Rejoice, ye heavens, with Him, and let the angels of God worship Him.”

This passage does not occur at all in the Hebrew. It is an interpolation of the Seventy. But the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews cites it in support of the thesis that the Son was—

“Made so much better than the angels, as He hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent gift than they.”

The closing stanzas of the Song of Moses are “typically” interpreted as a promise of the coming of the avenging and redeeming Lord; and the final apostrophe interpolated in the

Septuagint is taken as an invocation to the worship of the Son—

“And again . . . He saith, And let all the angels of God worship Him” (Heb. i. 6).

Another source has indeed been found for this quotation. Psalm xcvi. 7 reads in the Septuagint version—

“Worship Him, all ye His angels.”

But this does not carry the matter any further; for the Hebrew word *Elohim*, which is here translated “angels,” does not bear that meaning. The sentence is properly rendered as in the A.V.—

“Worship Him, all ye gods.”

This, it can hardly be doubted, is a case of deliberate alteration on the part of the Seventy, who were most anxious to disabuse the minds of the philosophical and sceptical Alexandrians of the notion that the Jewish religion was merely a variety of polytheism.

Another example may be taken from Psalm iv. 4, which reads in the A.V.—

“Stand in awe, and sin not.”

And this is a correct translation of the Hebrew original. The Seventy, by a blunder which is

capable of easy explanation, rendered this passage—

“Be ye angry, and sin not.”

And it is in this distorted form that it is quoted by St. Paul in Ephesians iv. 26.

In another case the Apostle Paul actually bases a theological argument upon a verbal peculiarity of the Septuagint—

“He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ” (Gal. iii. 16).

In Genesis xviii. 8, which is the Scripture referred to, the singular form is used both in the Hebrew original and in the Greek of the Septuagint. But in the Hebrew the plural form could not have been used, for it does not mean seeds, but “crops of grain”; whereas, in the Greek, the plural (*σπέρματα*) does mean seeds, and might therefore have been properly used.¹

We know from Tertullian and from other sources that in early Christian times the Septuagint translation was believed to have been

¹ See Davidson's *Introduction to the New Testament*, pp. 103, 104; also Davidson's *Canon of the Bible*, p. 78.

It is a further difficulty that the singular form both in Hebrew and Greek may be used with a collective signification. See Harner, *Introduction*, vol. ii. p. 192, where Tholuck's ingenious attempts to explain away this difficulty are given.

miraculously accomplished. It might almost appear as though the Apostles and Evangelists entertained this view. And it is worthy of remark that whatever problems may be raised by the quotation of uncanonical works in the pages of the New Testament, such problems are of precisely the same character as those which are raised by the quotation of the Old Testament itself through the medium of a translation which is manifestly inaccurate.

CHAPTER X

NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION OF DEUTERO-CANONICAL SCRIPTURE

THE books which for the sake of convenience may be described as deutero-canonical¹ are of Alexandrian origin, and were written in Greek. Some of them, such as Bel and the Dragon, resemble those tales of the Talmud which passed under the name of Haggadah. Others, such as Wisdom, are of a much more elevated character. These works were incorporated with, or at least annexed to, the Septuagint, and this association no doubt materially added to their prestige. They were never, however, reckoned canonical by the Jewish Church. How far the Evangelists and Apostles made use of them is a question which is by no means free from dis-

¹ The deutero-canonical books are Tobit, Judith, Second Esther, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch, Epistle of Jeremiah, Song of the Three Children, Bel and the Dragon, 1 Maccabees and 2 Maccabees.

pute. A collection has been made of more than one hundred passages in the New Testament which are said to be taken from, or at least founded upon, passages in the deutero-canonical Scriptures. But in most of these cases the resemblance is altogether fanciful. Only in very few is it sufficient to warrant a marginal note in a Reference Bible. Bleek reduces the number of New Testament references to the deutero-canonical books to eight; and as these are the strongest cases which can be advanced, it is worth while to examine them in detail. In two cases out of the eight, although the New Testament passage closely resembles a passage in a deutero-canonical book, it also resembles a passage in the Old Testament, from which very probably both may have been derived. This may be seen from the following comparison:—

ROMANS ix. 21.

WISDOM xv. 7.

JEREMIAH xviii. 6.

Hath not the potter power over the clay, fashioneth every vessel of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? The potter . . . fashioneth every vessel you as this potter? . . . Yea of the same clay he maketh both the vessels that serve for clean uses, and likewise such as serve to the contrary. Cannot I do unto you as this potter? saith the Lord. Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye in Mine hand, O house of Israel!

EPHESIANS vi. 13-17.

WISDOM v. 17-20.

ISAIAH lxx. 17.

Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God . . . having your loincloth girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness . . . Above all, taking the shield of faith . . . And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God.

He shall take to him jealousy for compassing of God . . . having your plate of armour . . . He shall put on righteousness as a breastplate, and shall put on truth as a breastplate, and the breastplate of and true judgment in righteousness . . . stead of a helmet. He shall take holiness as a shield of faith . . . And an invincible shield. For He put on righteousness as a breastplate, and an helmet of salvation upon His head; and He put on the garments of vengeance for clothing, and was clad with zeal as a cloke.

It is contended that Romans i. 20-32 bears a resemblance both in argument and language to Wisdom xiii.-xv., and this may be conceded; but there is nothing in this case which amounts to quotation, even of the loosest kind. St. Paul may have had the passage in Wisdom in his mind; but the presumption in favour of this view is very slight. The passages in question are too long to be set out here.

Again, it is suggested that the words in Hebrews xi. 35,

"And others were tortured, not accepting deliverance; that they might obtain a better resurrection,"

have reference to the "extreme tortures" suffered by the seven brethren and their mother who refused to eat swine's flesh, as recorded

in 2 Maccabees vi. 18. There, is, however, nothing to show that this "historical reference" was intended; and there are other circumstances mentioned in the Old Testament to which the language used might very well apply.

In two more cases the resemblance is so close as to make it appear probable that the later writer was consciously or unconsciously imitating the language of the earlier, though in both these cases the ideas expressed are familiar in a slightly different shape in the Old Testament.

These are—

1 PETER i. 7.

That the trial of your faith, being much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise and honour.

1 CORINTHIANS ii. 11.

For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.

WISDOM iii. 5, 6.

For God proved them, and found them worthy of Himself. As gold in the furnace hath He tried them, and received them as a burnt-offering.

JUDITH viii. 14.

For ye cannot find the depth of the heart of man, neither can ye perceive the things he thinketh; then how can ye search out God, that hath made all these things, and know His mind or comprehend His purpose?

In the remaining two cases the presumption that the later writer was consciously employing the language of the earlier is strong—

HEBREWS i. 3.

Who [Christ], being the brightness of His [the Father's] glory, and the express image of His person.

WISDOM iii. 26.

[Wisdom is] the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted image of His goodness.

Here, although the idea does not entirely correspond,¹ the similarity of phrase and the use of the peculiar and unusual word *ἀράγασμα* for “brightness” in both cases, justify the inference that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews adapted to the purpose of his argument an expressive sentence which he had found in the Book of Wisdom.

JAMES i. 19.

... Let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath.

ECCLÆSTICUS v. 11.

Be swift to hear . . . and with patience give answer.
ECCLÆSTICUS iv. 29.—Be not hasty with thy tongue.

In this last case it seems most likely that St. James intended to reproduce the language of Ecclesiasticus.

In no case is a deutero-canonical book referred to by name in the New Testament; in no case

¹ See *supra*, Chap. VII.

is a passage from any of these books introduced by any of the phrases which commonly (though not invariably) preface quotations from the Old Testament, such as: “That the Scripture might be fulfilled,” “Thus fulfilling the Scripture,” “As the Scripture saith,” “As it is written,” “He saith.” In no case is a passage from any of these books quoted *as prophetic* or *as authoritative*; that is, as the foundation of doctrine or moral duty. No passage can, I think, be found in the New Testament which unmistakably refers to any incident related in them. So far as they are used at all in the passages which have been set out above, they are used by way of *literary allusion* only.

This is not, of course, conclusive as to their value or their inspiration. Neither the Book of Esther, nor the Book of Ecclesiastes, nor the Song of Solomon, is quoted or referred to by any New Testament writer.

The works of the early Fathers show a great variety of opinion with regard to the authority of the books now under discussion, as indeed they do with regard to some of the books which are now accepted as canonical, and some which have never obtained a place in any canon.

St. Augustine and St. Jerome, who are usually

treated as the protagonists in the controversy concerning the deutero-canonical books, seem to have been alike in treating the matter as one of tradition rather than criticism. St. Jerome, with some vacillations, inclined to the Hebrew, or rather the Talmudic, Canon, because with regard to the books contained in it there was practically no dispute. St. Augustine insisted on the inclusion of the Alexandrian Haggadah in the canon, because they were "generally received as divine in the Churches." An appeal to Church Councils only adds to the perplexity in which the subject is involved. Those who contend for the canon recognised by the Anglican Church, rely upon the 60th canon of the Council of Laodicea (A.D. 364). But the list contained in this canon is now believed to have been drawn up at a much later date; and, in any case, it does not exactly agree with our canon, for it includes Baruch¹ and the Epistle of Jeremiah.

On the other hand, the Councils of Hippo (393 A.D.) and the two Councils of Carthage (397 A.D. and 419 A.D.) acknowledged the

¹ Although Baruch was never included in the Talmudic Canon, it was at one period commonly accepted by the Jews as canonical.

canonicity of Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Tobit, Judith, and 1 and 2 Maccabees. But it is objected that these Councils were provincial merely, and not œcuménical.

In practice the Eastern Church adhered during many centuries to the Talmudic Canon, and the Western Church adopted the wider canon which had the support of St. Augustine. The Reformers returned to the Talmudic Canon, and, following the example of St. Jerome, gave the name of the Apocrypha to the disputed books.

The question of the inspiration and canonicity of the Apocrypha was one of those which came before the Council of Trent. It aroused much more difference of opinion than might have been expected from the pervading animus against the Reformers. A resolution was moved that the sacred writings should be divided into two classes,—one, comprising books like Proverbs and Wisdom, to be read for edification only, and the other to be used for proof of doctrine and morals. This proposition found very few supporters. But when Cardinals Pole and Cervini suggested that there should be a fresh examination of the sacred books with regard to their canonicity, the proposition received strong support as well as strong

opposition. In order to disarm their opponents, the cardinals mentioned explained that they were only desirous that the evidence in favour of the inspiration and canonicity of each of the deutero-canonical books should be carefully stated, and the ordinary objections answered. Put in this way, the proposal was accepted by a large majority in private congregation. But when the Council met in public congregation, the matter was reopened, and a warm debate terminated lamely with a resolution that there should be a private examination of the deutero-canonical books upon the lines suggested, but that the result should not be registered amongst the public acts of the Council. It is worthy of observation that many doctors of theology and no fewer than fourteen bishops voted against the decree which pronounced an anathema upon all who did not admit the plenary inspiration and authority of all the deutero-canonical books.¹

¹ It is said that the Roman Catholic Church insisted on the canonicity of the Apocrypha in order to retain scriptural authority for prayers for the dead and for the efficacy of good works. The former doctrine is supported by 2 Maccabees xii. 44—

"For if he had not hoped that they that were slain should have risen again, it had been superfluous and vain to pray for the dead."

The latter is supported by Ecclesiasticus iii. 30—

"Alms maketh an atonement for sins."

The English Apocrypha contains three books which are not deutero-canonical; that is to say, which have never been included by the Western Church in the Canon of Scripture. These are the First and Second Books of Esdras¹ and the Prayer of Manasses. The Prayer of Manasses is a devotional composition, which deserves the place which the Church of England has assigned to it. First Esdras repeats a part of the contents of Ezra and Nehemiah, and adds some circumstances of no great interest or value. Second Esdras stands on a very different footing. It was originally written in Hebrew, and belongs to that class of apocalyptic literature of which the Book of Enoch is the most remarkable example. It may have had its origin, as many of the other apocalyptic books are supposed to have had theirs, in Engedi: it is certainly not Alexandrian either in style or in spirit. It is believed to have been written some thirty or forty years before the Christian era; and, like other apocalyptic works, it is valuable as throwing some light on the history of eschatological doctrine.

¹ So called in the English Apocrypha. They are otherwise described as the Third and Fourth Books of Esdras, the first and second being respectively Ezra and Nehemiah.

These observations apply to the main body of the book, from ch. iii. to ch. xiv. inclusive. The first two chapters are a separate work or a fragment of a separate work; and so also are the last two chapters. Even the central portion appears to have been corrupted by interpolations. When the two opening and the two final chapters were added, or what is the history of these compositions, is entirely unknown. The first chapter contains a passage which has occasioned some discussion—

"Thus saith the Almighty Lord. . . . I gathered you together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings: but now, what shall I do unto you? I will cast you out from My face" (2 Esd. i. 28-30).

It has been thought that our Lord referred to this passage in His lament over Jerusalem—

"O Jerusalem . . . how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not" (Matt. xxiii. 37).

But the probability is, and it is now generally assumed, that the writer of chapters i. and ii. of Second Esdras lived in Christian times, and here adopted or imitated the language of our Lord.

CHAPTER XI

NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION OF UNCANONICAL SCRIPTURE

THERE were undoubtedly many other religious works which were known to the authors of the New Testament besides those which are now known respectively as canonical and deutero-canonical. Extensive traces of the influence of uncanonical Scriptures are to be found in the New Testament. Origen, the first and one of the best of Biblical critics, says—

"Many passages are cited by the Apostles and Evangelists and inserted in the New Testament which we nowhere read in those Scriptures which we call canonical, but which are nevertheless found in uncanonical books or are taken from them."

It is greatly to be regretted that Origen did not draw up a list of all these passages and the names of the books from which they

are taken. In those of his works which have come down to us, he does, however, in several instances refer texts in the New Testament to apocryphal sources.

Of the uncanonical books named by Origen, incomparably the most important is that which is quoted by the Apostle Jude—

"And Enoch also, the seventh from Adam, prophesied of these, saying, Behold, the Lord cometh with ten thousand of His saints, to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed."

It is an illustration of the narrow range of Biblical study in this country, that the work from which this passage is unquestionably taken is still unfamiliar to the great majority of theological students.

The history of the loss and recovery of the Book of Enoch is one of the romances of literature; and it is so little known that it will bear a brief recapitulation.

There are many proofs that this work was familiar to the early Church. It is quoted as authentic in the uncanonical Epistle of Barnabas (*circ. 119 A.D.*) on the one hand, and in the Cabballistic Zohar on the other (*circ. 180 A.D.*). It is censured, along with some other

uncanonical books, in the *Apostolic Constitutions*. It is cited as authoritative by Justin Martyr (150 A.D.), by Irenæus (202 A.D.), and by Clement of Alexandria (220 A.D.). Tertullian (220 A.D.) believes it to be inspired, although he admits that it is uncanonical; whilst Origen (254 A.D.), in controversy with Celsus, denies that it possesses the authority of Holy Scripture, though he admits in other parts of his works that it is received as such by some.

By the beginning of the fifth century the Book of Enoch had passed altogether into disrepute in the Western Church; and St. Jerome, writing in 420 A.D., says that there were some critics who were disposed to reject the Epistle of St. Jude on the ground that that writer "assumed the authority of the apocryphal Enoch." But in the East the book continued to be studied and treated as an authentic document. About the year 792 A.D., Georgius, generally known as "Syncellus," from his office of Secretary, or, as we may say, Chaplain to the Patriarch of Constantinople, published in the Greek language his *Chronographia*, or history of the world from the creation of Adam. In this work he introduces three lengthy passages, which he says are taken from the First Book of

Enoch, and which describe the fate of the angels or "watchers" through love of the daughters of men, their punishment at the hands of Raphael and Michael, and the doom of their offspring, the antediluvian giants. Clearly, Syncellus accepts the Book of Enoch as a narrative of fact; and he introduces his quotations as from a known and accepted authority. Fifty-eight years later, Nicephorus, Patriarch of Constantinople, published his *Stichometry*, or list of religious works, with the number of "stichoi" of which each was composed, the *stichos* being an artificial division somewhat corresponding to the "folio" in English legal documents. The object was to afford a test of genuineness, and to provide against fraudulent or accidental additions or omissions. In the *Stichometry* the Book of Enoch has a place, proving that it was still in use in the Eastern Church. It must have remained in use also in the Western Church, notwithstanding its disparagement by ecclesiastical authority; for quite recently a medieval manuscript, which had long remained unexamined in the British Museum, has been found to consist of a lengthy fragment of a Latin version of the Book of Enoch. Before the middle of the sixteenth century, however, both this Latin version

and the Greek version from which Syncellus quoted seem to have disappeared completely from the ken of scholars. Joseph Scaliger was certainly ignorant of the existence in his time of any version of the Book of Enoch whatever. This great scholar rediscovered the *Chronographia* of Syncellus, which had also passed into oblivion. In reading this work Scaliger was struck with the importance of the passages cited from Enoch, and he immediately published these fragments in his notes ("most learned notes," as Hugo Grotius deservedly calls them) on Eusebius; "because," as he says, "the passage in the Epistle of Jude respecting the transgressing angels is manifestly taken from this source." His opinion upon this point has been generally accepted. The passage referred to is Jude 6—

"The angels which kept not their first estate (or principality), but left their own habitation, He hath reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day."

Somewhat to the same effect is 2 Peter ii. 4—

"God spared not the angels when they sinned, but cast them down to hell, and committed them to pits of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment."

For these statements there is no authority in Old Testament Scripture, yet they are made not as though some new and original matter were unfolded, but incidentally, as in reference to things well known to the reader, and therefore apt to enforce the argument, which is the same in each case, namely, that judgment will surely overtake the wicked.

But in the fragments of Enoch cited by Syncellus we read that Samyaza and Azazyel and many other angels, who had been stationed in mid-air to be "watchers" over mankind, abandoned their aërial principality, and left their own habitation for a home on earth with the daughters of men. Terrible disorders and impieties ensued.

"Then the Lord said unto Raphael, Bind Azazyel hand and foot; cast him into darkness; opening the desert which is in Dudael, cast him in there. . . . There shall he remain for ever. . . . And in the great day of judgment let him be cast into the fire. . . . To Michael likewise the Lord said, Go and announce his crime to Samyaza and to the others who are with him, who have been associated with women . . . bind them for seventy generations underneath the earth, even to the day of judgment."

It is impossible to doubt that in this passage we have the key to the allusions of St. Jude and St. Peter to the fallen angels. The abandon-

ment of duty, the chains, the darkness, the day of judgment, and the fire are all in correspondence. In the passage from St. Peter the phrase "cast them down to hell" is expressed in the Greek by the word *ταρταρώσας*, which occurs nowhere else in the Bible, and which means "having committed them to Tartarus." In the imagination of the ancients, Tartarus was a deep abyss beneath the surface of the earth. The word was aptly employed to express the darkness of the desert of Dudael in the condemnation of Azazyel, and the imprisonment underneath the earth in that of Samyaza and his fellows.

Biblical criticism had to content itself with the fragments of the Book of Enoch preserved by Syncellus until late in the eighteenth century, when the entire volume was discovered in an unexpected quarter.

Ethiopia, which had received Christianity in the fourth century, was in the seventh century completely cut off from the rest of Christendom by the subjection of Northern Africa to the empire of Mahomet. During many ages it remained hermetically sealed in its own fastnesses, as inaccessible to outer civilisation as Thibet. In the year 1767, however, the adventurous Bruce penetrated its mountain barriers

and made the intimate acquaintance of its king and people. Not the least interesting of this great traveller's discoveries during his residence in Abyssinia was the Book of Enoch, which he found to be included in the canon of the Ethiopian Church, and regarded as an integral part of the Sacred Scriptures. Upon his return to England in 1774 Dr. Bruce presented a copy of this book in the Ethiopian language to the Bodleian Library at Oxford. There, much to the disgrace of English scholarship, it remained neglected and apparently forgotten for nearly half a century. It may be that the absurd scepticism with which Bruce's account of his travels was received—a scepticism which, however, was shared by Dr. Johnson—disinclined the authorities of Oxford University to publish or even to investigate the literary treasure which the discredited traveller had confided to their care.

At length, in the year 1821, Dr. Laurence, Professor of Hebrew at Oxford and afterwards Archbishop of Cashel, translated the Abyssinian manuscript into English, and published it through the Clarendon Press.

Its identity was readily established, for it was found to contain not only the fragments preserved by Syncellus, but also the passage ex-

pressly quoted by St. Jude. In Enoch the passage reads as follows—

"Behold, He comes with ten thousands of His saints to execute judgment upon them and destroy the wicked, and reprove all the carnal for everything which the sinful and ungodly have done and committed against Him" (1n. ii.).

But these discoveries did not exhaust the interest of this book. It was perceived to abound in matter hardly less surprising and perplexing, and to constitute a document of incalculable value to the Biblical student. The curiosity of scholars with regard to this remarkable work was stimulated by Professor Laurence's copious and learned Preliminary Dissertation, and also by Butts' *Genuineness of the Book of Enoch* (1827), Murray's *Enoch Restitutus* (1836), and by some other less important treatises. Laurence published a second edition in 1833, and a third in 1838. This last, however, was intended mainly to meet the demands of the American book market. In this country the interest which the work had excited was already waning. A German translation appeared a little later, and afforded scope for abundant Teutonic criticism and discussion. No further edition appeared in this country until the year 1892, when, the copyright in Laurence's trans-

lation having run out, Mr. Charles Gill republished it, with introductory notes of his own. In the following year Oxford University gave to the world for the first time the original Ethiopic text of the Book of Enoch, with a new translation, introduction, and notes by the Rev. R. H. Charles. Mr. Charles's translation is a great improvement upon Archbishop Laurence's, and his introduction and notes comprise the results of the best Continental scholarship, as well as original matter of great value. For the first time the English reader was enabled to study this strange work as it deserves to be studied.

Even with this publication, the literary romance, as I have called it, of the Book of Enoch did not terminate. Complete as the Ethiopic version appeared to be, there were some quotations purporting to be from Enoch in the ancient Fathers which could not be discovered in the text. In the year 1892, whilst Mr. Charles was preparing his translation, he saw it stated in a German review that there existed a Slavonic version of the Book of Enoch. Not without difficulty he succeeded in obtaining a copy of this supposed version; but it turned out not to be the same book as the "Ethiopic" Enoch, but a continuation of it known as the

Secrets of Enoch. This work, lost for many centuries to the rest of Christendom, has survived in the theological libraries of Russia. Mr. Charles secured a translation of the Secrets of Enoch from Mr. Morfill, the eminent Slavonic scholar, which was published, with an introduction from his own pen, in the year 1896.

It is now conceded with practical unanimity by English and German critics that the Book of Enoch is pre-Christian. The Secrets of Enoch, if not pre-Christian, is held to be at any rate of earlier date than any book of the New Testament. But the expression "the Book of Enoch" is misleading. It should more properly be described as the Books of Enoch and the Book of Noah. There are at least three Books of Enoch, perhaps more; and they are unquestionably of very different date. The earliest may be of very remote antiquity, and cannot be placed later than about 170 B.C. The latest is held to have been written about 50 B.C. But in the Abyssinian version these different books have been intermixed in such a fashion that it seems impossible to disentangle them one from the other with any degree of certainty; and, to increase the confusion, the Book of Noah is interspersed in fragments in

the text of the Enoch books, but upon what principle or with what object it is well-nigh impossible to form a conjecture. It is as though the leaves of a papyrus manuscript had by some accident fallen in a confused heap and had been rearranged by some ignorant and unskilful person.

The Books of Enoch relate the history of the fate of the angels through their passion for the daughters of men, and the mission of Enoch as God's messenger to the rebels. They also contain a series of "parables" and "visions" which delineate the history of the Jewish people, foreshadow the advent of the delivering Messiah, and portray the solemn judgment, the splendours of heaven, and the terrors of hell.

It has been very fairly said of the books of the "Apocrypha" that in literary style as well as in elevation of thought they are immeasurably inferior to the canonical books of Scripture. But this cannot be said with the same degree of truth of Enoch. Although this work suffers from the fact that it had already passed through the medium of two, or perhaps three, languages before being translated into English, and although the English in which we read it is that of the nineteenth century

instead of the far nobler and more melodious tongue of King James's bishops, it nevertheless contains passages which in poetic beauty do not fall far short of some of the finest in the Prophetic books.

Besides the prophecy quoted by Jude, there are, I think, very few instances of direct quotation from the Book of Enoch by New Testament writers. There are indeed in the long lists of parallel passages compiled by Bute and Gill and Charles many resemblances of language and idea so close as to suggest quotation; but careful examination often shows that there are texts in Isaiah or in Daniel which may have served as a common original.

The following, however, appear to be cases of direct quotation:—

All things are naked and opened before the eyes of Him with whom we have to do (Heb. iv. 13).

It had been good for that man if he had not been born (Matt. xxvi. 24).

When the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of His glory (Matt. xix. 28; and see Matt. xxv. 31, 32).

All things are naked and open in Thy sight (En. ix. 5).

It had been good for them if they had not been born (En. xxxviii. 2).

When they see the Son of Man sitting on the throne of His glory (En. lxii. 5; and see En. xlvi. 3).

Here there are no Old Testament passages in point; and these are therefore either cases of quotation from Enoch or else of verbal coincidence.

There are also some detached phrases with regard to which the same observation holds good. Thus the phrase "mammon of unrighteousness" (Luke xvi. 9) is found also in Enoch lxiii. 10; "wandering stars" (Jude 13) occurs in Enoch xviii. 15. And Enoch, who is described in Jude 14 as "the seventh from Adam," is also so described in Enoch lx. 8.

To this category of detached phrases belong certain ascriptive titles of Jehovah and the Messiah.

The title "King of kings and Lord of lords" is not found in the Old Testament. It is found, however, in Enoch ix. 4; and it is repeated in 1 Timothy vi. 15 and Revelation xvii. 14.

The most usual title of Jehovah in Enoch is "Lord of Spirits." This is only found in the Old Testament in the somewhat different form of "God of the spirits of all flesh" (Num. xvi. 22). In Hebrews xii. 9 we have "Father of Spirits."¹

¹ Next to Lord of Spirits, the title most usually applied to God the Father is "Ancient of Days." This phrase occurs in

One of the titles ascribed to the Messiah in Enoch is the Righteous One. This is not an Old Testament phrase, but we find it in the New Testament—

- "Jesus Christ the Righteous" (1 John ii. 1).
- "The Holy and Righteous One" (Acts iii. 14 (R.V.)).
- "The Righteous One" (Acts vii. 52 (R.V.)).

In 2 Corinthians xi. 31 Christ is referred to as

"He who is blessed for evermore" (R.V.).

This reproduces Enoch lxxvii. 1—

"He who is blessed for ever."

The most interesting title applied to the Messiah in Enoch is the "Son of Man." It is by this name and by that of the Elect One that the Hope of Israel is most usually referred to throughout the book. It is in the following striking passage that the Son of Man is first introduced—

"There I beheld the Ancient of Days, whose head was like white wool; and with him another, whose countenance resembled that of a man. His countenance was full of grace, like that of one of the holy angels. Then I inquired

the Old Testament only in Daniel vii., and does not occur in the New Testament at all.

of one of the angels who went with me, and who showed me every secret thing concerning this Son of Man: who He was, whence He was, and why He accompanied the Ancient of Days. He answered and said to me, This is the Son of Man, to whom righteousness belongs, with whom righteousness has dwelt, and who will reveal all the treasures of that which is concealed; for the Lord of Spirits has chosen Him" (En. xlvi.).

This passage bears a close resemblance to Daniel vii. 9, where also the "Ancient of Days" and the "Son of Man" are named. It has been doubted whether the "Son of Man" in Daniel vii. is intended to indicate the Messiah. Certainly this phrase is not applied to the Messiah in any other place in the Old Testament. In Enoch, however, there are a multitude of cases in which its application to the Messiah is beyond question.

In the Gospels the use of the title Son of Man as applied to our Lord is familiar. But it is observable that its use is confined to the lips of our Lord Himself,—a circumstance from which Unitarians have deduced the inference that Christ made no claim to be more than human; and Trinitarians, on the other hand, have argued that the divinity of Christ's character was so manifest to His followers that His true human nature might have been lost sight

of if He Himself had not been careful to insist upon it. It becomes plain, however, from the Book of Enoch that in adopting the designation of the Son of Man our Lord was claiming in the most emphatic manner to be the Messiah who had "from the beginning existed in secret," and who was destined to sit "upon the throne of His glory," and to judge the world; He was claiming to be the "Elect One" who should be "revealed to the elect," before whom "kings and princes" should "fall down on their faces and worship" (En. lxi. 10-13).

The "Elect One" is even more frequently used as a title of the Messiah in the Book of Enoch than the "Son of Man." The only Old Testament precedent for the use of this phrase is to be found in Isaiah xlii. 1—

"Behold My Servant, whom I uphold; Mine Elect, in whom My soul delighteth."

This text is quoted in Matthew xii. 18, and the same phrase occurs in Luke ix. 35 and in Luke xxiii. 35. The very frequent use of this title in Enoch is expressive of the deep sense which the writer or writers entertained of the sovereignty of God. Righteous men are habitually described as God's "elect"; and the

heavenly host are "elect angels." I think it may be a question worthy of consideration whether the New Testament doctrine of Election is not founded on hints contained in Isaiah, expanded and amplified in the pages of Enoch.

But it is by way of what I have described as "historic reference"—that is, by allusion to events related in the Book of Enoch—that New Testament writers most strikingly display their knowledge of this work.

Thus in Hebrews xi. 5 we read—

"Enoch was translated . . . for before his translation he had this testimony, that he pleased God."

This statement seems to be explained in Enoch xv. 1 and lxxi. 14 *et seq.*, where it is narrated that Enoch was pronounced righteous by angelic messengers, and informed by them that his worship was acceptable to the Most High.

In 1 Peter iii. 19, 20 there occurs the mysterious passage—

"By which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing."

These words become intelligible in the light of Enoch x.-xv., where we read that, immediately following upon the announcement of the impending deluge to Noah, the erring angels were imprisoned by Raphael and Michael, and Enoch was sent by God to visit them in the place of their punishment, in order to rebuke and denounce their sin and to confirm their doom. These must assuredly be the events to which St. Peter alludes; and if so, he would seem to have regarded Enoch as a type of Christ.

In 1 Corinthians xi. 10 St. Paul enjoins women to have their heads covered in the churches "because of the angels." This exhortation is one of the enigmas of the New Testament. The allusion is perhaps poetical rather than theological. It may be regarded as a kind of Elizabethan "conceit," in which the female headgear is represented as forming a screen from the gaze of the "watchers" who floated in mid-air. It was looking downwards from that point of vantage that these "sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair" (Gen. vi. 2).

In St. John x. our Lord represents Himself under the figure of a shepherd. "The sheep

follow Him: for they know His voice." "All that came before Me are thieves and robbers." "The thief cometh but for to steal and to kill and to destroy." "The hireling seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and fleeth, and the wolf catcheth them and scattereth the sheep."

The reference to "all that came before Me" shows that the parable has a historical aspect. In Enoch lxxxviii. and lxxxix. there is a long allegory in which the history of Israel is typified. The children of Israel are figured as sheep. Wolves "frightened and oppressed them." The Lord of the sheep came to them. He "led" them, and "all His sheep followed Him." He "placed Himself between them and the wolves." The Lord of the sheep appointed seventy shepherds over the flock. One after another they "killed and destroyed the sheep," "trod them under foot and devoured them," and "did not save them from the power of the wild beasts." These wicked shepherds, of course, represent the kings and rulers of Israel; and our Lord's allusion to those who "came before" Him receives additional point if it be supposed that His parable had reference to the allegory in Enoch.

Again, our Lord's parable of the rich man

who said, "I will pull down my barns and build greater . . . and I will say to my soul, Thou hast much goods laid up for many years: take thine ease," and to whom God said, "Thou fool, this night shall thy soul be required of thee" (Luke xii. 13), seems like a vivid and powerful reproduction of Enoch xcvi.—

"We are rich: we possess wealth: we have acquired everything which we desire. Now then we will do whatsoever seems good to us: for we have amassed silver: our barns are full. . . . They shall surely die suddenly."

In Hebrews xi. 10 we read of—

"The city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God."

This seems to be an allusion to Enoch xc., where God is described as Himself building the New Jerusalem.

In Luke xv. 26 Abraham is represented as saying to Dives—

"Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed."

And in Enoch xxii. 10 we are told that the spirits of the righteous are separated from other spirits by a "chasm."

In John xiv. 2 our Lord says—

"In My Father's house are many mansions."

The future world is nowhere else referred to in this way in canonical Scripture; but in Enoch the expression "mansions" or "habitations" is commonly used in this connection, *e.g.* Enoch xxxix. 7, "The mansions of the righteous"; Enoch xlvi. 3, "countless mansions."

In Romans viii. 38 St. Paul uses the expression, "Neither angels, nor principalities, nor powers"; and again, in 2 Thess. i. 7 he speaks of "the angels of His power." His reference is probably to the Enochian classification of angels as "angels of power and angels of principalities" (En. lxi. 10).

It is in the Revelation of St. John that resemblances to the Book of Enoch are most numerous. These may be explained to some extent by the dependence of both upon Isaiah and Daniel. But there are similarities for which no common original can be found.

The apocalyptic machinery of the two books is much alike. The "seven spirits which are before the throne" in Revelation i. 4 correspond with the "seven white ones" in Enoch xc. 21. The "four living creatures round about the throne" in Revelation iv. 6 correspond with the "four presences" who surround

the Lord of Spirits in Enoch xl. 2. "The angels of the winds" in Revelation vii. 1 are found in Enoch under the title of the "spirits of the winds" (En. lxix. 22); and the "angel of the waters" (Rev. xvi. 5) may be identified with the "spirit of the sea" in Enoch lx. 16.

In Revelation there is a "tree of life," and those who overcome are promised to eat of it (Rev. ii. 7). In Enoch there is a tree of which the elect are to eat, with the result that they will live a long life (En. xxv. 45; En. xxiv. 9). In Revelation there are "fountains of waters of life" (Rev. vii. 17), and in Enoch there is a "fountain of righteousness." Both the author of Revelation and the author of Enoch beheld "a star fall from heaven" (Rev. ix. 1; En. lxxxvi. 1). In Revelation xx. 10 the devil is cast into a "lake of fire and brimstone," whilst in Enoch lxvi. the fallen angels are described as plunged in subterranean "rivers of fire," with the waters of which "sulphur is mixed." In Revelation xiv. 20 blood is seen to come out of the winepress, "even unto the horses' bridles," whilst in Enoch c. 3 horses are to "walk up to the breast in the blood of sinners."

And as in Revelation vi. 10 the souls under the altar cry, "How long . . . dost Thou not judge and avenge our blood?" so in Enoch xxii. 5-7 the souls of the righteous in Hades pray to God for vengeance upon the wicked.

There may be, and probably are, other traces in the New Testament of the influence of the Book of Enoch. Those that I have referred to above are those which seem to me to be most free from doubt. From the character of the extracts I have made, it will be seen how impossible is the theory which some have advanced, that the New Testament phraseology found in the Book of Enoch is due to the interpolations of the Christian editors during the first two centuries. The supposed interpolations cannot have been interpolated. They cannot consist either of editorial notes carelessly incorporated in the text by copyists, or of editorial additions introduced in pious fraud. They are inseparable from the substance of the work. No human ingenuity can disentangle them. Nor can it be imagined that long "visions" and "parables" were invented for the purpose of throwing a false light upon a few obscure allusions in the Gospels and Epistles.

But was the Book of Enoch used and regarded by writers of the New Testament as an inspired book?

Even apart from the express quotation in Jude, I think there would be strong evidence that it was so used and regarded. It is true that, apart from that express quotation, there is no text of Enoch which is cited as *prophetic* or as *authoritative*, in the sense of being the basis of doctrine or morals. In all other cases except that referred to, the Book of Enoch is used by way of *literary allusion* or by way of *historical reference*. References by a writer to incidents related in another work do not, as I have before observed, necessarily imply that writer's belief in the authenticity of the work referred to or the truth of the incidents related. But in some cases such an inference is inevitable. And it seems to me impossible to conceive that the allusions of St. Jude and St. Peter to the fate of the trespassing angels (to take one example only) can be construed otherwise than as indicating a belief in the authenticity of Enoch and the truth of the narrative contained in it. Some of the other examples of *historic reference* which I have mentioned appear hardly less conclusive on this point. But, so far as Jude is concerned,

the question is put beyond controversy by the express quotation from Enoch. The passage quoted is a general prophecy of doom against the ungodly, and it is cited by the Apostle as applicable to the case of the particular wrong-doers whom he was rebuking. Thus the words of Enoch are quoted *as prophetic* and also *as authoritative*. Nor is this all. Jude does not only quote the Book of Enoch, but he also accepts it, or at any rate he accepts the part he quotes, as actually proceeding from the antediluvian patriarch whose name it bears. It is "Enoch the seventh from Adam" to whom the prophecy is ascribed.

CHAPTER XII

NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION OF UNCANONICAL SCRIPTURE (*contd.*)

I DESIRE now to direct attention to cases in which New Testament writers appear to have quoted from uncanonical Scriptures other than the Book of Enoch.

In John vii. 38 our Lord is reported as saying—

"He that believeth in Me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water."

These words are not found in the Old Testament. It is assumed by many critics and commentators that they are taken from secret or apocryphal Scripture, but I have not seen them attributed to any particular book.

In James iv. 5 we read—

"Do ye think that the Scripture saith in vain, The spirit that dwelleth in us lusteth to envy?"

And, again, these words are not found in the Old Testament. The theory that the Apostle only purports to give the general tenor of Scripture teaching cannot be accepted. This quotation, like the previous one, is referred by critics and commentators to apocryphal literature, without any more particular identification of its source.

In 1 Corinthians ii. 9 St. Paul says—

"But, as it is written, Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him."

The expression "it is written" is always elsewhere employed with reference to quotations from the Old Testament. Origen, however, says of this passage, "It is not to be found in any regular book, but in the secret Book of Elias."¹ A later writer alleges plainly that he has found the passage in the Revelation of Elias. St. Jerome, however, says, "Heretics have contended that this quotation comes from the Apocalypse of Elias." Readers of the English Bible might think it unnecessary to go so far afield to find the source of St. Paul's quotation. In Isaiah lxiv. 4 (A.V.) we read—

¹ See Migne, *Origen*, iii., on Matthew xxii.

"For since the beginning of the world men have not heard, nor perceived with the ear, neither hath the eye seen, O God, besides Thee, what He hath prepared for him that waiteth for Him."

But this is not an accurate translation of the original, which should read, as in the R.V.—

"For from of old men have not heard, nor perceived with the ear, neither hath the eye seen a God beside Thee, which worketh for him that waiteth for Him."

St. Paul would appear to have quoted from the same source on another occasion. In Ephesians v. 13, 14 he writes—

"Whatsoever doth make manifest is light. Wherefore He saith, Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead."

Again, the preface "He saith" is always used elsewhere in the New Testament to indicate a quotation from Old Testament Scripture; but there is no Old Testament Scripture which is at all in point. According to Epiphanius, this passage is borrowed from the Apocalypse of Elias;¹ and Jerome says that the Apostle quotes it from "secret prophets and such as seem to be apocryphal." Two ancient manuscripts are

¹ In a note in a Bible of the ninth century, however, it is said to be from an apocryphal Book of Jeremiah.

said to have existed formerly in the Vatican Library, entitled respectively the Great and the Little Elias, but they seem to have disappeared, and there is, I believe, no fragment of this work now known to be in existence.

St. Matthew, after describing how the chief priests expended the thirty pieces of silver, which Judas cast down in the Temple, in the purchase of the potter's field, continues—

"Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy the prophet, saying, And they took the thirty pieces of silver, the price of Him that was valued, whom they of the children of Israel did value, and gave them for the potter's field, as the Lord appointed me" (Matt. xxvii. 9, 10).

Neither in the Prophecies nor in the Lamentations of Jeremiah is there any passage even remotely resembling what is here quoted. But a passage, which though not identical is very similar, does exist in the Book of the prophet Zechariah. It occurs in the curious parable of the two staves, Beauty and Bands. The prophet describes himself as cutting in sunder the staff Beauty and saying to the "poor of the flock"—

"If ye think good, give me my price; and if not, forbear. So they weighed for my price thirty pieces of silver. And the Lord said unto me, Cast it unto the potter: a goodly price that I was prized at of them. And I took the thirty

pieces of silver, and cast them to the potter in the house of the Lord" (Zech. xi. 12, 13).

There is enough resemblance between these two passages to justify the conjecture that St. Matthew had the words of Zechariah in his mind, and quoted them either as a "typical" prophecy or by way of literary allusion. But if this conjecture is correct, the reference to Jeremiah is a mistake. On the other hand, if the reference to Jeremiah is accurate, there must be some work of that prophet which is not included in the canon of Scripture. It has been asserted in some theological works that Origen identifies the passage in question as a quotation from an apocryphal Book of Jeremiah. But this is not the case. Commenting on Matthew xxvii. 9, 10, he says—

"I suspect that either there is a mistake and that Jeremiah is put for Zechariah, or else that there is some secret scripture of Jeremiah in which the passage occurs."

He then gives the words of Zechariah xi. 12, 13, and proceeds—

"If, however, any one is offended by the supposition that Jeremiah is written in mistake for Zechariah, let him see whether the prophecy is not contained in a secret Book of Jeremiah."¹

¹ See Migne, *Origen*, iii. col. 1769. The alternative put by Origen has not been universally accepted. The uniformity of

Origen's words seem to indicate that he was not actually cognisant of any apocryphal Book of Jeremiah, though he was quite prepared to believe that such a book existed, that it was of sufficient authority to have been quoted by an Evangelist, and that it nevertheless remained to his own day concealed from common knowledge.

There is evidence, however, quite apart from Origen, that there did exist an apocryphal

ancient manuscripts forbids the supposition that the mistake was one of a copyist. It is recalled that it was a saying of the Jews that the spirit of Jeremiah was in Zechariah, and that some of them even affirmed that the earlier prophet lived again in the later. The suggestion has been made that the closing chapters of Zechariah were mistakenly attributed to him, having been in fact written by Jeremiah. Dr. John Lightfoot, "the English Hebrewist," refers to the circumstance that at one time Jeremiah was placed first amongst the prophets in the order of the Hebrew Canon, and supposes that St. Matthew's reference was not to the writer of the particular passage which he quoted, but to the section of Scripture in which it was to be found; and that, in fact, he meant no more than that the quotation was from "the prophets." This resolution of the difficulty is more ingenious than sound. In the absence of a division of the Bible into chapters and verses, New Testament references to the Old Testament are sometimes made in conventional terms. Thus in Mark xii. 26, where it is said, "Have ye not read in the Book of Moses how *in the bush* God spake unto him, saying, I am the God of Abraham, etc.," the words "*in the bush*" mean *in the bush section*, *i.e.* Exodus iii. And similarly, in Rom. xi. 2, "Wot ye not what the Scripture saith in Elias," the words "*in Elias*" mean in the Elias section, *i.e.* 1 Kings xvii. *et seq.* But there is no evidence either in the Scriptures or in the Talmud of a practice of referring to the prophets generally under the name of Jeremiah.

Book of Jeremiah; and the passage quoted by St. Matthew was actually found in it by St. Jerome. "I lately read," says he, "in a certain Hebrew volume which a Hebrew of the sect of Nazarenes obtained for me, an apocrypha of Jeremiah in which I found the passage (quoted in St. Matthew xxvii. 9, 10) word for word." It is true that St. Jerome goes on to say, "Nevertheless it seems to me more likely that the prophecy was taken from Zechariah."¹ But he gives no reason for this conclusion. He was no friend to apocryphal literature; and if there had been any ground for suggesting that the book, though written in Hebrew, was a Christian composition, he would not, I think, have been slow to mention it. But if the work appeared to him to be pre-Christian; and if, as he declares, St. Matthew's quotation was found in it *word for word*, his opinion that it was nevertheless Zechariah who was cited seems absurd. It would be curious, indeed, if the Evangelist, intending to quote from Zechariah, but departing considerably from his language, should have chanced to use the exact words of another writer.

Our information regarding the sect of

¹ See Migne, *Jerome*, vii. col. 205.

Nazarenes or Nazaræans who were in possession of this apocryphal book is chiefly derived from Epiphanius, who tells us that they were heretics of Jewish race, who, whilst adopting the principal doctrines and ceremonies of the Christian Church, nevertheless maintained a rigid observance of the Mosaic Law; that they were found principally in the regions around Beræa and Pella, to the east of the Jordan; that they boasted the possession of the Gospel of St. Matthew in the original Hebrew; and that they rejected the Gospel according to St. John.

St. Jerome seems to have taken a special interest in these sectaries. He translated their Gospel according to St. Matthew, which is more generally referred to by the Fathers as the Gospel of the Hebrews or the Gospel of the Twelve Apostles, and frequently refers to it in his works. And in his commentary upon Isaiah ix. 12 he quotes, and apparently adopts, the explanation given by the Nazarenes of that text and of its fulfilment. The passage referred to is as follows:—

“At the first he lightly afflicted the land of Zebulun and the land of Naphtali, and afterwards did more grievously afflict her by the way of the sea, beyond Jordan, in Galilee of

the nations. The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined.”

This prophecy is quoted and its fulfilment declared in Matthew iv. 15, 16. After some reference to the history of the districts mentioned, the Nazarene exposition sets forth that the prophecy had been immediately fulfilled in the deliverance, through Christ's doctrine, of Zebulun and Naphtali and the regions beyond Jordan from the religious tyranny of the scribes and Pharisees and the grievous yoke of Jewish tradition; and that its ultimate fulfilment was accomplished by the preaching of the Gospel to the Gentiles. Jerome evidently quotes the opinion of the Nazarenes in connection with this prophecy, because they were themselves peculiarly interested in it. They were dwellers beyond Jordan in Galilee of the Gentiles. Their interpretation of the Scripture referred to does not strike one as quite consistent with that continued observance of the Law of Moses which Epiphanius imputes to them.

The account of their origin given by Epiphanius is that they were Jews who received Christianity in the early days of the Church, when all Christians were called Nazarenes, and that, when the

Christian Jews generally abandoned the practice of Jewish rites and ceremonies, they separated themselves from the Church at Jerusalem and established their headquarters at Beræa, retaining the name of Nazarenes although other believers in Christ became known as Christians. Another account represents them as Essenes long settled beyond Jordan, who adopted the Christian faith, but clung, like the Ebionites, to the practice of Jewish ceremonies. In this connection it is interesting to note that Epiphanius, in his long catalogue of heresies, mentions another sect of Nazarenes, or Nazaræans, whom he describes as non-Christian. According to his account, these sectaries also dwelt beyond Jordan. They had an extraordinary reverence for the Patriarchs, practised circumcision and observed the Sabbath, but offered no sacrifices, wholly rejected the Law of Moses, lived secluded and ascetic lives, and abstained from flesh and wine. It is thought that they may have derived their name and origin from the profession of the Nazarite vow in a developed form. Nazarene, Nazaræan, and Nazarite seem indeed to be only different forms of the same Hebrew word, which is commonly interpreted as meaning "separated."

Epiphanius is often inaccurate in his account of the tenets of heretics; and his critics have thought that he was in error in supposing that there were two distinct Nazaræan sects, deriving their name and origin from entirely different sources. The more probable conjecture seems to be that the Christian Nazarenes were simply Christianised descendants of the old Hebrew Nazarenes (who may very well have ranked amongst the Essenes), retaining in their remote settlements beyond Jordan some of the patriarchal customs and ascetic usages of their ancestors. The Hebrew Nazarenes practised circumcision and kept the Sabbath, for these observances were regarded by them as patriarchal and not Mosaic. The Christian Nazarenes maintained the same practice, and their doing so may easily have led to the belief that they continued in obedience to the Law of Moses.

There is a circumstance which seems to me strongly confirmatory of the view which I am suggesting. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the old Nazarenes was, as I have said, their extraordinary reverence for the Patriarchs, who may be described as the saints of their faith and the heroes of their legends.

Now there is only one book the authorship of which has been traced to a Christian Nazarene,—a book, no doubt, intended for the use of his own co-religionists, and presumably written in harmony with their views. This is the well-known "Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs," which is generally believed to have been written between 70 A.D. and 100 A.D.¹ It may be described as a religious romance, in which the writer sets forth his opinions in the form of imaginary addresses from each of the sons of Jacob.

This digression on the Nazarenes is not wholly irrelevant. Another prophecy besides that which has been already referred to has been ascribed to the apocryphal Jeremiah, namely that mysterious saying in Matthew ii. 23—

"And He came and dwelt in a city called Nazareth: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, He shall be called a Nazarene."

The question of the meaning of this text cannot be separated from the question of its

¹ According to the Rev. Dr. Charles, however, the book was only edited and altered about that period. There are portions of it which he thinks may be attributed to the second century before Christ.

origin. Is it possible that a clue to both may be found in the history of the Hebrew Nazarenes?

The common though somewhat hesitating explanation of Matthew ii. 23 is that those prophecies of Isaiah and Ezekiel are alluded to in which Christ is prefigured as the Branch. The Hebrew for Branch is "Netsir," from which word it has been thought that the name of Nazareth may also have been derived, though this etymology is very doubtful. This interpretation seems to suggest a play upon words rather than a fulfilment of prophecy, and cannot be regarded as satisfactory.

Another explanation is that the word Nazarene, being the equivalent of Nazarite, the reference is to Judges xiii. 5—

"For the child shall be a Nazarite unto God."

If this explanation be accepted, the words used with reference to Samson are applied as "typically" prophetic of Christ. But inasmuch as Christ cannot be supposed to have taken the Nazarite vow to allow his hair to grow and to abstain from wine, the allusion seems defective in point; and, again, the supposed fulfilment of the prophecy involved in Christ's

residence at Nazareth appears to amount to no more than a play upon words.

An explanation of the difficulty might be found if it were permissible to suppose that there was a connection between Nazareth and the Hebrew sect of Nazarenes, and that the theory which connects this sect with the ancient Nazarites is well founded. Nazareth is not mentioned in the Old Testament, nor indeed in any known document before the time of Christ. Nothing is known of its early history or of the derivation of its name. The Nazarenes are supposed to have lived apart in communities like the Essenes, from whom they were perhaps not easily distinguishable; and though they were most numerous "beyond Jordan," they may, like the Essenes, have had settlements throughout Palestine. Nazareth, which was a village in Zebulun—in "Galilee of the Gentiles,"—possibly constituted such a settlement, and took its name from the circumstance.

All this rests on conjecture, and may be quite wide of the mark; but if our hypothesis could be accepted, the words spoken with reference to Samson might appropriately have been adopted by Matthew as a "typical"

prophecy of Christ; and, moreover, Nathaniel's ironical question, "Can any good come out of Nazareth?" would receive a ready explanation. For whilst the Nazarites were so named as "separated" in the sense of superior sanctity, it can easily be understood that the word would acquire a very different significance as applied to a sect of ascetics who claimed to be followers of patriarchal religion and who repudiated the Law of Moses. "The separated" would become synonymous with the "Separatists"—the Dissenters. And if Christ's earlier years were passed in association with such sectaries, one can understand the bitterness with which, by priests and scribes and Pharisees, "He was called a Nazarene," and the malice with which His teaching was interpreted as subversive of the Levitical Law.

Sgambati asserts that this prophecy is taken from the apocryphal Jeremiah. If this were true there would be no need for the hypothesis which has been above put forward, though it would not be necessarily inconsistent with it. And in this case we should find additional interest in the fact that the Christian Nazarenes so carefully preserved a "secret" book containing

a prophecy so peculiarly precious to them. But Sgambati has no authority to offer for his assertion other than an alleged statement of Origen. Unfortunately, Origen's commentary on the earlier chapters of St. Matthew's Gospel has been lost, and the statement in question cannot be found in any of his extant writings. It is against the probability that he made such a statement, that his language with reference to Matthew xxvii. 9, 10, whilst it implies that he believed in the existence of an apocryphal Jeremiah, implies also that he had not himself examined it. And, again, it seems probable that Jerome, when he read the apocryphal Jeremiah of the Nazarenes, would have noted the fact if he had found that it contained this prophecy. In commenting upon Matthew ii. 23, Jerome adopts the view that the prophecies referred to are those of Isaiah and Ezekiel in which Christ is referred to as the Branch.

Chrysostom and Theophylact and other Christian Fathers say that the prophecy "He shall be called a Nazarene" is taken from some uncanonical Scripture, but do not indicate any particular book.

It has been alleged (see Fabricius, *Pseud.*

Vet. Test. p. 1105) that the assertion in 1 Peter iii. 19,¹

"He went and preached to the spirits in prison,"

is founded on what is related in the apocryphal Jeremiah; and again, as has been noted above, an unknown commentator of the ninth century attributes Ephesians v. 14 to this source.

It is to be noted that Josephus mentions as extant in his day a work entitled "The Song of Jeremiah on the Death of Josiah," which he seems to intimate was regarded by his countrymen as genuine and inspired. Some have supposed that the work which he describes was in fact included in the Book of Lamentations, but this opinion has been generally rejected. It is an interesting speculation whether this "Song" was the apocryphal Jeremiah preserved by the Nazarenes.

Jude, in condemning those "who despise dominion, speaking evil of dignities," says (verse 9)—

"Yet Michael the archangel, when contending with the devil, he disputed about the body of Moses, durst not bring a railing accusation, but said, The Lord rebuke thee."

No hint of this encounter is contained in the

¹ See, however, *supra*, Chap. XI.

Old Testament, but Origen says that St. Jude is quoting from a work entitled the "Assumption of Moses."¹ Clement of Alexandria, in annotating the passage, writes, "This confirms the *Assumptio Moysi*." Marginal notes in many early manuscript copies of St. Jude also refer to the *Assumptio Moysi* as the source from which the Apostle drew his illustration. This work is commonly referred to by Christian writers down to the eighth century. Even so late as the sixteenth century, Sixtus of Sienna would seem, from his categorical statements regarding it, to have had access to some copy of the work, or at least to some synopsis of its contents. Grotius says that the words "the Lord rebuke thee" came from an ancient tradition which was preserved in the "Assumption of Moses." Oeumenius asserts that according to the "Assumption of Moses" Satan brought an accusation against Moses on account of the death of the Egyptian. But in more modern times the book had passed wholly from the cognisance of scholars and theologians, until a considerable fragment of it was discovered at Milan in the year 1857.

¹ Origen also quotes the "Assumption of Moses" as the authority for the statement that it was by the instigation of the devil that the serpent tempted Eve.

This fragment, however, ends before the death of Moses, and therefore affords no information with regard to the conflict between St. Michael and the devil. But an ancient Greek manuscript of St. Jude, which has recently come under the notice of the Rev. Dr. M. R. James of Cambridge contains a lengthy marginal note (published in *Texts and Studies*, vol. ii.), which, although it does not mention the *Assumptio Moysi*, seems to have been based upon it, and to confirm the reference made by Oeumenius. According to this note, the devil made no pretension to the soul of Moses, but claimed his body, saying, "The body is mine, for I am the lord of matter." "The devil also," so the note continues, "reviled Moses, calling him a murderer on account of his having slain the Egyptian." At this point St. Michael exclaims, "The Lord rebuke thee, Satan!"¹

An English edition of the recovered fragment of the "Assumption of Moses," with valuable notes, was published in 1897 by the Rev. Dr.

¹ There was a somewhat similar legend as to the burial of Abraham. "If any one thinks fit to accept apocryphal scriptures, we read in them that angels of justice and of iniquity disputed over the salvation and the burial of Abraham" (Origen, 35th *Homily on St. Luke*). The work referred to is supposed to be the *Apocalypse of Abraham*.

Charles. It is considered that this work may have been written as late as the early years of the first century A.D., but that it is certainly prior in date to any part of the New Testament. A part of St. Stephen's brief recital of the history of Moses seems to have been taken from the *Assumptio*. One sentence of the proto-martyr curiously corresponds with its language. "Moses," said St. Stephen (Acts vii. 36), "showed wonders and signs in the land of Egypt, and in the Red Sea, and in the wilderness forty years."¹ "Moses," says the author of the *Assumptio*, "suffered many things in Egypt and in the Red Sea and in the wilderness during forty years." Again there is a close correspondence in thought, and at least a singular coincidence in language, between St. Peter's description of the "scoffers" who "shall come in the last days" (2 Pet. iii. 2, 3) and the

¹ St. Stephen's *résumé* of Jewish history contained in Acts vii. has been thought to have been largely taken from uncanonical works. His account is in some instances in conflict with Old Testament history. Thus he speaks of "the sepulchre that Abraham bought for a sum of money of the sons of Emmor, the father of Sychem" (Acts vii. 16). But it was Jacob, and not Abraham, who purchased a field from the sons of Emmor (see Gen. xxxiii. 19). He represents Jacob and his sons as having been buried in Sychem, whereas Jacob was buried in Machpelah (see Gen. xlix. 30), and his sons, except Joseph, were buried in Egypt.

description by the author of the "Assumption of Moses" of the "scornful and impious men" who will rule when "the times are ended" (see *Assumptio Moysi*, ch. vii. vers. 1-9). In Jude also there seems to be more than a reminiscence of the same passage.

In 2 Timothy iii. 8 St. Paul says of the ungodly of the "last days"—

"Now, as Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these also resist the truth."

This passage has puzzled many a student of the Bible, who has searched the Pentateuch in vain for the names referred to. But Origen tells us that there existed in his time a secret (*i.e.* uncanonical) book called "Jannes and Jambres," or "Jannes and Mambres," and adds that the above reference to it in 2 Timothy caused some of his contemporaries to doubt the authority of that Epistle.¹

The tale or legend regarding Jannes and Jambres was that they were magicians sent by Pharaoh to contend against Moses and Aaron in miracle-working, and that, after various vain endeavours to surpass the achievements of the two great Hebrew brethren, they

¹ See Migne, *Origen*, iii. col. 1636.

confessed their defeat, acknowledged the power of God in the wonders wrought by His servants, and were converted to the Jewish religion. It is related of the two magicians in some legends that they were brothers, and that Moses was confided to their care by Pharaoh's daughter in order to be instructed in the wisdom of Egypt. They appear in the Talmud under the names of Jochanes and Mamres, and in the Zohar as Janes and Jambres. All accounts do not agree that they were converted. According to a very ancient Hebrew commentary on the Pentateuch, "Jochane and Jamre" were present with Pharaoh when Moses and his people crossed the Red Sea. "If this is done by the hand of God," said they to the monarch, "we shall not prevail against Him; but if it is done by the hand of the angels, we are able to overthrow them." Strife between them and the angels then ensued, and in the result the angels triumphed and the army of Pharaoh was overwhelmed. So an early Arab commentator on the Pentateuch says—

"These are the names of the magicians who withheld Moses—Dejannes, Jambaras, and Sarudas. But God caused them to perish in the Red Sea with Pharaoh and his army."

The book "Jannes and Jambres" continued in common circulation amongst Christians down to the time of Pope Gelasius the First (492 A.D.), who formally condemned it, together with other uncanonical writings. From that period it has entirely disappeared from Christian literature. But, like some other works of the same class, it has helped to swell the religious literature of Mahometanism; and it survives in Arabic to this day under the title of "Sadur and Ghadur." Some years ago a fugitive interest was aroused in these Egyptian magicians when a papyrus in the British Museum was deciphered as recording that one "Janni" was the chief of the archers to that Pharaoh who was the contemporary of Moses. This discovery was thought by some to supply a key to the myths relating to Jannes and Jambres.

In the New Testament there are several references to the violent deaths of prophets and holy men of old. Thus our Lord is recorded in St. Matthew xxiii. 37 to have exclaimed—

"O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets."

Commenting upon this apostrophe, Origen says—

"It is related in secret scriptures that Isaiah was sown

in pieces, and that Zechariah and Ezekiel were put to death."¹

Again, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews records (Heb. xi. 37), amongst other sufferings inflicted on the saints of the elder dispensation "of whom the world was not worthy," that—

"They were sawn asunder . . . were slain with the sword."

Origen refers to this passage as follows:—

"There is a tradition that Isaiah was hacked in pieces with a saw. But if any one does not admit this story because it is related in the apocryphal Book of Isaiah, let him believe what is written in the Epistle to the Hebrews. 'They were sawn in sunder' refers to Isaiah, as also 'They were slain with the sword' refers to the death of Zechariah, who, as our Lord has told us, was slain 'between the temple and the altar,'² confirming, as I think, by His own testimony some scripture not disclosed in books which are in common use, but in apocryphal books, a scripture which is very likely still in existence."³

Origen does not indicate the apocryphal work or works in which he supposes the martyrdom of Zechariah and of Ezekiel to be recorded. But an apocryphal book known as the "Ascension of Isaiah" was familiar to

¹ Migne, *Origen*, iii. col. 1636 and col. 1657.

² Matt. xxiii. 36.

³ Migne, *Origen*, iii. col. 882.

the early Fathers. After having been lost to the Western Church during many centuries, it was rediscovered by Dr. Bruce during his travels in Abyssinia, and a manuscript of it was presented by him to the University of Oxford, together with the manuscript of the Book of Enoch. Archbishop Laurence translated it from the Ethiopic in the year 1819—giving it priority to the Book of Enoch. It was found to contain a description of the death of Isaiah by being sawn in pieces with a wooden axe, thus confirming the statement of Origen. A new edition of the "Ascension of Isaiah" was published in 1900 by the Rev. Dr. Charles. In his opinion it consists of three distinct works, namely the "Martyrdom of Isaiah," which was written in pre-Christian times, and the "Vision of Isaiah" and the "Testament of Hezekiah," both of which were of Christian authorship.

George Syncellus, in his *Chronographia*, mentions a book called the "Apocalypse of Moses," and says that the words of St. Paul in Galatians v. 6 and in Galatians vi. 15,

"Neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature,"

are quoted from this work. The sentiment con-

tained in this text is incompatible with Jewish authorship; and it has been thought that the work referred to by Syncellus must have been some production of a Christian author who copied the language of St. Paul. The "Apocalypse of Moses" has, however, been generally accepted, on the authority of Cedrenus the historian, as identical with "Little Genesis," which again, as Epiphanius and others tell us, was only another name for the Book of Jubilees. This was certainly a Hebrew work, and one which could not conceivably have contained such a passage as the supposed quotation. The assertion of Syncellus must be altogether mistaken.

The Book of Jubilees, though not the source of this text or, I believe, of any other text in the New Testament, is an apocryphal work of much interest and importance. It was familiar to the Church in the earlier centuries of the Christian era, but was afterwards lost, and only rediscovered in a fragmentary condition in Abyssinia in the year 1840. The Ethiopic text was published in England in 1859. It is understood that an English translation of the text is in course of preparation. The Book of Jubilees is believed to be founded largely on Enoch, and, like that work, it con-

tains much information regarding the angels. Though not quoted in the New Testament, it serves to explain certain passages therein which have occasioned much difficulty to commentators.

In Acts vii. 3 we are told that the law was received "by the disposition of angels." In Galatians iii. 19 we read that the law was "ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator"; and, again, in Hebrews ii. 2 the law is described as "the word spoken by angels." There have been many conjectures as to the meaning of these texts. The explanation appears in Jubilees i. 99-102, where it is stated that the law was delivered to Moses, not immediately by Jehovah but through the agency and intervention of "the Presence Angel."

Of the suggested quotations from uncanonical writers mentioned in this chapter, it will be observed that in six instances the quotation is prefaced by words which are always elsewhere employed by the New Testament writers in introducing quotations from the Old Testament (John vii. 38, "As the Scripture hath said." James iv. 5, "The Scripture saith." 1 Corinthians ii. 9, "As it is written." Ephesians v. 14, "He saith." Matthew xxvii. 9, 10,

"Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by the prophets." Matthew ii. 23, "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets"). In the last two cases it is possible that the quotation may have come from the Old Testament. In the other four cases it seems clear that uncanonical Scriptures were quoted. And though the method of citation does not perhaps necessarily imply a belief that the works cited were inspired, there is at any rate a strong presumption that this belief was entertained.

Turning from the form to the substance of these quotations, there are only two cases in which the borrowed passages can possibly be cited *as prophetic*. If Matthew xxvii. 9, 10 is really taken from Zechariah, and if Matthew ii. 23 is really taken from Judges, they must be regarded as "typical" prophecies. If they are taken from apocryphal sources, they *may* of course be cases of direct prediction, but on the other hand they may still be prophecies of a purely "typical" character, and as such undistinguishable from mere "literary allusions."

Not one of the suggested quotations referred to in this chapter is cited *as authoritative* in the sense of being used as the foundation of

doctrine, though those contained in Ephesians v. 14 and James iv. 5 are cited in support of homiletics.

All the remaining cases come under the class of *historical references*, or under that of *literary allusions*. The latter are unimportant so far as concerns any inference as to the inspirational status of the book cited. And I doubt whether it can be said that any of what I have called, for the sake of brevity, the "historical references" are so made as to necessarily imply a belief in the truth of the incidents related. The use made, for instance, of the story of St. Michael and Satan, or that of Jannes and Jambres, by the sacred writers is at least consistent with the idea that they were alluding to well-known religious fictions.

The degree in which the writers of the New Testament were influenced by uncanonical Scriptures cannot be measured by their quotations from them. The importance of demonstrating that uncanonical Scriptures are quoted in the New Testament lies principally in the presumption thereby afforded, that the works referred to, and other similar works, may have affected the form of Christian doctrine as it was presented to the world by the Evangelists and Apostles.

One of the most remarkable of modern treatises on apocryphal literature bears the title, *Books which Influenced our Lord and His Disciples*. In this book the Rev. Dr. E. H. Thomson gives an excellent summary and analysis of the Book of Enoch, the Assumption of Moses, and the Book of Jubilees, which have been referred to above, as also of the Eleventh of Daniel, the Psalter of Solomon, and the Apocalypse of Baruch. In his view these works stand, as it were, midway between the Old Testament and the New in the development of doctrine on some important points. He finds them in advance of the Old Testament in their conception of the Almighty, not merely as a national Deity but also as God of the universe and of each individual soul; in their more spiritual conception of the Messiah's advent; and in their loftier teaching with regard to the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, and the life in the world to come. Not very different is the opinion of the Rev. Dr. Charles, who in his great work on the *Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life in Israel*¹ very fully discusses the same apocalyptic

¹ Jowett Lecture, 1899. In addition to the works on Hebrew Apocalyptic discussed by Dr. Thomson, Dr. Charles examines

literature. Dr. Charles's immediate subject is Eschatology, but he shows in a most interesting and convincing manner that the doctrine of Immortality was intimately associated with the doctrine of the Messianic Kingdom, and that as Jewish conceptions of God and of the Messiah became more spiritual, so their belief in the immortality of the soul became more definite.

Old Testament Scripture is indeed restrained and vague, and, as it might appear, vacillating, in its references to the future life. The Jewish religion was primarily a religion of the nation, and the nation does not die. Its heaven is prosperity, and its hell decay. Right worship and right conduct were the themes which chiefly absorbed the thoughts of the writers of the Old Testament. Is it possible that there was an esoteric doctrine, an inner religion of the individual soul, which coexisted with the observance of the law and the worship of the Temple? This question is suggested by the study of apocryphal works such as some of those which have been mentioned, and parts of which may

the "Twelve Patriarchs," "Fourth Esdras," and "Sibylline Oracles." He also comments upon the Alexandrian "deutero-canonical" works, pointing out that they are Sadducean in their denial of the resurrection of the body, though they asserted the immortality of the soul.

have come down from remote antiquity, containing, as we have seen they did, advanced and spiritual views on immortality.

The word "apocryphal," which has in our day acquired a bad sense, was not used in the early days of the Christian Church altogether as a term of disparagement. On the contrary, there is evidence that the "secrecy" of these books was very commonly regarded as implying a peculiar sanctity, as though their teaching were reserved for an inner circle of the spiritually-minded. The Jews, it is said, only repudiated these works when the significance of their high Messianic teaching became apparent in the light of the doctrine of the Apostles.

As the Christian Church tended towards the adoption of the Talmudic Canon of the Old Testament, so the "secret" books fell into disuse, and many of them passed into oblivion. In our own day they have been vulgarly regarded, without distinction, as gratuitous forgeries, and the name "apocryphal" has become almost synonymous with fraudulent. This idea of forgery has been favoured by the circumstance that the Hebrew uncanonical Scriptures are almost all pseudonymous. There is no great name in Old Testament history

which has not given a title to some work of this description.¹ It would seem as though the pious zeal which in our day expends itself in the production of the religious novel, found exercise during a period extending from at least 200 B.C. to 70 A.D. in the composition of imaginary visions and prophecies and parables, which were associated, not by way of pretence but as a matter of conformity to current literary fashion, with the names of Old Testament worthies. In compositions of this kind there was no more intention to deceive than in Landor's *Imaginary Conversations*.

During quite recent years the attitude of scholars towards apocryphal literature has undergone a change. The learned labours of men like Dr. Charles of Oxford and Dr. James of Cambridge have revived interest in a study which had long ago been abandoned as barren and unprofitable. One after another the uncanonical Scriptures which remain to us are being retranslated, and tested by new canons of criticism, and it is likely that quite a new estimate

¹ See the long list of uncanonical Scriptures enumerated and discussed in the Jesuit Sgambati's *Archiv. Vet. Test.* (anno 1703); also in Fabricius, *Pseud. Vet. Test.* (anno 1713)—both deeply interesting works. See also Migne's *Dictionary of Apocryphal Works*.

may be formed of the value of some of them which are still regarded by theologians with contemptuous indifference. And not only are the uncanonical Scriptures which we possess being investigated afresh, but also a systematic search has been commenced for those which have been lost. The libraries of Europe are being ransacked, and the archives of the Coptic, Armenian, and Slavonic Churches examined, in the hope of discovering treasures of religious literature such as have been yielded up by Abyssinia.

In post 8vo, price 2s. 6d.

THE TRIAL OF JESUS CHRIST. A LEGAL MONOGRAPH.

BY A. TAYLOR INNES, ADVOCATE.

With Two fine Engravings—(1) From Mr. Holman Hunt's "Finding of the Saviour in the Temple"; and (2) from a Bust of Tiberius as "Pontifex Maximus," found at Capri.

"Men have too much forgotten that the central event in history assumed the form of a judicial trial.

"The prodigious influence of the life and personality of Jesus of Nazareth is admitted by all. But His tragical death, early and pitiably accepted by Christianity as the significant fact of His career, has become more than any other incident the starting-point of modern history—His tomb, as Lamartine puts it, was the grave of the old world and the cradle of the new. Yet that memorable transaction was the execution of a capital sentence, proceeding upon a twofold criminal trial—upon one process conducted under Hebrew and one under Roman law.

"In its forensic aspect, as in some others, it is peculiar—perhaps unique. . . . When the two systems of law meet in the most striking and influential event that has ever happened, its investigation at once becomes not only interesting, but important. It becomes, undoubtedly, the most interesting isolated problem which historical jurisprudence can present."—*From the Author's Preface.*

"Mr. Innes gives what to most of his readers will be wholly new light and fresh thoughts. . . . This volume is a striking example of the value of the critical examination of historical problems by an accomplished lawyer."—*Times.*

"In the dry light of the trained analytical mind, the august tragedy, as Mr. Innes handles it in the course of his inquiry, is touched with a new gleam of realism."—*Academy.*

"How much there is that is wholly new; how much there is that is true and helpful! We do not study enough. We do not put questions enough. We are too content with the daily superficial reading. If Mr. Innes had done nothing more than above us the wealth of suggestion and information that lies in a single episode in our Redeemer's earthly life, he had done us a service indeed."—*Expository Times.*

"This deeply interesting study supplies a 'felt want' in English literature. . . . The realism of a juridical study of

"The deep damnation of His taking off' must give us paines and make us grateful. Nor are we sure that a more competent investigator could have been named for this task. . . . We earnestly commend the book for its carefulness and power, and for its commanding interest."—T. SHAW, Esq., K.C., M.P., in the *Critical Review.*

Mr. HOLMAN HUNT, R.A., writes to Mr. Taylor Innes: "Your book is a gift which is of imperishable value to me."

EDINBURGH: T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.

